Reimagining the UK's China Capabilities: A Joined-Up Approach to an "Epoch-Defining Challenge"
https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/reimagining-the-uks-china-capabilities-a-joined-up-approach-to-an-epoch-defining-challenge
By Multiple experts Nov 15 2024
第一章
摘要
在这场原本激烈的争论中，英国难得达成共识：中国究竟是英国最大的战略机遇，还是最大的战略威胁，我们都需要理解。
随着中国在多个领域转变策略，这一点比以往任何时候都更加真实。北京方面在国内全力推动技术创新，并在海外部署更先进的工具，这都有望重塑英国与中国打交道的条件。与此同时，随着主要合作伙伴各自推进应对中国全球角色的举措，复杂的新形势正在浮现，这些举措有时甚至相互冲突。
英国历届政府都认识到了面临的挑战。《2023年综合评估报告》将中国列为“划时代的挑战”，并承诺将对中国能力的投入增加一倍。新政府也同样呼吁对英中关系进行审计，以评估英国目前的对华政策工具箱。
审计预计将于明年初完成，届时，美国新政府将对英国在对华政策上的期望有清晰的认识。这意味着英国需要尽快确定我们自身对与中国关系的期望，以及实现这一目标所需的工具。
采取正确的方法至关重要。中国带来的挑战和机遇本质上是相互交织的；确保拥有适当的、灵活的跨学科能力是驾驭我们关系的关键，并将在未来几年带来投资回报。
为此，英国必须更明智地投入，而不仅仅是增加投入。从历史上看，英国的能力建设工作过分侧重于白厅公务员队伍的学习和发展，通常是一些对英国几乎没有战略利益的兼职语言课程。
我们需要更全面地看待能力建设，认识到英国与中国接触点的多样性。这些接触点包括议会议员、英国政治参与的公众形象（其中335人是新任）以及商界，后者往往在缺乏部长级访问的情况下，率先开展后疫情时代的接触。另一个亟待解决的问题也应得到重视：以中国为重点的学生人数正在下降，这削弱了英国建立可持续新人才输送渠道的能力。
换句话说，英国需要一项不仅关注政府，还关注政府周边生态系统及其人才输送渠道的战略。本文提出了三个总体目标，这些目标应构成英国能力建设工作的基础：
提升政府内部的中国能力：反思英国政府的语言学习方式，增加英语培训，以培养广泛的中国素养。更有效地在议员中传播中国素养，包括通过与选区相关的情况介绍会。
提升政府内部的中国能力：承诺在政府之外分配能力建设资金，以培育一个充满活力的中国智库和企业生态系统，这些智库和企业能够补充政府政策，而不是与政府政策相冲突。
提升政府内部的中国能力：在教育的每个阶段，尽可能顺畅地决定开始或继续研究中国，从而打造一支对中国感兴趣的年轻人队伍。解决A-Level课程等关键障碍，并充分利用教育科技解决方案。
这一切的基础需要一位“能力倡导者”，其模式或许可以借鉴美国国务院下属的中国事务协调办公室（非正式名称为“中国之家”），该办公室能够推动英国政府、威斯敏斯特乃至更广阔地区的变革。
这些目标共同作用，可以帮助英国应对《综合评估》中提出的各种挑战和机遇，并制定出一项连贯的战略，以应对“划时代的挑战”。
第二章
英国为何需要面向未来的能力
如果像人们常说的那样，中国着眼于未来几十年，那么英国或许也应该如此。这并不意味着我们要被困在一个僵化的计划中，而是要发展灵活的能力，认识到英国十年后将要应对的中国可能与今天的中国截然不同——这将带来一系列不同的政策挑战和机遇。
图 1
中国的潜在发展将如何影响英国
来源：TBI 分析
当然，英国与中国的关系并非空穴来风。英国还需要具备一系列能力，以适应中国在世界范围内日益演变的角色。
前
助力英国迎接技术竞争力新时代
在未来十年，全球将共同推动技术竞争力和韧性，英国需要做好准备，维护自身利益。
这取决于英国能否深入了解其他国家的新兴能力。中国尤其如此，中国是一个强大的参与者，其决策足以重塑全球市场和供应链。中国目前正将大量资源投入到人工智能、核能力、关键矿产加工和半导体生产等领域——所有这些都应纳入英国自身的战略考量。
以电动汽车 (EV) 为例。英国面临的挑战不仅在于如何驾驭中国巨大的生产能力——2022 年至 2023 年，电动汽车出口增长了 80%，使中国成为全球最大的汽车出口国
