Niccolò Machiavelli 君主论 The Prince

Niccolò Machiavelli 君主论 The Prince

君主论

维基百科 最后修订于2025年1月14日

《君主论》（意大利语：Il Principe，或翻译为《君王论》）是意大利文艺复兴时期作家尼科洛·马基雅维利的政治论著，于1513年献给洛伦佐二世·德·美第奇，但此书在马基雅维利死后第五年的1532年才公开出版。美第奇家族的教皇克莱门特七世允许书藉出版发行。

《君主论》篇幅不长，但由于书中主张有违常人道德观念，自手稿首次面世以来就争议不断。《君主论》的中心主题是“如有必要，君主是应该使用不道德的手段去实现目标（例如荣誉和生存）”：

对于一个君主来说，不仅不必具备各种美德，而且还要保留那些不会使自己亡国的恶行在守信和失信方面，君主应当效法狐狸与狮子

贬义词“马基雅维利主义”正由此书衍生出来，连带“政治”和“政客”也含有了贬义。

《君主论》有时被称为是现代哲学，特别是现代政治哲学的第一批著作，《君主论》仿佛是传统风格的作品，但人们普遍认为它特别具有创新性。部分原因是因为它是用意大利语而不是拉丁语编写的，自从但丁的《神曲》和其他文艺复兴时期文学作品出版以来，这种做法就越来越流行。

摘要

[编辑]
  • 在善良与恶行方面，对于一个君主来说，不仅不必具备各种美德，而且还要保留那些“不会使自己亡国”的恶行。
  • 在慷慨与吝啬方面，宁可被称吝啬，也不要因慷慨而让民众觉得横征暴敛，“在我们的时代里，我们看见只有那些曾经被称为吝啬的人们，才做出了伟大的事业；至于别的人，全都失败了。”[1]“明智之士宁愿承受吝啬之名，因其虽带来骂声但不会引起憎恨。倘追求慷慨之誉，则必招致贪婪之名，而贪婪之名则使骂声与憎恨俱来。”[2]
  • 在残暴和仁慈方面，君主对于残暴这个恶名不必介意，所应重视的倒是不要滥用仁慈，因为仁慈会带来灭顶之灾， “被人畏惧比受人爱戴是安全得多的”。[3]“因为关于人类，大致上可以这样说：他们是忘恩负义的、善变的，是伪装者、冒牌货，是趋利避害的。”[3]但君主要掌握好使用残暴手段的限度和范围，即要迅速做完一切恶行，对臣民的财产和他们的妻女不要染指。
  • 在守信和失信方面，君主应当效法狐狸与狮子。“由于狮子不能够防止自己落入陷阱，而狐狸则不能够抵御豺狼。因此，君主必须是一头狐狸以便认识陷阱，同时又必须是一头狮子，以便使豺狼惊骇。” [4]当遵守信义对自己不利，或原来使自己作出诺言的理由不复存在时，一位英明的君主绝不能够、也不应当遵守信义。但君主又必须深知怎样掩饰这种兽性，并需做一个伟大的伪装者和伪善者，要显得具备一切优良品质。“因为群氓总是被外表和事物的结果所吸引，而这个世界中尽是群氓。”[5]
  • 在尊重与轻视方面，君主必须要受人尊重，君主一定要学会避免那些可能使自己受到憎恨或轻视的事情。君主必须像提防暗礁一样提防被人认为变幻无常、轻率浅薄、软弱怯懦、优柔寡断，君主应该努力在行动中表现伟大、英勇、严肃庄重、坚忍不拔，使人们对自己抱有“谁都不要指望欺骗他或者瞒过他”的见解，这样才能对抗一切阴谋，坐稳江山。[6]
  • 在人民与贵族方面，君主应避免自己因袒护人民而受到贵族的责难，也要避免因袒护贵族而受到人民的非议，就应设立作为第三者的裁判机关（议会），而用不着君主担负责任。“对于国王和王国来说，世界上再没有比这个制度更好、更审慎，再没有比这个方法更安全的了。”[7]
  • 在施恩与负责方面，务必把担负责任的事情委诸他人办理，而把布惠施恩的事情由自己掌管。君主必须依靠行动，赢得伟大与才智非凡的声誉。当一位君主公开表示自己毫无保留地赞助某一方或反对另一方，他也会受到尊重，采取这种态度明确的办法，总是比保持中立更有用处。[8]
  • 在择才与辨奸方面，君主必须表明自己爱才，起用有才之人，对于各个行业中杰出的人物授予荣誉，激励公民在职业上能安心地从事其职务，给人民以欢乐。君主对待臣下一方面要使他感恩戴德、分享荣誉、分担职责，另一方面要避开谄媚者。
  • 总之，君主不应相信命运，要使自己的做法符合时代的特性，完成“将意大利从蛮族手中解放出来”的伟业。

分析

马基雅维利强调，有必要研究“有效真理”（verita effetuale），而不是依靠“想像中的共和国和公国”。他用比喻了光荣的行为和犯罪的行为之间的区别，他说：“有两种竞争方式，一种是依法进行的，另一种是通过武力进行的；第一种适用于人，第二种适用于人和野兽”。

马基雅维利在《君主论》中，也没有解释何为至善的道德或政治目标。马基雅维利认为，将来的君主自然会以荣誉或生存为目标。他将这些目标与美德和审慎视为良好政治所必不可少的。更多的美德，意味着更少的依赖偶然的机会，是马基雅维利时代受古典影响所产生的“人文常识”，即使这有争议。

然而，马基雅维利的进步远远超出了其他作家。他使用“美德”和“审慎”一词来指代追求荣誉和进取的品格，这与基督徒对这些用语的传统用法形成强烈反差，但更符合皈依基督信仰前的古希腊与古罗马时期的原始概念，马基雅维利鼓励野心和冒险精神。因此，在与传统的另一次突破中，他不仅考虑了稳定性，还考虑了彻底的创新。进行重大改革可以显君主的美德并赋予他荣耀。马基雅维利显然认为意大利在他的时代需要重大改革，并且他的观点得到了广泛认可。

