Hugh White 揭露美国低估中国

澳大利亚教授休·怀特揭露美国低估中国

Australian Professor Hugh White Reveals US Underestimates China

Rise of Asia 2025年5月15日

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DZ4a2Gf2YPY

在本视频中，休·怀特教授解释了美国为何低估了中国的实力，以及这对未来全球领导力的影响。

在我看来，尤其是在与中国的竞争中，有两个关键的区别。首先，中国比美国以前遇到过的任何同等竞争对手都强大，尤其是作为经济强国，中国更加强大。我确实持有一种传统的观点，即经济实力是国家实力的基础。这并不是说中国不强大，美国也是一个非常强大的国家，但中国相对于美国的实力比自19世纪末美国首次涉足西半球以来的任何国家都要强大。中国的经济规模远远大于美国，现在可能已经是冷战高峰时期苏联相对于美国的两倍，而且很可能还会进一步扩大。如果我们继续低估中国在未来几年的实力，那将是一个真正的错误，就像我们在过去25年里一直低估中国一样。我们今天面临这种困境，是因为我们长期以来低估了中国的力量。我可以说，我们已经我们太长时间高估了美国，理所当然地认为美国是世界上最强大的国家，拥有为所欲为的军事实力。我们反复发现但似乎仍然没有吸取教训的是，尽管美国拥有强大的实力、创造力和所有优点，但它并不像我们想象的那样强大，也不像我们期望的那样强大。这意味着，面对中国的实力和超越中国的野心，美国在亚洲保持领导地位的成本将非常高昂，甚至可能高于冷战时期保持对苏联地位的成本，因为中国现在更强大了。另一方面，美国面临的紧迫性比以前面对同等竞争对手时要低，这是因为在过去，当美国着手击败例如威廉·德国时， 1917年，1941年纳粹德国和日本，以及1948年苏联及之后的战争，在每一次战争中，他们都面临着真正有望主宰整个欧亚大陆的强国。任何主宰整个欧亚大陆的国家都足以威胁到美国在西半球的本土，这提供了一个非常深刻的、根本性的理由，解释了为什么美国应该准备好承担与这些强国对抗的负担和代价。但我认为很难说中国有这样做的前景，因为尽管我对中国相当乐观，但我认为中国拥有某种优势，使其能够主宰欧亚大陆其他国家的可能性非常低，因此，它能够主宰欧亚大陆并在西半球威胁美国本土的可能性非常低，因此，美国拥有意愿、动机和为了在东亚对抗中国，阻止中国成为东亚主要力量，而承担更高的成本和风险，这种可能性很低，因为我不明白为什么美国应该承担这些成本和风险，而且，没有真正的迹象表明他们这样做。华盛顿有些人，包括国务卿和国防部长，都在谈论新冷战或类似的言论，但我认为他们仍然低估了中国。我没有听到他们清楚地认识到，这将有多大。他们没有清晰地阐述一项战略，能够让美国在对抗中国方面获得合理的成功前景。他们没有明确认识到这将花费多少，也没有明确说明为什么美国必须承诺承担这些成本。我甚至还没有提到唐纳德·特朗普，但特朗普是其中的重要组成部分，这不仅仅是因为他自己的政策，还因为他的当选反映了华盛顿特区外交政策精英的态度。而是由美国选民决定，因为最终，在自己的半球对抗像中国这样强大的国家，其规模、成本和风险，都不是马萨诸塞大道上几个智库能决定的，而是由全体美国人民决定。从唐纳德·特朗普的当选，从共和党建制派愿意与他合作，以及从民主党人身上，你都能看到在特朗普时代，民主党试图重新定义自身，而政治立场却鲜有承诺维护美国的领导地位，而美国在亚洲的整个参与模式都依赖于此。鉴于这一切，澳大利亚人必须扪心自问，我们能有多大把握相信美国今天以及未来几十年会承担遏制中国的成本和风险？如果我错了怎么办？如果他们真的决定承诺，我们又能有多大把握相信他们会成功？如果我错了，而他们真的决定承诺，那么我们将看到的是战略竞争的升级，进一步加剧了我们在过去几个月和几年里看到的急剧上升的趋势。现在，华盛顿的每个人，以及澳大利亚的每个人，我想都希望，面对这种情况，中国会……简单地退缩，但我认为这再次低估了中国。决心的天平对中国有利，原因很简单：地理上，我们现在谈论的竞争是在东亚，如果竞争发生在西半球，我不会相信。中国有机会，但在中国后院，决心的平衡受地理因素影响很大，我认为中国先于美国退让的可能性非常低，这意味着如果美国坚持承诺，战争的可能性就会上升，在这种情况下，像台湾这样的问题，战争的可能性相当高。从某种意义上说，引发战争的问题是什么并不重要，重要的是美国和中国将发现自己陷入了一场冲突，而冲突的根本驱动力在于谁是亚洲的主要力量，这是一种非常过时的霸权战争概念。如果发生这种情况，美国不会轻易取胜，事实上，我认为美国很可能根本不会赢，从某种意义上说，它不会输，解放军不会在美国沿着宪法大道前进，但它不会赢，如果不能赢得胜利，如果不能解决，亚洲的旧秩序无论如何都会被摧毁。此外，这场冲突升级为核冲突的可能性很高，而且很有可能演变成一场全面核战争的可能性相当高，所以，如果真是这样，如果我错了，如果美国真的下定决心，那将直接导致亚洲和澳大利亚陷入在我看来非常严重的灾难。无论美国是否下定决心，支持和鼓励当前的美国政策是否符合澳大利亚的安全利益，我们也会这样做。我刚才解释了我们应该做什么，我们将做什么，我不知道。实际上，我们很容易继续像现在这样滑行，而不做出选择。