[1]链接至脚注
——还在于如何处理与其他关键参与者的微妙关系。这一挑战需要制定一种自主的应对策略：对拥有庞大汽车制造基地的欧盟或正在更广泛地努力保持技术领先地位的美国有效的策略，并不一定适用于英国。北京青睐的不受限制的贸易方式也未必适合英国：美国和欧盟可能会向英国施压，要求其不要成为中国电动汽车的“倾销地”，而英国则有可能过度依赖净零转型关键产品的单一供应商。
电动汽车的例子很可能只是众多例子中的一个，因为新兴技术提出了如何在气候、增长、安全和外交优先事项之间取得适当平衡的棘手问题。过去几年，英国在制定战略以阐明如何保护竞争优势和防范关键行业脆弱性方面落后于其他参与者——包括中国本身。
但对技术竞争力的需求不太可能减弱。在北京，中国长期安全稳定依赖于关键技术创新的观点如今已深入人心。中国24位高层领导人中有8位是STEM领域的技术专家，还有更多人是通过层层晋升而来。尽管美国两党之间存在诸多分歧，但有一点是共识：美国必须在对未来竞争力至关重要的技术上“尽可能保持对中国的领先优势”。
[2]链接至脚注
正如托尼·布莱尔全球变化研究所（TBI）在其“新国家目标”系列报告中所述，英国在关键领域——尤其是在生物技术、人工智能和数据领域——拥有显著的竞争优势。但取舍仍将不可避免。要做出正确的选择以保持竞争力，就需要培养具备混合技能的新型人才，将英国最优秀的技术专长与对中国关键系统运作方式的更深入理解相结合。
为中国全球参与的新阶段做好准备
未雨绸缪也意味着要将眼光投向中美之间的大国竞争之外。尽管英国拥有丰富的发展专业知识，并承诺在2023年《综合评估更新》中更积极地与新兴大国和中等强国接触，但全球南方国家在北京的议程中的地位始终高于英国政府。
[3]脚注链接
中国目前正在转变其传统的海外参与模式，这种模式通常被描述为充当“不附加任何条件”的经济伙伴。
相反，北京正采取越来越积极主动的全球治理方式，旨在就中国“互不干涉内政”的核心原则以及各国自主探索发展道路的权利达成共识——所有这些都是在“构建人类命运共同体”的旗帜下进行的。
旗舰倡议“一带一路”正在变得更加“精简、清洁和绿色”，
[4]链接至脚注
并辅以一系列完善的新举措，扩大了中国在从冲突调解到职业培训等各个领域的服务范围。
表1 – 中国海外参与的演变
倡议
其构成
“一带一路”倡议 (2013)
高达1万亿美元的全球基础设施项目，旨在促进全球互联互通，提升中国的地缘战略影响力
全球发展倡议 (2021)
旨在帮助各国实现联合国可持续发展目标，并根据中国优先目标重塑全球发展议程的框架
全球安全倡议 (2022)
旨在重新定义全球安全规范，挑战西方安全理念
全球文明倡议 (2023)
旨在促进“文明多样性”，挑战西方意识形态主导地位
全球人工智能治理倡议 (2023)
旨在制定国际人工智能标准，提升人工智能的代表性
全球南方国家
这一转变对英国如何与中国及发展伙伴互动具有重大影响。“一带一路”倡议于2013年启动后，国际社会对其范围的理解迟缓；英国必须避免重蹈覆辙。随着中国进入新的试错阶段，英国应及早采取行动，开始分析风险和机遇所在。
以国际发展为例，中国正在加大资源投入，包括在新的全球发展倡议下设立50亿美元的专项基金。在某些领域，尤其是数字基础设施领域，英国可能认为需要加大力度支持伙伴国家，避免锁定效应或安全风险。但在其他领域，英国丰富的发展专业知识与中国快速、大规模地交付成果的能力之间存在显著的互补性。
中国的“全球安全倡议”也是如此。该倡议已被认为促成了北京在2023年3月斡旋伊朗与沙特关系正常化的最后阶段
[5]链接至脚注
以及在2024年7月促成巴勒斯坦14个派别达成协议。
[6]链接至脚注
中国改变其当前低风险冲突调解模式的程度将是有限的，但北京希望被视为“负责任的大国”
[7]链接至脚注
这意味着英国应该期待中国在“全球热点问题”中发挥更积极的作用。
[8]链接至脚注
双方肯定会存在持续的分歧。但英国不应忽视这样一个事实，即英国和中国之间也往往存在着被低估的共同稳定利益，无论是在管理前沿人工智能的风险、维护全球金融体系稳定，还是推进绿色转型方面。增强区分两者的能力，不仅有助于建立更具建设性的双边关系，还能提升英国在其全球南方伙伴国（中国在这些国家已取得长足进步）心目中的可信度。
中国的影响范围广泛——我们的能力必须反映这一点
本文前面概述的情景可能不会全部实现，而其他未在此处描述的情况也将不可避免地出现。例如，很少有人能够预测新冠疫情将在多大程度上重塑全球关于中国供应链和外交接触的对话。