马基雅维利的描述鼓励君主光荣地控制自己的命运，在某些情况下，尽管存在危险和必要的情况，但在某些情况下需要重新定义“模式和秩序”。

文章目录及概要

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  • 第一章 君主国的种类及其获得之方法 （Chapter I: Of the Various Kinds of Princedom, and of the Ways in Which They Are Acquired）
这一章里，作者区分了两种“君主国”，即世袭王国和新奠基缔造的王国，后者是本书讨论的主题，即那些推翻了原世袭王国从而得以建立新的家族统治的国家。
  • 第二章 论世袭君主国 （Chapter II: Of Hereditary Princedoms）
作者主要论述了世袭君主国的利弊，好处在于拥有较为稳固的统治，由于所谓的“习惯性倾向”，那些世代传承的统治法则早已被人民所接受，只要统治者不越矩，不做过分出格之事（例如荒淫无度），顺应民心安邦治国并非难事。而弊处也正在于墨守陈规遵循旧制而缺乏变革的意识，其终究将要被历经改革得以强盛的新兴国家所侵犯。正如本章结尾所总结那样“历史发展的规律以无可辩驳的事实表明：每一个变革总是为新变革做准备，并促成另一个新的变革的发生！”
  • 第三章 论混合君主国 （Chapter III: Of Mixed Princedoms）
相较于世袭制王国，混合君主国的统治难度要大的多。作为被征服土地的原有居民在心理上自然而然地会有对征服者的抵触感，如何巩固新政权是征服者面临的首要问题。对此作者给予了较为细致的分析。他区分了两种情况：
  • 第一种：当新的领土从与征服者语言、风俗习惯等较为接近的国土中征服而来时，新统治者需要从两方面做起：
  • 其一，通俗的说法即是“斩草除根，永绝后患”。对所征服土地尚存的旧势力残党，予以彻底消灭。
  • 其二，维持该地区原有的语言，风俗习惯、法律等社会规范，给予一定程度的尊重。
  • 第二种：当新的领土是从与征服者语言、风俗习惯等存在较大差异的国土中征服而来时：
  • 其一，新的统治者应实行的最有效的方法是，君主亲自押阵，驻营扎寨，以防暴乱。好处在于即使出现叛乱事件也可以及时镇压；同时还可防止财富被不法官吏所掠夺；最后，能够及时解决当地臣民的申冤求助。总之利大于弊。
  • 其二，一种既省事又经济的治理方法是建立殖民地，其原则是尽可能把对当地原有居民的损害降至最低。作者在此还分析了建立武装部队的弊端，即浪费大量财力，同时极易激起当地被征服居民的反抗。由此可见建立殖民地是安定新邦的有力措施。
除了以上两种统治措施外，作者特别指出需要重视外国势力的渗透，提防那些被征服的弱小领地为了生存而投靠境外势力颠覆自己的行径。
  • 第四章 论亚历山大大帝所征服的大流士王国在其崩逝后为何未反抗新君 （Chapter IV: Why the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander, Did Not, on Alexander's Death, Rebel Against His Successors）
作者给出的答案是被征服者的性质造成的。大流士王国是一个绝对君权统治的国家，这种国家难于攻打但易于统治。为此他在本章开头就分析了两种不同性质的君主治理类型：
  • 第一种是君主以绝对君权统治的国家，如土耳其。这种国家里，君主之下都是没有实权的奴才，很难渗透这种层层严密的中央集权统治而分化之，离间之。但也正因为这种“一人独大”的局面，一旦君主被强力征服，其下的层层官员也将不堪一击。
  • 第二种是君主和贵族同治的国家，如法兰西。可以说政局复杂，各种牵制关系、利益和矛盾纠结，外部势力可以较为轻易的收买分化各种不同势力从而最终使其毁灭。但同时也正因为复杂的利益关系和那些残存的贵族势力可能产生的新的不满和变革欲，使得新生的政权极易再次陷入毁灭的境地。
大流士王国正是属于第一种类型，因此亚历山大付出巨大代价将其击溃，但之后却可以较为稳固实施统治，正如书中所言：“假如亚历山大的继承者们能够团结一致的话，那么他们永久地享有这片土地是不成问题的；假如他们不因为起内讧而引起一系列的纠纷，那个王国是不会出现其他乱子的。”[9]
  • 第五章 论占领前自有法律之城市或君主国当如何统治 （Chapter V: How Cities or Provinces Which Before Their Acquisition Have Lived Under Their Own Laws Are To Be Governed）
作者认为有三种方法可以选择：
  • 第一种：彻底摧毁原有法律条文等旧制。
  • 第二种：征服者坐镇被征服地亲自统治。
  • 第三种：尊重原有法律等制度，但需要按期进贡，且建立一个忠心的“寡头制”政府。
作者举出了斯巴达在雅典和底比斯，罗马在征服希腊建立“寡头制”失败的例子来证明第三种选择的不可靠。而最好的办法即是第一种和第二种。如作者所指出的那样：“任何一个人要想成为一个自由城市的新生统治者，若不以摧毁这个城市作先决条件，那么他所得到的报应则是坐以待毙。”因为原有居民随时可以恢复旧有统治秩序下的自由和法律为理由起义推翻现有统治，这种所谓的“复仇”心理使得新生的政权面临很大的威胁，所以君主可以选择彻底将之毁灭或者亲自加以统治。
  • 第六章 论以武以德建立之新君主国 （Chapter VI: Of New Princedoms Which a Prince Acquires With His Own Arms and by Merit）
由于巩固新政权的重重困难，使得唯有强力的措施才更加有效。“当人们不再有信仰的时候，就只能依靠武力迫使他们就范。”[10]
统治者的成功是自身才能和外在机会的共同产物。但依靠自身的才能是更为重要的，且这种统治更为长久有效。作者为此举了叙拉古希伦二世的例子，希伦二世通过自身的努力，例如广交朋友，组建新军、审慎地选择盟友等建立自己的王国，由卑微的庶民一跃为古老城邦的最高统治者—叙拉古之王。
  • 第七章 论借兵或幸运建立之新君主国 （Chapter VII: Of New Princedoms Acquired By the Aid of Others and By Good Fortune）
通过他人的部队，或是透过运气而获取君主国，统治难度要高得多，因为既不可靠也不稳定，君主既不容易去维护，也没有能力保持自己的君位。作者为此也给出了自己解决措施，君主为了确保新邦免遭侵犯，就有必要争取外交、建立军队、巧施计谋，有必要消灭要加害自己的人，甚至有必要时也可以消灭有二心的军队，再创一支新军。对外交也需要重视，应该使外国君主殷殷勤勤地帮助自己，或者诚惶诚恐地服从自己。也因此对恶名昭彰的凯撒·波吉亚给予高度赞赏。
  • 第八章 论以罪行建国之君主 （Chapter VIII: Of Those Who By Their Crimes Come to Be Princes）
仰赖罪刑建国，确实是邪恶的，但阿加托克利斯那样无比奸诈、残暴的人，反而能够稳固自己的统治，这在作者看来是恰当地使用残暴手段的结果，所以君主应审时度势施暴。正如文中所说：“恶行应该一次把它干完，以便老百姓少受一些损害，老百姓的积怨就少些；相反，恩惠应该是一点一点地赐予，以便百姓能够好好品尝恩惠的滋味。”[11]总之，最重要的就是君主要学会与百姓和谐相处。
  • 第九章 论市民之君主国 （Chapter IX: Of the Civil Princedom）
市民之君主国是受到本国市民拥戴而建立的国家，包括民众和贵族两种方式的拥戴而成。由于民众的目的比贵族的目的更加公正，民众需要的仅仅是不受压迫，而贵族则需要得更多，受本性驱使，贵族还希望可以压迫他人。因此，如果是受民众支持而被拥戴为君主，应与民众保持友好关系即可。而如果是凭借贵族力量而成为君主，那么争取民众的支持，更是首要的任务。此外，作者特别指出了赢得民心的最好办法并非是一成不变的，重要的是因地制宜。
  • 第十章 论衡量所有君主国力量之道 （Chapter X: How the Strength of All Princedoms Should Be Measured）
君主的统治依赖于自身，同时又需要他人力量的援助。因此，作为一个明君，首先需要做的是建立稳固的防卫措施，准备充足的粮食，以备将来遭受敌人的侵袭后可以坚定民众的意志。
  • 第十一章 论教会君主国 （Chapter XI: Of Ecclesiastical Princedoms）
教会君主国统治难度较小，最为安宁和稳定，因为依靠强大的宗教信仰的力量，如同奥古斯丁所说的上帝之城，君主完全可以实行稳固统治，即使在外敌入侵的情况下，臣民也必将遵循内心的准则而坚定地效忠君主，而非背信弃义，这正是信仰力量的伟大之处，它要比单纯依靠武力的桎梏更为有效。
  • 第十二章 论军队的种类与雇佣军 （Chapter XII: How Many Different Kinds of Soldiers There Are, and of Mercenaries）
作者认为稳固统治的保障在于“拥有健全的制度、完善的法律和优良的军队”[12]作者此处着重指出了军队的重要性，认为所谓的雇佣军是极为危险的，他们仅仅为了获得微薄的军饷而在战场上作战，毫无忠义之心，作者更直接了当指出了当时意大利崩溃衰亡的原因正是过分依赖雇佣军的结果。
此外，作者还分析了雇佣军的起源，由于教会神权对于世俗王权的胜利，意大利落入了教会和部分建立共和国的市民手中，不识治国尤其是军队治理之道的他们，只有雇佣大量外国军人为其作战，雇佣军由此产生。建立在这种赤裸裸的“雇佣关系”基础上的军队必然不会全心投入作战，正如马基维利所指出的那样：“战斗中他们尽量不进行屠杀而是活捉俘虏，而且战后不要求敌方赎金即将俘虏大赦释放。他们并不夜袭城市，城市的防军亦不夜袭野营。他们在军队的周围既不树立栅栏，或者挖掘壕沟建筑工事，也不在冬季出征作战。而所有这些又都是他们的兵法所允许的，并且这也是他们为着避免疲劳和危险这两者而想出来的绝招。”[13]
  • 第十三章 论援军、混合军以及本国军队 （Chapter XIII: Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and National Arms）
援军即是“当一个君主面临窘境，便请求一个强国进行援助和保卫自己的时候派来的军队”[14]相比于雇佣军，求助于强国外援的危险要更大。由于援军本身即是一支训练有素的队伍，内部结构层次紧密，团结一致，且完全听命于他国君主，对于君主来说如同一个“强悍的侵略者”，国家也随时可能面临毁灭的危险。可以说，不管是雇佣军还是强国外援，借助他人的力量取得的胜利，不是真正的胜利。
  • 第十四章 论君主对于军事之责 （Chapter XIV: Of the Duty of a Prince In Respect of Military Affairs）
作者认为君主在军事方面的职责包括：“从事战争、军事制度和纪律以及军事方面的研究”[15]。身为君主如果不懂军事，就会遭到蔑视，试想一个白丁如何让铠甲之徒（军队）信服。其次身为一个全然不知用兵的君主，苟且安身于武装的臣仆之中，也是不合情理的。
君主可以通过两种途径来提高自己的军事素养：
  • 第一种:行动。如经常地参与狩猎活动，锻炼身体，以适应艰苦的生活环境；此外，还要专注于战争专业的研究。作者于此特别指出地理知识的重要性，君主要全面了解各种地理地形，知道如何使用军事手段保卫国土。同时通过举一反三，以此很容易地推断出其他相似地区的相关知识。
  • 凭心智方面思考。培养思维能力，重在阅读历史，深入研究在历史上声名显赫的历史人物，树立楷模以此效仿。
  • 第十五章 论世人尤其君主之褒贬 （Chapter XV: Of the Qualities In Respect of Which Men, and Most of all Princes, Are Praised or Blamed）
作者强调自己关注于现实的真实情况而非不切实际的想象。对於哲学史上哲学家们所构想出的众多理想王国（如柏拉图的《理想国》，亚里士多德《政治学》中所构想的城邦）。因而君主重在根据具体情况采取适合的治国方略，善于审时度势，明辨真伪。
  • 第十六章 论慷概与吝啬 （Chapter XVI: Of Liberality and Miserliness）
在慷慨和吝啬两种性格中，作者认为君主更应该追求吝啬。从常识上来说，慷慨显然是一种善行，而吝啬则多为贬义。但作者却认为，君主为慷慨不得不挥霍钱财，大肆攫取财富，而向人民大量课金，以保有慷慨之虚名。相比之下，随着时间的推移，人民看到那些吝啬的君主，通过勤俭节约，而逐渐积累财富以建设国家、抗击侵略之时，态度自然转变。明君宁可接受吝啬之名，也不要遭受人民的憎恨。
  • 第十七章 论残忍与慈仁，受人爱戴与受人畏惧之利弊 （Chapter XVII: Of Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether It Is Better To Be Loved or Feared）
作者认为，相比于慈仁，残忍更有利于统治。原因在于过分仁德以至纵容凶杀劫掠危害整个社会秩序，最终使国家陷入危难之中。必要的强力手段虽会使人畏惧，但却不会使人憎恨。正如文章所说：“一个被人畏惧，同时又不为人们所憎恨的君主，就是一个成功的君主。”[16]
此外，作者还给出了另一个理由：“人们之所以爱君主，是基于他们自己的意志；而畏惧君主，则是基于君主的意志。因此，一位明君办任何事情，都应当将自己的地位及自己的意志建立在自己能够控制的方面，而不能立足在他人的意志之上。”[17]
  • 第十八章 论君主守信之道 （Chapter XVIII: How Princes Should Keep his word）
守信是一种美好的品德，但在持性恶观点的作者看来，人根本做不到守信不渝、忠诚不二，因为人本身具有兽性的一面，而这必须诉诸武力才可予以制服。
其次，君主还需效仿狐狸学会掩饰自己的兽性，但在必要时刻要学会察言观色、见风使舵。为了维护国家的统治，背信弃义、不讲仁慈甚至违反教义、清规，这在作者看来都是合理的。但是这并非是鼓励作恶，而只是在迫不得已的情况下才会如此，道义上我们不应违背善道。
  • 第十九章 论君主应避免受鄙视及憎恨 （Chapter XIX: That a Prince Should Seek to Escape Contempt and Hatred）
本章主要论述了君主如何免遭人民的鄙视和憎恨，为此他举了大量实例来做论证。首先，作者分析了君主受人鄙视的原因，即喜怒无常、轻率浅薄、软弱怯懦和优柔寡断的特质。因此君主需要建立威严庄重、坚忍不拔的形象，让人民甘心臣服于他，君主的职责也在于充分满足人民需要，使之安居乐业。
作者认为当时法国是统治秩序最好的国家。原因在于他们设立了众多优越的制度，议会既是其中之一。作为一个第三方的裁判机构，它的设立既可以起到约束贵族从而保护平民的作用，同时还可以确保君主免于承担责任。作者由此得出结论：“君主务必委诸他人办理承担责任之事，并亲自施恩布德。同时又可推出以下结论：君主既要呵护贵族，又不能因此使人民对自己产生怨恨。”[18]
  • 第二十章 论城堡以及其他许多君主习用策略之利弊 （Chapter XX: Whether Fortresses, and Certain Other Expedients to Which Princes Often Have Recourse, are Profitable or Hurtful）
城堡是抵御外敌、保卫国家的有利措施。但作者却认为，判断城堡是否有利要具体问题具体分析：“一位君主如果害怕人民更甚于外国人，他就应当建筑城堡；如果他害怕外国人更甚于人民，他就应当摧毁城堡。”[19]城堡并非万能的，仅仅依赖城堡，而无视本国人民，是该被谴责的。
  • 第二十一章 论君主获得声望的行事准则 （Chapter XXI: How a Prince Should Bear Himself So As to Acquire Reputation）
君主获得声望的最佳做法既是做出惊天动地的伟业，并尽情施展自己的才能，西班牙国王费尔南多二世即是一个典型例子。
作者认为在外交上，需要坚定地选择支持或反对，中立是不明智的，应该选择加入一方并支持其作战。原因在于“如果你不公开表态，最终也会成为那个胜者的战利品，而败者也将讥笑你，遇此情形，你还提不出任何言辞来为自己抗辩，或者找别人来庇护你。”[20]在选择支持哪一方问题上，作者认为，君主投靠一个实力强于自己的国家，结果必为阶下囚。君主要极力避免陷入任人摆布的境地，要审慎选择，而非草率行事。
君主也要做到珍惜人才，任人惟贤，激励人们工作尽职。同时还要尊重人们的风俗习惯，适时给与人们假期以欢度节日，重视并给与各种社会团体特殊关照，但尊重之余，君主始终要保持自己的权威和尊严。
  • 第二十二章 论君主之大臣 （Chapter XXII: Of the Secretaries of Princes）
对君主来说，如何选取大臣是检验其统治才能高低的重要标准。作者给出了自己的判断准则：那些过于关注自己私人利益超过他人利益的大臣绝不是好大臣，君主要对此予以警惕。
此外，君主也要采取措施让大臣尽心尽责地臣服于自己。方法在于给予他们必要恩惠同时又让其分担职责。
  • 第二十三章 论远佞之道 （Chapter XXIII: That Flatterers Should Be Shunned）
诌媚小人自古都是正义社会的毒瘤，对于君主来说，小人的谗言更是必须提防的，需要臣民敢于说真话而非粉饰太平，但是敢于直言在一定程度上也是对君主威严的一种挑战。为此作者自己给出解决方法，即选拔有识之士有限度的参论时政，给予他们充分的发言权，但前提是君主必须保持自己的绝对权威性，君主的意愿是起主导作用的。即：只是对于君主有意征询的问题，才允许臣民献言、献策。本章结尾作者给出了精妙的论断：“君主的贤明未必出自良好的忠言；而一切良好的忠言，不论来自何人，必然处于君主的贤明。”[21]
  • 第二十四章 论意大利诸君主失国之因 （Chapter XXIV: Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States）
作为一个具有强烈爱国热情的公民，作者致力于为祖国的统一稳定而探索实践。作者仔细考察那个时代意大利各个君主，如那不勒斯国王以及米兰公爵失国原因，主要在于：没有一支强大稳定的军队；君主缺乏治国之策而失去人民的拥护和贵族的效忠。而在作者看来，君主唯有依靠自身的实力才可解决统治危机。
  • 第二十五章 论命运如何影响人间及如何应急 （Chapter XXV: What Fortune Can Effect in Human Affairs, and How She May Be Withstood）
大凡遇到不如意之事，世人终将一切归于天命的造化而自求安慰。但作者却是个积极的抗争者：“命运是我们行动的半个主宰，但是它留下其余一半或者几乎一半归我们支配。”我们需要依赖主动性。完全听任命运的支配即是统治垮台之日。但是需要注意的是，我们的决策必须顺应环境时代的变化，并且勇于直面命运的挑战。
  • 第二十六章 将意大利从蛮族手中解放的劝告 （Chapter XXVI: An Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians）
作为全书的总结，作者实际表明了自己决心，从蛮族手中解放意大利，对统一富强的意大利的美好憧憬。