这实际上是系统性的欺骗，告诉美国我们支持他们，同时告诉中国我们不支持。这是澳大利亚目前的政策。我认为，我们能否解决这个问题？我们能否站出来，真正地说“不”，我们不会走这条路。美国正在谈论追随这条路，这将是困难的。由于胆怯和缺乏想象力，我们很容易陷入支持美国。

人们很容易说我们别无选择，因为人们一直在说这完全是错误的。我们确实有选择。我们确实有选择，但我们还没有做出选择，呃，但是，我注意到的是，澳大利亚政府，包括现任政府，迄今为止，还没有不认可美国将中国列为战略竞争对手。我认为，他们还没有这样做，不是因为我刚才提出的某种战略论点，而是因为一个更简单的原因，比如蓬佩奥先生对中国愤怒的恐惧，以及这会对我们的贸易关系造成什么影响。

但我认为这表明，他仍然希望蒙混过关，我认为政治双方都是如此，这让我想起了20世纪30年代，因为如果你看看澳大利亚在20世纪30年代末局势恶化时的做法，澳大利亚仍然……澳大利亚政治领导人认识到，新加坡战略，以及我们对英国的持续依赖，虽然我们如此坚定地致力于此，但……并没有奏效，但我们根本……无法想象做其他任何事情。因此，我们滑向了新加坡的沦陷，这是我们国家历史上最大的灾难。那么，我们应该怎么做呢？有两个可能性：

我们应该回到美国，并告诉他们，我们认为你们目前正在制定的政策不会奏效，但我们可以鼓励他们制定一项行之有效的政策。可以想象，美国会制定一项承认中国日益增长的实力的政策，这种政策在美国愿意付出努力的情况下是可持续的。这将使美国在亚洲的角色与我们过去所见的截然不同，但这对我们来说比美国撤军要好得多，因为美国撤军似乎是最有可能的选择。我认为大约在2012年左右，澳大利亚本可以这样做。嗯，我本来可以去那里，为不同的模式辩护，如果你看看，例如，李显龙今年6月1日在新加坡发表的重要演讲，他就是谈论这种事情，我们可以做到，也许我们应该这样做，但我在这里要告诉你，我认为时机已经过去，我认为成功的机会现在非常低，所以我们应该做什么呢？我们应该做的是，做好准备，如果失败了，我们能做到最好地管理我们的安全，这意味着准备好孤军奋战，非常感谢。

Australian Professor Hugh White Reveals US Underestimates China

Rise of Asia 2025年5月15日

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DZ4a2Gf2YPY

In this video, Professor Hugh White explains why the United States has underestimated China’s power and what it means for the future of global leadership.