影响

这本书曾被视为改变世界的16本书之一（见美国学者道恩斯《改变世界的书》），与《圣经》、《资本论》等书并列。本书是西方许多君主、领袖学习统治术的经典。相传本书是“英王查理一世爱不释手；英国护国公克伦威尔珍藏着它的手稿影本；法王亨利四世被刺杀时，人们发现他贴身带的，竟然是一部染血的《君主论》；普鲁士腓特烈大帝把它作为自己决策的依据；路易十四，这位赫赫有名的法国国王，每晚必温习此书，并说：“不读此书不能高枕而眠”；拿破仑对《君主论》也百读不厌，胜利的联军在清扫滑铁卢战场时，从缴获的拿破仑的御车中，发现了一本他写满批注的《君主论》；希特勒放在床边经常从中汲取力量；墨索里尼称之为政治家的指南……”。[22][23]

解读

基督徒观点认为《君主论》的政治理论邪恶令人震惊。即使放在当时的历史背景下来看，仍然是过分而不可接受的，“马基雅维利主义”一词因而产生，特地描绘“为达到目而不择手段”，以及“表面仁厚实则残忍的虚伪政治”等等特质。

但是，也有人认为“为达目的而可以不择手段”的观点是对于马基雅维利的误读，因为马基雅维利也指出了邪恶手段的一些限制，首先，他指出只有维持稳定和繁荣才是国家可以追求的正当目标，个人为了其利益而不择手段则不是正当的目标，而且也不能正当化邪恶的手段。再者，马基雅维利并没有完全否定道德的存在，也并非鼓吹完全的自私或堕落。英国政治哲学家昆廷·斯金纳在《近代政治思想的基础》中指出过：“对于马基雅维利就像对于其他人文主义者一样，美德这个概念被用来指一种不可或缺的品质，这种品质能使统治者使令人的厌恶命运的打击和箭头转向并从而立志取得荣誉、荣耀和名声。”在〈意大利君主们失国之因〉一章中，马基维利认为一位新君主要巩固新政权，首先需要意识到的是：“使用那些建立在你自己的行动和美德之上的方法才是“唯一正确和持久的方法。”。此外马基雅维利明白澄清了他的定义，以及采取残忍手段的前提（必须要快速、有效、而且短期）。

解读为讽刺

有学者认为该书的目的是对专制君主的讽刺。卢梭在《民约论》中提到该书是为了向读者展示共和相对专制的优点。安东尼奥·葛兰西认为该书不是写给统治阶级看的，而是写给老百姓看的。因为统治阶级本来就会接受这种教育，不需要看这本书。

参见

法家

The Prince

From Wikipedia

The Prince (Italian: Il Principe [il ?print?ipe]; Latin: De Principatibus) is a 16th-century political treatise written by the Italian diplomat, philosopher, and political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli in the form of a realistic instruction guide for new princes. The Prince shocked many readers by assuming that immoral acts are justifiable if they achieve political glory.[1]

From Machiavelli's correspondence, a version was apparently being written in 1513, using a Latin title, De Principatibus (Of Principalities).[2] However, the printed version was not published until 1532, five years after Machiavelli's death. This was carried out with the permission of the Medici pope Clement VII, but "long before then, in fact since the first appearance of The Prince in manuscript, controversy had swirled about his writings".[3]

Although The Prince was written as if it were a traditional work in the mirrors for princes style, it was generally agreed as being especially innovative. This is partly because it was written in the vernacular Italian rather than Latin, a practice that had become increasingly popular since the publication of Dante's Divine Comedy and other works of Renaissance literature.[4][5] Machiavelli illustrates his reasoning using remarkable comparisons of classical, biblical, and medieval events, including many seemingly positive references to the murderous career of Cesare Borgia, which occurred during Machiavelli's own diplomatic career.

The Prince is sometimes claimed to be one of the first works of modern philosophy, especially modern political philosophy, in which practical effect is taken to be more important than any abstract ideal. Its world view came in direct conflict with the dominant Catholic and scholastic doctrines of the time, particularly those on politics and ethics.[6][7]

This short treatise is the most remembered of Machiavelli's works, and the most responsible for the later pejorative use of the word "Machiavellian". It even contributed to the modern negative connotations of the words "politics" and "politician" in Western countries.[8] In subject matter, it overlaps with the much longer Discourses on Livy, which was written a few years later. In its use of near-contemporary Italians as examples of people who perpetrated criminal deeds for political ends, another lesser-known work by Machiavelli to which The Prince has been compared is the Life of Castruccio Castracani.

 

Summary

[edit]
Each part of The Prince has attracted extensive commentary over centuries. Machiavelli's writings continue to provoke examination of leadership and government, posing age-old issues regarding the nature of power and the decisions that rulers must make to preserve it.[9]

Letter to Lorenzo de' Medici, Duke of Urbino

[edit]
Machiavelli prefaces his work with an introductory letter to Lorenzo de' Medici, Duke of Urbino, the recipient of his work.

The subject matter: New Princedoms (Chapters 1 and 2)

[edit]
The Prince starts by describing its subject. In the first sentence, Machiavelli uses the word "state" (Italian stato, which could also mean "status") to cover, in neutral terms, "all forms of organization of supreme political power, whether republican or princely". How the word "state" acquired its modern meaning during the Renaissance has been the subject of much academic debate, with this sentence and similar ones in the works of Machiavelli being considered particularly important.[10]

Machiavelli explained here that The Prince is about princedoms, indicating that he has written about republics elsewhere, which is a reference to the Discourses on Livy. Commentators note that in fact he mixes discussion of republics into this work in many places, effectively treating republics as a type of princedom with many strengths. More importantly, and less traditionally, he distinguishes new princedoms from established hereditary princedoms.[11] He deals with hereditary princedoms quickly in Chapter 2, saying that they are much easier to rule. For such a prince, "unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him".[12] Gilbert (1938:19–23), comparing this claim to traditional presentations of advice for princes, wrote that the novelty in chapters 1 and 2 is the "deliberate purpose of dealing with a new ruler who will need to establish himself in defiance of custom". Normally, these types of works were addressed only to hereditary princes. He thinks Machiavelli may have been influenced by Tacitus as well as his own experience.

This categorization of regime types is also "un-Aristotelian"[13] and apparently simpler than the traditional one found for example in Aristotle's Politics, which divides regimes into those ruled by a single monarch, an oligarchy, or by the people, in a democracy.[14] Machiavelli also ignores the classical distinctions between the good and corrupt forms, for example between monarchy and tyranny.[15]

"Mixed" princedoms (Chapters 3–5)

[edit]
New princedoms are either totally new or they are "mixed", meaning that they are new parts of an older state, already belonging to that prince.[16]

New conquests added to older states (Chapter 3)

[edit]
Machiavelli generalizes that there were several virtuous Roman ways to hold a newly acquired province, using a republic as an example of how new princes can act:

  • to install one's princedom in the new acquisition, or to install colonies of one's people there, which is better.
  • to indulge the lesser powers of the area without increasing their power.
  • to put down the powerful people.
  • not to allow a foreign power to gain reputation.
More generally, Machiavelli emphasizes that one should have regard not only for present problems but also for the future ones. One should not "enjoy the benefit of time", but rather the benefit of one's virtue and prudence, because time can bring evil, as well as good.

Machiavelli notes in this chapter on the "natural and ordinary desire to acquire" and as such, those who act on this desire can be "praised or blamed" depending on the success of their acquisitions. He then goes into detail about how the King of France failed in his conquest of Italy, even saying how he could have succeeded. Machiavelli views doing harm to enemies as a necessity, stating, "if an injury is to be done to a man, it should be so severe that the prince is not in fear of revenge".[17]

Conquered kingdoms (Chapter 4)

[edit]
A 16th-century Italian impression of the family of Darius III, emperor of Persia, before their conqueror, Alexander the Great: Machiavelli explained that in his time the Near East was again ruled by an empire, the Ottoman Empire, with similar characteristics to that of Darius—seen from the viewpoint of a potential conqueror.
In some cases, the old king of the conquered kingdom depended on his lords; 16th-century France, or in other words France as it was at the time of writing of The Prince, is given by Machiavelli as an example of such a kingdom. These are easy to enter, but difficult to hold.

When the kingdom revolves around the king, with everyone else his servant, then it is difficult to enter, but easy to hold. The solution is to eliminate the old bloodline of the prince. Machiavelli used the Persian empire of Darius III, conquered by Alexander the Great, to illustrate this point, and then noted that if one considers it, they will find this historical example similar to the "kingdom of the Turk" (Ottoman Empire) in their time – making this a potentially easier conquest to hold than France would be.[18]

Conquered free states, with their own laws and orders (Chapter 5)

[edit]
Gilbert (1938:34) notes that this chapter is quite atypical of any previous books for princes. Gilbert supposed the need to discuss conquering free republics is linked to Machiavelli's project to unite Italy, which contained some free republics. As he also notes, the chapter in any case makes it clear that holding such a state is highly difficult for a prince. Machiavelli gives three options:

  • Ruin them, as Rome destroyed Carthage, and also as Machiavelli says the Romans eventually had to do in Greece.[19]
  • Go to live there and rule it personally.
  • Keep the state intact, but install an oligarchy.
Machiavelli advises the ruler to go the first route, stating that if a prince does not destroy a city, he can expect "to be destroyed by it".[20]

Totally new states (Chapters 6–9)

[edit]

Conquests by virtue (Chapter 6)

[edit]
Machiavelli described Moses as a conquering prince, who founded new modes and orders by force of arms, which he used willingly to kill many of his own people. Other sources describe the reasons behind his success differently.
Princes who rise to power through their own skill and resources (their "virtue") rather than luck tend to have a hard time rising to the top, but once they reach the top they are very secure in their position. This is because they effectively crush their opponents and earn great respect from everyone else. Because they are strong and more self-sufficient, they have to make fewer compromises with their allies.

Machiavelli writes that reforming an existing order is one of the most dangerous and difficult things a prince can do. Part of the reason is that people are naturally resistant to change and reform. Those who benefited from the old order will resist change very fiercely, and those who may stand to benefit from the new order will be less enthusiastic in their support, because the new order is unfamiliar and they are not certain it will live up to its promises. Moreover, it is impossible for the prince to satisfy everybody's expectations. Inevitably, he will disappoint some of his followers. Therefore, a prince must have the means to force his supporters to keep supporting him even when they start having second thoughts, otherwise he will lose his power. Only armed prophets, like Moses, succeed in bringing lasting change. Machiavelli claims that Moses killed uncountable numbers of his own people in order to enforce his will.

Machiavelli was not the first thinker to notice this pattern. Allan Gilbert wrote: "In wishing new laws and yet seeing danger in them Machiavelli was not himself an innovator,"[21] because this idea was traditional and could be found in Aristotle's writings. But Machiavelli went much further than any other author in his emphasis on this aim, and Gilbert associates Machiavelli's emphasis upon such drastic aims with the level of corruption to be found in Italy.