It seems to me in particular that the in the case of the contest with China there are two key differences the first is that China is stronger than any of the peer competitors would be peer competitors that the United States has ever faced before it's stronger as an economic power in particular and I do take an old-fashioned view that economic weight is the foundation of national power that is not to say that China that America isn't strong too it's a very strong country but China is stronger relative to the United States than any country has ever been since the United States

first poked its nose out of the Western Hemisphere at the end of the 19th century its economy is far far bigger probably already now twice as big as the Soviet Union's was relative to America's at the height of the Cold War and is likely to grow much bigger still we would make a real mistake to keep on underestimating China's power for the

next few years as we have done so consistently for the last 25 years we face this predicament today because we've underestimated China's power for so long and I might say we've overestimated the United States for too

long taken it for granted that the

United States is by definition the

world's strongest state by definition

has military power to do whatever it

likes what we've discovered repeatedly

but still don't seem to have learned

from is that the United States for all

its strength and power and creativity

and all the good things about it is not

the power we thought it was and the

power we hoped it would be and what that

means is that the cost to the United

States of preserving its leadership in

Asia in the face of China's power and

ambition to overtake it is going to be

very high it will be co comparable to

and perhaps higher than the cost of

preserving its position vis the Soviet

Union during the cold war because China

is stronger now the other side of the coin is that

the imperatives to the United States are

lower than than they were in previous

enterprises when it confronted um peer

competitors and that's because in the

past when the United States has set out

to defeat for example Wilhham Germany in

1917 or the Nazis and the Japanese in

1941 or the Soviets in 19 48 and onwards

they confronted in each of those

episodes powers which had a real

prospect of dominating the whole of the

Eurasian land mass and any country that dominates the

whole of the Eurasian land mass is

easily going to be strong enough to

threaten the United States at home in

the Western Hemisphere that provided a

very deep fun foundational reason why

the why the United States should be

prepared to bear the burdens and pay the

cost of confronting those very powerful

states but I think it's hard to argue

that China has a prospect of doing that

because although I am pretty bullish

about China I think the chances of China

having a kind of preponderance that

would allow it to dominate the other

countries in Eurasia are very low

therefore the chance of it being able to

dominate Eurasia and threaten the United

States at home in the Western Hemisphere

are very low and therefore the chance of

the United States having the will the

motive the purpose to pay those higher

costs and risks in order to confront

China in East Asia to prevent China

becoming the primary power in East Asia

is pretty low because I just don't see

why the United States should commit

itself to those costs and risks and

moreover there's no real sign that they

are there are people in Washington including

the Secretary of State and the Secretary

of Defense who talk of a new cold war or

language like it but I think they still

underestimate China i don't hear from

them a clear understanding of how big

that will be a clear articulation of a

strategy that would deliver America a

reasonable pro prospect of success in

confronting China no clear recognitions of how much that

will cost and no clear statement of why the

United States has to commit itself to

paying those costs and I haven't even mentioned

Donald Trump but Trump is an important part of

this not because not just because of his

own policies but because of what his

election tells us about the attitude not

of the foreign policy elites in Washington DC but of American voters

because in the end a national effort on

the scale and cost and risk required to

confront a country as powerful as China

in its own hemisphere is not something

that can be decided by a few people in

think tanks up and down Massachusetts

Avenue it needs to be decided by the

American people as a whole and what you

see from the election of Donald Trump

what you see from the willingness of the

Republican establishment to go along

with him and what you see on the

Democrat side of politics as the

Democrats try to redefine themselves in

the Trump era is very little commitment

if any to preserving the US leadership

role upon which this whole model of

American engagement in Asia depends in

the light of all this Australians have

to ask themselves how confident can we

be that America today and in the decades

to come will commit to the costs and

risks of containing China and what if I'm