Conquest by fortune, meaning by someone else's virtue (Chapter 7)

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According to Machiavelli, when a prince comes to power through luck or the blessings of powerful figures within the regime, he typically has an easy time gaining power but a hard time keeping it thereafter, because his power is dependent on his benefactors' goodwill. He does not command the loyalty of the armies and officials that maintain his authority, and these can be withdrawn from him at a whim. Having risen the easy way, it is not even certain such a prince has the skill and strength to stand on his own feet.

This is not necessarily true in every case. Machiavelli cites Cesare Borgia as an example of a lucky prince who escaped this pattern. Through cunning political maneuvers, he managed to secure his power base. Cesare was made commander of the papal armies by his father, Pope Alexander VI, but was also heavily dependent on mercenary armies loyal to the Orsini brothers and the support of the French king. Borgia won over the allegiance of the Orsini brothers' followers with better pay and prestigious government posts. To pacify the Romagna, he sent in his henchman, Remirro de Orco, to commit acts of violence. When Remirro started to become hated for his actions, Borgia responded by ordering him to be "cut in two" to show the people that the cruelty was not from him, although it was.[22] When some of his mercenary captains started to plot against him, he had them captured and executed. When it looked as though the king of France would abandon him, Borgia sought new alliances.

Finally, Machiavelli makes a point that bringing new benefits to a conquered people will not be enough to cancel the memory of old injuries, an idea Allan Gilbert said can be found in Tacitus and Seneca the Younger.[23]

Of Those Who Have Obtained a Principality Through Crimes (Chapter 8)

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Conquests by "criminal virtue" are ones in which the new prince secures his power through cruel, immoral deeds, such as the elimination of political rivals.

Machiavelli offers two rulers to imitate, Agathocles of Syracuse and Oliverotto Euffreducci. After Agathocles became Praetor of Syracuse, he called a meeting of the city's elite. At his signal, his soldiers killed all the senators and the wealthiest citizens, completely destroying the old oligarchy. He declared himself ruler with no opposition. So secure was his power that he could afford to absent himself to go off on military campaigns in Africa.

Machiavelli then states that the behavior of Agathocles is not simply virtue, as he says, "Yet one cannot call it virtue to kill one's citizens, betray one's friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; these modes can enable one to acquire empire, but not glory. [...] Nonetheless, his savage cruelty and inhumanity, together with his infinite crimes, do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent men. Thus, one cannot attribute to fortune or virtue what he achieved without either."

Machiavelli then goes to his next example, Oliverotto de Fermo, an Italian condottiero who recently came to power by killing all his enemies, including his uncle Giovanni Fogliani, at a banquet. After he laid siege to the governing council and terrified the citizenry, he had then set up a government with himself as absolute ruler. However, in an ironic twist, Oliverotto was killed the same way his opponents were, as Cesare Borgia had him strangled after he invited Oliverotto and Vitellozzo Vitelli to a friendly setting.

Machiavelli advises that a prince should carefully calculate all the wicked deeds he needs to do to secure his power, and then execute them all in one stroke. In this way, his subjects will slowly forget his cruel deeds and the prince can better align himself with his subjects. Princes who fail to do this, who hesitate in their ruthlessness, will have to "keep a knife by his side" and protect himself at all costs, as he can never trust himself amongst his subjects.

Gilbert (1938:51–55) remarks that this chapter is even less traditional than those it follows, not only in its treatment of criminal behavior, but also in the advice to take power from people at a stroke, noting that precisely the opposite had been advised by Aristotle in his Politics (5.11.1315a13). On the other hand, Gilbert shows that another piece of advice in this chapter, to give benefits when it will not appear forced, was traditional.

Becoming a prince by the selection of one's fellow citizens (Chapter 9)

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A "civil principality" is one in which a citizen comes to power "not through crime or other intolerable violence", but by the support of his fellow citizens. This, he says, does not require extreme virtue or fortune, only "fortunate astuteness". For this is one of the four means of coming about a principality (the other three being by virtue, fortune, and criminality).

Machiavelli makes an important distinction between two groups that are present in every city, and have very different appetites driving them: the "great" and the "people". The "great" wish to oppress and rule the "people", while the "people" wish not to be ruled or oppressed. A principality is not the only outcome possible from these appetites, because it can also lead to either "liberty" or "license".

A principality is put into place either by the "great" or the "people" when they have the opportunity to take power, but find resistance from the other side. They assign a leader who can be popular to the people while the great benefit, or a strong authority defending the people against the great.

Machiavelli goes on to say that a prince who obtains power through the support of the nobles has a harder time staying in power than someone who is chosen by the common people; since the former finds himself surrounded by people who consider themselves his equals. He has to resort to malevolent measures to satisfy the nobles.

One cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed.

Also a prince cannot afford to keep the common people hostile as they are larger in number while the nobles smaller.

Therefore, the great should be made and unmade every day. Two types of great people might be encountered:

  1. Those who are bound to the prince: Concerning these it is important to distinguish between two types of obligated great people, those who are rapacious and those who are not. It is the latter who can and should be honoured.
  2. Those who are not bound to the new prince: Once again, these need to be divided into two types – those with a weak spirit (a prince can make use of them if they are of good counsel) and those who shun being bound because of their own ambition (these should be watched and feared as enemies).
How to win over people depends on circumstances: Machiavelli advises:

  • Do not get frightened in adversity.
  • One should avoid ruling via magistrates, if one wishes to be able to "ascend" to absolute rule quickly and safely.
  • One should make sure that the people need the prince, especially if a time of need should come.

How to judge the strength of principalities (Chapter 10)

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The way to judge the strength of a princedom is to see whether it can defend itself, or whether it needs to depend on allies. This does not just mean that the cities should be prepared and the people trained; a prince who is hated is also exposed.

Ecclesiastical principates (Chapter 11)

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Leo X: a pope, but also a member of the Medici family. Machiavelli suggested they should treat the church as a princedom, as the Borgia family had, in order to conquer Italy, and found new modes and orders.
This type of "principality" refers explicitly to the Catholic Church as an example, which is of course not traditionally thought of as a principality. According to Machiavelli, these are relatively easy to maintain, once founded. They do not need to defend themselves militarily, nor to govern their subjects.

Machiavelli discusses the recent history of the Church as if it were a princedom that was in competition to conquer Italy against other princes. He points to factionalism as a historical weak point in the Church, and points to the recent example of the Borgia family as a better strategy which almost worked. He then explicitly proposes that the Medici are now in a position to try the same thing.

Defense and military (Chapters 12–14)

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Having discussed the various types of principalities, Machiavelli turns to the ways a state can attack other territories or defend itself. The two most essential foundations for any state, whether old or new, are sound laws and strong military forces.[24] A self-sufficient prince is one who can meet any enemy on the battlefield. He should be "armed" with his own arms. However, a prince that relies solely on fortifications or on the help of others and stands on the defensive is not self-sufficient. If he cannot raise a formidable army, but must rely on defense, he must fortify his city. A well-fortified city is unlikely to be attacked, and if it is, most armies cannot endure an extended siege. However, during a siege a virtuous prince will keep the morale of his subjects high while removing all dissenters. Thus, as long as the city is properly defended and has enough supplies, a wise prince can withstand any siege.

Machiavelli stands strongly against the use of mercenaries, and in this he was innovative, and he also had personal experience in Florence. He believes they are useless to a ruler because they are undisciplined, cowardly, and without any loyalty, being motivated only by money. Machiavelli attributes the Italian city states' weakness to their reliance on mercenary armies.

Machiavelli also warns against using auxiliary forces, troops borrowed from an ally, because if they win, the employer is under their favor and if they lose, he is ruined. Auxiliary forces are more dangerous than mercenary forces because they are united and controlled by capable leaders who may turn against the employer.

The main concern for a prince should be war, or the preparation thereof, not books. Through war a hereditary prince maintains his power or a private citizen rises to power. Machiavelli advises that a prince must frequently hunt in order to keep his body fit and learn the landscape surrounding his kingdom. Through this, he can best learn how to protect his territory and advance upon others. For intellectual strength, he is advised to study great military men so he may imitate their successes and avoid their mistakes. A prince who is diligent in times of peace will be ready in times of adversity. Machiavelli writes, "thus, when fortune turns against him he will be prepared to resist it."

The Qualities of a Prince (Chapters 14–19)

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Each of the following chapters presents a discussion about a particular virtue or vice that a prince might have, and is therefore structured in a way which appears like traditional advice for a prince. However, the advice is far from traditional.

A Prince's Duty Concerning Military Matters (Chapter 14)

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Machiavelli believes that a prince's main focus should be on perfecting the art of war. He believes that by taking this profession an aspiring prince will be able to acquire a state, and will be able to maintain what he has gained. He claims that "being disarmed makes you despised." He believes that the only way to ensure loyalty from one's soldiers is to understand military matters. The two activities Machiavelli recommends practicing to prepare for war are physical and mental. Physically, he believes rulers should learn the landscape of their territories. Mentally, he encouraged the study of past military events. He also warns against idleness.