wrong how sure can we be that they will

succeed if they if I'm wrong and they do

decide to commit because if I'm wrong if

America really is committed then what

we'll see is escalating strategic

rivalry further steps up the trend the

very sharply rising trend that we've

seen in the last few months and years

now everyone in Washington and everyone

in Australia I guess would hope that

that in the face of that China would

simply back off but I think that

underestimates China again the balance

of resolve favors China for the simple

geographical reason that the contest

we're talking about is one in East Asia

if the contest was in the Western

Hemisphere I wouldn't give China a

chance but in China's backyard where the

balance of resolves is so strongly

shaped by geography I think the chances

of China backing off before America does

are very low that means if America

sticks to the to the commitment the

chance of war goes up it's quite high in

this scenario over an issue like Taiwan

in a sense what it doesn't really matter

what the issue that starts it is what's

important is is that the US and China

will find themselves fighting a conflict

whose essential driver is the question

as to which of them is the primary power

in Asia a very old-fashioned conception

of a hegmonic war if that happens America will not win

easily in fact I think the chances are

America will not win at all it won't

lose in a sense the PLA is not going to

march down the constitution constitution

avenue in the United States but but it

will not win and in and in failing to win in

failing to resolve the old order in Asia

will be destroyed anyway moreover the

chance of that conflict escalating to a

nuclear conflict is quite

high and the chance of that becoming a

full-scale nuclear exchange is quite

high so if so if I'm wrong if America is

committed that leads Asia and Australia

directly to what looks to me like a very

serious catastrophe in neither case

whether America's committed or it isn't

are Australia's security interests

served by supporting and encouraging

current US policy so will we anyway i've just

explained what we should do what will we

do i don't know actually it's it's very easy for us to keep

trying to slide along as we're doing at

the moment without making a choice on

this being actually systemically

duplicitous telling the United States

that we are supporting them and telling

the Chinese that we're not that is

Australia's policy today i think whether we can resolve that

whether we can come out and actually say

no we're not going to go down this path

the United States is is is talking about

following is going to be hard it's very

easy to slide into supporting the United

States through timidity and a lack of

imagination it's easy to say we have no

choice as people keep on saying that's

simply wrong we do have a choice we do

have a choice we haven't yet made that choice yet uh

and the but but what it what is notable

to me is that Australian government so

far including the present government

have not have have so far failed to

endorse the American designation of

China as a strategic rival they haven't

done so yet not I think because of a

kind of strategic argument I've just

unfolded but for the simpler reason

going back to Mr pompeo of fear of China's anger and what

it would mean for our trade

relationships but I think what that

shows is he's still hoping to muddle

through and I think this is true of both

sides of politics and that does remind

me of the 1930s because if you look at

what Australia did as things darkened in

the in the late 1930s australia still

Australian political leaders recognized

that the Singapore strategy the

continuing dependence on the United

Kingdom to which we are so heavily

committed was not working but we simply

couldn't imagine doing anything else and

so we slid into the fall of Singapore

and the biggest catastrophe in our

national history so what should we

do well two possibilities one is that we

should go back to the United States and

say we don't think the policy you're

working on at the moment is going to

work but we can encourage them to

develop one that will and it is possible

to imagine a US policy which recognized China's growing

power which was sustainable at an effort

at a level of effort the United States

is prepared to commit it would be a very

different US role in Asia than one we've

seen in the past but it would be much

better for us than than the United

States withdrawing which seems to be the

most likely alternative i think there

was a time around about 2012 when Australia could have done that

could have gone out there and argued for

that different model and if you look at

for example what Lee Shenlong was

talking about his big speech in

Singapore on the 1 of June this year

that was the kind of thing he was

talking about and we could we could do

that and maybe we should but I'm here to

tell you I think the time has passed i

think the chances of that succeeding is

now very low so what should we do

instead prepare for how best we can

manage our security if that fails which

means prepare to stand alone thank you

very much