Reputation of a prince (Chapter 15)

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Because, says Machiavelli, he wants to write something useful to those who understand, he thought it more fitting "to go directly to the effectual truth ("verità effettuale") of the thing than to the imagination of it". This section is one where Machiavelli's pragmatic ideal can be seen most clearly. Machiavelli reasons that since princes come across men who are evil, he should learn how to be equally evil himself, and use this ability or not according to necessity. Concerning the behavior of a prince toward his subjects, Machiavelli announces that he will depart from what other writers say, and writes:

Men have imagined republics and principalities that never really existed at all. Yet the way men live is so far removed from the way they ought to live that anyone who abandons what is for what should be pursues his downfall rather than his preservation; for a man who strives after goodness in all his acts is sure to come to ruin, since there are so many men who are not good.

Since there are many possible qualities that a prince can be said to possess, he must not be overly concerned about having all the good ones. Also, a prince may be perceived to be merciful, faithful, humane, frank, and religious, but most important is only to seem to have these qualities. A prince cannot truly have these qualities because at times it is necessary to act against them. Although a bad reputation should be avoided, it is sometimes necessary to have one. In fact, he must sometimes deliberately choose evil:

He who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation.[25]

Generosity vs. parsimony (Chapter 16)

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If a prince is overly generous to his subjects, Machiavelli asserts he will not be appreciated, and will only cause greed for more. Additionally, being overly generous is not economical, because eventually all resources will be exhausted. This results in higher taxes, and will bring grief upon the prince. Then, if he decides to discontinue or limit his generosity, he will be labeled as a miser. Thus, Machiavelli summarizes that guarding against the people's hatred is more important than building up a reputation for generosity. A wise prince should be willing to be more reputed a miser than be hated for trying to be too generous.

On the other hand: "of what is not yours or your subjects' one can be a bigger giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander, because spending what is someone else's does not take reputation from you but adds it to you; only spending your own hurts you".

Cruelty vs. mercy (Chapter 17)

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Hannibal meeting Scipio Africanus. Machiavelli describes Hannibal as having the "virtue" of "inhuman cruelty". But he lost to someone, Scipio Africanus, who showed the weakness of "excessive mercy" and who could therefore only have held power in a republic.
Machiavelli begins this chapter by addressing how mercy can be misused which will harm the prince and his dominion. He ends by stating that a prince should not shrink from being cruel if it means that it will keep his subjects in line. After all, it will help him maintain his rule. He gives the example of Cesare Borgia, whose cruelty protected him from rebellions.[26] He contrasts this example with the leaders of Florence, who, through too much mercy, allowed the city of Pistoia to destroy itself.

In addressing the question of whether it is better to be loved or feared, Machiavelli writes, "The answer is that one would like to be both the one and the other; but because it is difficult to combine them, it is far safer to be feared than loved if you cannot be both." As Machiavelli asserts, commitments made in peace are not always kept in adversity; however, commitments made in fear are kept out of fear. Yet, a prince must ensure that he is not feared to the point of hatred, which is very possible.

This chapter is possibly the most well-known of the work, and it is important because of the reasoning behind Machiavelli's famous idea that it is better to be feared than loved.[27] His justification is purely pragmatic; as he notes, "Men worry less about doing an injury to one who makes himself loved than to one who makes himself feared." Fear is used as a means to ensure obedience from his subjects, and security for the prince. Above all, Machiavelli argues, a prince should not interfere with the property of their subjects or their women, and if they should try to kill someone, they should do it with a convenient justification.

Regarding the troops of the prince, fear is absolutely necessary to keep a large garrison united and a prince should not mind the thought of cruelty in that regard. For a prince who leads his own army, it is imperative for him to observe cruelty because that is the only way he can command his soldiers' absolute respect. Machiavelli compares two great military leaders: Hannibal and Scipio Africanus. Although Hannibal's army consisted of men of various races, they were never rebellious because they feared their leader. Machiavelli says this required "inhuman cruelty" which he refers to as a virtue. Scipio's men, on the other hand, were known for their mutiny and dissension, due to Scipio's "excessive mercy" – which was, however, a source of glory because he lived in a republic.

In what way princes should keep their word (Chapter 18)

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Machiavelli notes that a prince is praised for keeping his word. However, he also notes that in reality, the most cunning princes succeed politically. A prince, therefore, should only keep his word when it suits his purposes, but do his utmost to maintain the illusion that he does keep his word and that he is reliable in that regard. Machiavelli advises the ruler to become a "great liar and deceiver", and that men are so easy to deceive, that the ruler won't have an issue with lying to others. He justifies this by saying that men are wicked, and never keep their words, therefore the ruler doesn't have to keep his.

As Machiavelli notes, "He should appear to be compassionate, faithful to his word, guileless, and devout. And indeed he should be so. But his disposition should be such that, if he needs to be the opposite, he knows how." As noted in chapter 15, the prince must appear to be virtuous in order to hide his actions, and he should be able to be otherwise when the time calls for it; that includes being able to lie, though however much he lies he should always keep the appearance of being truthful.

In this chapter, Machiavelli uses "beasts" as a metaphor for unscrupulous behavior. He states that while lawful conduct is part of the nature of men, a prince should learn how to use the nature of both men and beasts wisely to ensure the stability of his regime. In this chapter however, his focus is solely on the "beastly" natures.[28] In particular, he compares the use of force to the "lion", and the use of deception to the "fox", and advises the prince to study them both. In employing this metaphor, Machiavelli apparently references De Officiis by the Roman orator and statesman Cicero, and subverts its conclusion, arguing instead that dishonorable behavior is sometimes politically necessary.[29]

Avoiding contempt and hatred (Chapter 19)

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Machiavelli divides the fears which monarchs should have into internal (domestic) and external (foreign) fears. Internal fears exist inside his kingdom and focus on his subjects, Machiavelli warns to be suspicious of everyone when hostile attitudes emerge. Machiavelli observes that the majority of men are content as long as they are not deprived of their property and women, and only a minority of men are ambitious enough to be a concern. A prince should command respect through his conduct, because a prince who raises no contempt of the nobles and maintains the satisfaction of the people, Machiavelli assures, should have no fear of conspirators working with external powers. Conspiracy is very difficult and risky in such a situation.

Machiavelli apparently seems to go back on his rule that a prince can evade hate, as he says that he will eventually be hated by someone, so he should seek to avoid being hated by the commonfolk.

Roman emperors, on the other hand, had not only the majority and ambitious minority, but also a cruel and greedy military, who created extra problems as they demanded iniquity. While a prince should avoid being hated, he will eventually be hated by someone, so he must at least avoid the hatred of the most powerful, and for the Roman emperors this included the military who demanded iniquity against the people out of their own greed. He uses Septimius Severus as a model for new rulers to emulate, as he "embodied both the fox and the lion". Severus outwitted and killed his military rivals, and although he oppressed the people, Machiavelli says that he kept the common people "satisfied and stupified".

Machiavelli notes that in his time only the Turkish empire had the problem of the Romans, because in other lands the people had become more powerful than the military.

The Prudence of the Prince (Chapters 20–25)

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Whether ruling conquests with fortresses works (Chapter 20)

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Machiavelli mentions that placing fortresses in conquered territories, although it sometimes works, often fails. Using fortresses can be a good plan, but Machiavelli says he shall "blame anyone who, trusting in fortresses, thinks little of being hated by the people". He cited Caterina Sforza, who used a fortress to defend herself but was eventually betrayed by her people.

Gaining honours (Chapter 21)

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A prince truly earns honour by completing great feats. King Ferdinand of Spain is cited by Machiavelli as an example of a monarch who gained esteem by showing his ability through great feats and who, in the name of religion, conquered many territories and kept his subjects occupied so that they had no chance to rebel. Regarding two warring states, Machiavelli asserts it is always wiser to choose a side, rather than to be neutral. Machiavelli then provides the following reasons why:

  • If your allies win, you benefit whether or not you have more power than they have.
  • If you are more powerful, then your allies are under your command; if your allies are stronger, they will always feel a certain obligation to you for your help.
  • If your side loses, you still have an ally in the loser.
Machiavelli also notes that it is wise for a prince not to ally with a stronger force unless compelled to do so. In conclusion, the most important virtue is having the wisdom to discern what ventures will come with the most reward and then pursuing them courageously.

Nobles and staff (Chapter 22)

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The selection of good servants is reflected directly upon the prince's intelligence, so if they are loyal, the prince is considered wise; however, when they are otherwise, the prince is open to adverse criticism. Machiavelli asserts that there are three types of intelligence:

  • The kind that understands things for itself – which is excellent to have.
  • The kind that understands what others can understand – which is good to have.
  • The kind that does not understand for itself, nor through others – which is useless to have.
If the prince does not have the first type of intelligence, he should at the very least have the second type. For, as Machiavelli states, "A prince needs to have the discernment to recognize the good or bad in what another says or does even though he has no acumen himself".

Avoiding flatterers (Chapter 23)

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This chapter displays a low opinion of flatterers; Machiavelli notes that "Men are so happily absorbed in their own affairs and indulge in such self-deception that it is difficult for them not to fall victim to this plague; and some efforts to protect oneself from flatterers involve the risk of becoming despised." Flatterers were seen as a great danger to a prince, because their flattery could cause him to avoid wise counsel in favor of rash action, but avoiding all advice, flattery or otherwise, was equally bad; a middle road had to be taken. A prudent prince should have a select group of wise counselors to advise him truthfully on matters all the time. All their opinions should be taken into account. Ultimately, the decision should be made by the prince and carried out absolutely. If a prince is given to changing his mind, his reputation will suffer. A prince must have the wisdom to recognize good advice from bad. Machiavelli gives a negative example in Emperor Maximilian I; Maximilian, who was secretive, never consulted others, but once he ordered his plans and met dissent, he immediately changed them.

Prudence and chance

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Why the princes of Italy lost their states (Chapter 24)

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After first mentioning that a new prince can quickly become as respected as a hereditary one, Machiavelli says princes in Italy who had longstanding power and lost it cannot blame bad luck, but should blame their own indolence. One "should never fall in the belief that you can find someone to pick you up". They all showed a defect of arms (already discussed) and either had a hostile populace or did not know to secure themselves against the great.

How Much Fortune Can Do in Human Affairs, and in What Mode It May Be Opposed (Chapter 25)

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As pointed out by Gilbert (1938:206) it was traditional in the genre of Mirrors of Princes to mention fortune, but "Fortune pervades The Prince as she does no other similar work". Machiavelli argues that fortune is only the judge of half of our actions and that we have control over the other half with "sweat", prudence and virtue. Even more unusual, rather than simply suggesting caution as a prudent way to try to avoid the worst of bad luck, Machiavelli holds that the greatest princes in history tend to be ones who take more risks, and rise to power through their own labour, virtue, prudence, and particularly by their ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

Machiavelli even encourages risk taking as a reaction to risk. In a well-known metaphor, Machiavelli writes that "it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike her down."[30] Gilbert (p. 217) points out that Machiavelli's friend the historian and diplomat Francesco Guicciardini expressed similar ideas about fortune.

Machiavelli compares fortune to a torrential river that cannot be easily controlled during flooding season. In periods of calm, however, people can erect dams and levees in order to minimize its impact. Fortune, Machiavelli argues, seems to strike at the places where no resistance is offered, as had recently been the case in Italy. As de Alvarez (1999:125–30) points out that what Machiavelli actually says is that Italians in his time leave things not just to fortune, but to "fortune and God". Machiavelli is indicating in this passage, as in some others in his works, that Christianity itself was making Italians helpless and lazy concerning their own politics, as if they would leave dangerous rivers uncontrolled.[31]

Exhortation to Seize Italy and to Free Her from the Barbarians (Chapter 26)

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Pope Leo X was pope at the time the book was written and a member of the Medici family. This chapter directly appeals to the Medici to use what has been summarized in order to conquer Italy using Italian armies, following the advice in the book. Gilbert (1938:222–30) showed that including such exhortation was not unusual in the genre of books full of advice for princes. But it is unusual that the Medici family's position of Papal power is openly named as something that should be used as a personal power base, as a tool of secular politics. Indeed, one example is the Borgia family's "recent" and controversial attempts to use church power in secular politics, often brutally executed. This continues a controversial theme throughout the book.

Analysis

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Cesare Borgia, Duke of Valentinois. According to Machiavelli, a risk taker and example of a prince who acquired by "fortune". Failed in the end because of one mistake: he was naïve to trust a new Pope.
As shown by his letter of dedication, Machiavelli's work eventually came to be dedicated to Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici, grandson of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and a member of the ruling Florentine Medici family, whose uncle Giovanni became Pope Leo X in 1513. It is known from his personal correspondence that it was written during 1513, the year after the Medici regained control of Florence, and a few months after Machiavelli's arrest, torture, and banishment by the in-coming Medici regime. It was discussed for a long time with Francesco Vettori – a friend of Machiavelli – whom he wanted to pass it and commend it to the Medici. The book had originally been intended for Giuliano di Lorenzo de' Medici, young Lorenzo's uncle, who however died in 1516.[32] It is not certain that the work was ever read by any of the Medici before it was printed.[33] Machiavelli describes the contents as being an un-embellished summary of his knowledge about the nature of princes and "the actions of great men", based not only on reading but also, unusually, on real experience.[34]

The types of political behavior that are discussed with apparent approval by Machiavelli in The Prince were regarded as shocking by contemporaries, and its immorality is still a subject of serious discussion.[35] Although the work advises princes how to tyrannize, Machiavelli is generally thought to have preferred some form of republican government.[36] Some commentators justify his acceptance of immoral and criminal actions by leaders by arguing that he lived during a time of continuous political conflict and instability in Italy, and that his influence has increased the "pleasures, equality and freedom" of many people, loosening the grip of medieval Catholicism's "classical teleology", which "disregarded not only the needs of individuals and the wants of the common man, but stifled innovation, enterprise, and enquiry into cause and effect relationships that now allow us to control nature".[37]

On the other hand, Strauss (1958:11) notes that "even if we were forced to grant that Machiavelli was essentially a patriot or a scientist, we would not be forced to deny that he was a teacher of evil".[38] Furthermore, Machiavelli "was too thoughtful not to know what he was doing and too generous not to admit it to his reasonable friends".[39]

Machiavelli emphasized the need for looking at the "effectual truth" (verita effetuale), as opposed to relying on "imagined republics and principalities". He states the difference between honorable behavior and criminal behavior by using the metaphor of animals, saying that "there are two ways of contending, one in accordance with the laws, the other by force; the first of which is proper to men, the second to beast".[40] In The Prince he does not explain what he thinks the best ethical or political goals are, except the control of one's own fortune, as opposed to waiting to see what chance brings. Machiavelli took it for granted that would-be leaders naturally aim at glory or honour. He associated these goals with a need for "virtue" and "prudence" in a leader, and saw such virtues as essential to good politics. That great men should develop and use their virtue and prudence was a traditional theme of advice to Christian princes.[41] And that more virtue meant less reliance on chance was a classically influenced "humanist commonplace" in Machiavelli's time, as Fischer (2000:75) says, even if it was somewhat controversial. However, Machiavelli went far beyond other authors in his time, who in his opinion left things to fortune, and therefore to bad rulers, because of their Christian beliefs. He used the words "virtue" and "prudence" to refer to glory-seeking and spirited excellence of character, in strong contrast to the traditional Christian uses of those terms, but more keeping with the original pre-Christian Greek and Roman concepts from which they derived.[42] He encouraged ambition and risk taking. So in another break with tradition, he treated not only stability, but also radical innovation, as possible aims of a prince in a political community. Managing major reforms can show off a Prince's virtue and give him glory. He clearly felt Italy needed major reform in his time, and this opinion of his time is widely shared.[43]

Machiavelli's descriptions encourage leaders to attempt to control their fortune gloriously, to the extreme extent that some situations may call for a fresh "founding" (or re-founding) of the "modes and orders" that define a community, despite the danger and necessary evil and lawlessness of such a project. Founding a wholly new state, or even a new religion, using injustice and immorality has even been called the chief theme of The Prince.[44] Machiavelli justifies this position by explaining how if "a prince did not win love he may escape hate" by personifying injustice and immorality; therefore, he will never loosen his grip since "fear is held by the apprehension of punishment" and never diminishes as time goes by.[45] For a political theorist to do this in public was one of Machiavelli's clearest breaks not just with medieval scholasticism, but with the classical tradition of political philosophy, especially the favorite philosopher of Catholicism at the time, Aristotle. This is one of Machiavelli's most lasting influences upon modernity.

Nevertheless, Machiavelli was heavily influenced by classical pre-Christian political philosophy. According to Strauss (1958:291) Machiavelli refers to Xenophon more than Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero put together. Xenophon wrote one of the classic mirrors of princes, the Education of Cyrus. Gilbert (1938:236) wrote: "The Cyrus of Xenophon was a hero to many a literary man of the sixteenth century, but for Machiavelli he lived". Xenophon also, as Strauss pointed out, wrote a dialogue, Hiero which showed a wise man dealing sympathetically with a tyrant, coming close to what Machiavelli would do in uprooting the ideal of "the imagined prince". Xenophon however, like Plato and Aristotle, was a follower of Socrates, and his works show approval of a "teleological argument", while Machiavelli rejected such arguments. On this matter, Strauss (1958:222–23) gives evidence that Machiavelli may have seen himself as having learned something from Democritus, Epicurus and classical materialism, which was however not associated with political realism, or even any interest in politics.

On the topic of rhetoric, Machiavelli, in his introduction, stated that "I have not embellished or crammed this book with rounded periods or big, impressive words, or with any blandishment or superfluous decoration of the kind which many are in the habit of using to describe or adorn what they have produced". This has been interpreted as showing a distancing from traditional rhetoric styles, but there are echoes of classical rhetoric in several areas. In Chapter 18, for example, he uses a metaphor of a lion and a fox, examples of force and cunning; according to Zerba (2004:217), "the Roman author from whom Machiavelli in all likelihood drew the simile of the lion and the fox" was Cicero. The Rhetorica ad Herennium, a work which was believed during Machiavelli's time to have been written by Cicero, was used widely to teach rhetoric, and it is likely that Machiavelli was familiar with it. Unlike Cicero's more widely accepted works however, according to Cox (1997:1122), "Ad Herennium ... offers a model of an ethical system that not only condones the practice of force and deception but appears to regard them as habitual and indeed germane to political activity". This makes it an ideal text for Machiavelli to have used.

The Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci argued that Machiavelli's audience for this work was not the classes who already rule (or have "hegemony") over the common people, but the common people themselves, trying to establish a new hegemony, and making Machiavelli the first "Italian Jacobin".[46]

Influence

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To quote Bireley (1990:14):

...there were in circulation approximately fifteen editions of the Prince and nineteen of the Discourses and French translations of each before they were placed on the Index of Paul IV in 1559, a measure which nearly stopped publication in Catholic areas except in France. Three principal writers took the field against Machiavelli between the publication of his works and their condemnation in 1559 and again by the Tridentine Index in 1564. These were the English cardinal Reginald Pole and the Portuguese bishop Jerónimo Osório, both of whom lived for many years in Italy, and the Italian humanist and later bishop, Ambrogio Caterino Politi.

Emperor Charles V, or Charles I of Spain. A Catholic king in the first generation to read The Prince.
Henry VIII of England. A king who eventually split with the Catholic Church, and supported some Protestant ideas in the first generation to read The Prince.
Machiavelli's ideas on how to accrue honour and power as a leader had a profound impact on political leaders throughout the modern West, helped by the new technology of the printing press. Pole reported that it was spoken of highly by his enemy Thomas Cromwell in England, and had influenced Henry VIII in his turn towards Protestantism, and in his tactics, for example during the Pilgrimage of Grace.[47] A copy was also possessed by the Catholic king and emperor Charles V.[48] In France, after an initially mixed reaction, Machiavelli came to be associated with Catherine de Medici and the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre. As Bireley (1990:17) reports, in the 16th century, Catholic writers "associated Machiavelli with the Protestants, whereas Protestant authors saw him as Italian and Catholic". In fact, he was apparently influencing both Catholic and Protestant kings.[49]

One of the most important early works dedicated to criticism of Machiavelli, especially The Prince, was that of the Huguenot, Innocent Gentillet, Discourse against Machiavelli, commonly also referred to as Anti Machiavel, published in Geneva in 1576.[50] He accused Machiavelli of being an atheist and accused politicians of his time by saying that they treated his works as the "Koran of the courtiers".[51] Another theme of Gentillet was more in the spirit of Machiavelli himself: he questioned the effectiveness of immoral strategies (just as Machiavelli had himself done, despite also explaining how they could sometimes work). This became the theme of much future political discourse in Europe during the 17th century. This includes the Catholic Counter Reformation writers summarised by Bireley: Giovanni Botero, Justus Lipsius, Carlo Scribani, Adam Contzen, Pedro de Ribadeneira, and Diego de Saavedra Fajardo.[52] These authors criticized Machiavelli, but also followed him in many ways. They accepted the need for a prince to be concerned with reputation, and even a need for cunning and deceit, but compared to Machiavelli, and like later modernist writers, they emphasized economic progress much more than the riskier ventures of war. These authors tended to cite Tacitus as their source for realist political advice, rather than Machiavelli, and this pretense came to be known as "Tacitism".[53]

Modern materialist philosophy developed in the 16th, 17th and 18th century, starting in the generations after Machiavelli. The importance of Machiavelli's realism was noted by many important figures in this endeavor, for example Jean Bodin,[54] Francis Bacon,[55] Harrington, John Milton,[56] Spinoza,[57] Rousseau, Hume,[58] Edward Gibbon, and Adam Smith. Although he was not always mentioned by name as an inspiration, due to his controversy, he is also thought to have been an influence for other major philosophers, such as Montaigne,[59] Descartes,[60] Hobbes, Locke[61] and Montesquieu.[62]

In literature:

Amongst later political leaders:

20th-century Italian-American mobsters were influenced by The Prince. John Gotti and Roy DeMeo would regularly quote The Prince and consider it to be the "Mafia Bible".[70][71]

Rapper Tupac Shakur read The Prince while in prison recovering from an attempt on his life. After he was released he used a pseudonym "Makaveli", referencing Machiavelli.[72] Death Row Records released The Don Killuminati: The 7 Day Theory the posthumous album under the name of Makaveli.

Interpretations

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Timeline of composition

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There has been much debate of when Machiavelli actually composed The Prince (and his other works).[73] Commentators have viewed this question to be of great importance, as some interpreters believe that Machiavelli changed his views between the composition of The Prince, and the composition of The Discourses. Hans Baron is one of such commentators who argued that Machiavelli must have changed his mind dramatically in favor of free republics, after having written The Prince.[74] Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, in the introduction to their translation of The Discourses on Livy, state that there are no discrepancies between The Prince and his later works, and that it "seems the safest" to see them "as a pair of works, not much different, if at all, in time of composition."[75] Scholar William Connell views that the composition and development of The Prince was a lengthy process with his ideas being revised from 1513 to 1515.[73]

Other interpretations

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Satire

This interpretation was famously put forth by scholar Garrett Mattingly (1958), who stated that "In some ways, Machiavelli's little treatise was just like all the other 'Mirrors of Princes', in other ways it was a diabolical burlesque of all of them, like a political Black Mass."[76]

This position was taken up previously by some of the more prominent Enlightenment philosophes. Diderot speculated that it was a work designed not to mock, but to secretly expose corrupt princely rule. And in his The Social Contract, the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau said:

Machiavelli was a proper man and a good citizen; but, being attached to the court of the Medici, he could not help veiling his love of liberty in the midst of his country's oppression. The choice of his detestable hero, Cesare Borgia, clearly enough shows his hidden aim; and the contradiction between the teaching of the Prince and that of the Discourses on Livy and the History of Florence shows that this profound political thinker has so far been studied only by superficial or corrupt readers. The Court of Rome sternly prohibited his book. I can well believe it; for it is that Court it most clearly portrays.

—?Social Contract, Book 3, note to Chapter 6.
Whether or not the word "satire" is the best choice, the interpretation is very rare amongst those who study Machiavelli's works. For example Isaiah Berlin states that he cannot find anything other than Machiavelli's work that "reads less" like a satirical piece.[77] Maurizio Viroli writes: "In my opinion, none of these defenses of Machiavelli is valid. The view that The Prince is the "book of Republicans" comes from Rousseau's desire to rescue its author's bad reputation and make The Prince consistent with the Discourses on Livy, the text in which Machiavelli developed a comprehensive republican theory of liberty and government" and added that the claim "misrepresents the meaning of the text."[78]

Deceit

Mary Dietz, in her essay "Trapping The Prince", writes that Machiavelli's agenda was not to be satirical, as Rousseau had argued, but instead was "offering carefully crafted advice (such as arming the people) designed to undo the ruler if taken seriously and followed."[79] By this account, the aim was to reestablish the republic in Florence. She focuses on three categories in which Machiavelli gives paradoxical advice:

  • He discourages liberality and favors deceit to guarantee support from the people. Yet Machiavelli is keenly aware of the fact that an earlier pro-republican coup had been thwarted by the people's inaction that itself stemmed from the prince's liberality.
  • He supports arming the people despite the fact that he knows the Florentines are decidedly pro-democratic and would oppose the prince.
  • He encourages the prince to live in the city he conquers. This opposes the Medici's habitual policy of living outside the city. It also makes it easier for rebels or a civilian militia to attack and overthrow the prince.
According to Dietz, the trap never succeeded because Lorenzo – "a suspicious prince" – apparently never read the work of the "former republican."[80]

Translations

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  • Machiavelli, Niccolò (1908), "The Prince", Translated by W.K. Marriot (1847–1927).
  • Machiavelli, Niccolò (1958), "The Prince", Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others, vol. 1. Translated by Allan Gilbert.
  • Machiavelli, Niccolò (1961), The Prince, London: Penguin, ISBN 978-0-14-044915-0 . Translated by George Bull.
  • Machiavelli, Niccolò (1985), The Prince, University of Chicago Press. Translated by Harvey Mansfield.
  • Machiavelli, Niccolò (1992), The Prince, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, ISBN 0-393-96220-2. Translated by Robert M. Adams (A Norton Critical Edition, 2nd ed., with "Backgrounds, Interpretations, Marginalia").
  • Machiavelli, Niccolò (1995), The Prince, Everyman. Translated and Edited by Stephen J. Milner. Introduction, Notes and other critical apparatus by J.M. Dent.
  • Machiavelli, Niccolò (2006), El Principe/The Prince: Comentado Por Napoleon Bonaparte / Commentaries by Napoleon Buonaparte, Mestas Ediciones. Translated into Spanish by Marina Massa-Carrara.
  • Machiavelli, Niccolò (2009), The Prince, Penguin Classics. Translated by Tim Parks.
  • Machiavelli, Niccolò (2015), The Prince with Related Documents, Bedford St. Martins. 2d rev. ed. Translated and edited by William J. Connell.

Other works by Machiavelli

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See also

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