但综合起来，这些情景让我们大致了解了英国在未来十年可能面临的一系列交叉挑战，以及缺乏正确架构的潜在成本。这些挑战不仅涉及各部门，也超越了政府层面。成功的应对不仅取决于各部门的专业知识，还取决于英国协调白厅、议会和主要私营部门行动的能力。
第三章
正确的能力是什么样的？
英国拥有令人羡慕的能力建设基础：世界领先的汉学学术团体，强大的专业人才库集中在外交、联邦和发展办公室（FCDO）、商务和贸易部、内阁办公室和安全部门，而科学、创新和技术部也正在不断增强其能力。英国政府也为此预留了预算：2023年综合评估更新报告承诺将对中国能力的资金增加一倍。
然而，政府一直难以将专业知识传播到这些部门之外，结果导致英国对华协调一致应对的能力受到影响。
在历届保守党政府执政期间，英国对华立场五花八门。在戴维·卡梅伦执政期间，英国与中国的关系经历了所谓的“黄金时代”，经济和外交关系不断深化。但到了2022年，里希·苏纳克声称“中国和中国共产党对英国乃至世界的安全与繁荣构成了最大威胁”。
[9]链接至脚注
苏纳克上台后或许有所软化——时任外交大臣詹姆斯·克莱弗利声称，将中国列为威胁是“对我们国家利益的背叛，也是对现代世界的故意误解”。
[10]链接至脚注
——但这种前后矛盾的做法仍然限制了英国政府推进计划的能力，并使英国在北京问题上背负了“摇摆不定”的名声。
英国官方与中国异常有限的接触也加剧了这种前后矛盾：在外交大臣戴维·拉米于2024年10月访华之前，英国部长级官员在过去六年中仅有三次访华，而克莱弗利在2023年访华前被贴上了“中国傀儡”的标签。
[11]链接至脚注
与此同时，主要合作伙伴在两个方面取得了进展，一方面加强了与中国的接触——美国、德国、法国、澳大利亚和意大利都举行了新冠疫情后的国家元首会晤——另一方面采取了更实质性的措施来保护本国
关键的脆弱领域。英国在这两个方面相对不作为，损害的只是英国自身。
新政府已承诺解决英国“分裂且不一致”的对华战略，
[12]链接至脚注
但这说起来容易做起来难。一个关键要素是重新接触（并向威斯敏斯特政府表明，接触不等于默许），但同样重要的要素是确保这种接触以一套强大的能力为基础，使其能够真正符合英国的利益。
为此，英国应超越目前以政府为中心的方针，采取三管齐下的方针，旨在建立一套可持续的、相互促进的对华能力，并认识到这一“划时代挑战”的广度。
政府内部：在威斯敏斯特地区传播中国知识
英国政府缺乏中国专业知识，这并非如人们通常认为的那样：仅在外交、金融和发展部（FCDO）就有超过50个专注于中国的职位。但这种持续存在的看法表明了一个问题：一些专业知识未能在威斯敏斯特地区得到有效传播。
白厅和威斯敏斯特之间往往存在不匹配的情况；议会辩论往往与专家评估严重脱节，有时甚至依赖过时或错误的信息。
随着英国迎来创纪录的335名新议员，弥合这一差距变得越来越重要，他们将成为英国对华政策的公众代言人。辩论越有深度，英国就越能更好地维护自身利益。
重新评估英国的语言需求
首先，在白厅内部构建合适的能力方面还有更多工作要做。与直觉相反的是，正确的答案不一定是增加普通话使用者。能力建设资金传统上偏向于语言课程，尤其是兼职或短期普通话课程。这是一种资源的低效利用。英国需要更坦诚地探讨普通话达到工作水平的难度——短期课程，尤其是针对初学者或中级学习者的短期课程，在兼顾日常工作的同时，很难培养出具备对英国具有战略意义的汉语水平的学习者。
美国外交学院将普通话列为“超级难学语言”
[13]链接至脚注
达到专业工作水平需要大约2200小时的学习，而法语只需750小时，俄语只需1100小时。此外，要完全理解中国党国话语，还需要额外的专业语言和语境培训。
相反，应该优先开展英语培训，以培养广泛的中国文化素养。相对而言，很少有职位需要掌握普通话，尤其是在工作水平以下的普通话。然而，在更多职位上，更深入地了解中国体系将有助于公务员在英国关注的关键领域更有效地开展工作，例如关键技术、贸易、国际发展和全球卫生等。
自2021年以来，英国政府一直在试行更多此类培训，而英国外交和联邦事务部（FCDO）的中国能力部门在推动更具战略性的能力建设方法方面发挥了核心作用，并在2023年为近1000名公务员提供了培训。据报道，这些英语课程的报名人数一直超额。未来，应该继续优先考虑扩大这些课程的入学机会，而不是入门级语言学习。
培养合适的语言能力
当然，培养合适的语言能力仍然至关重要，政府应该扩大针对少数有志于此的语言专家的语言课程范围。例如，某些即将被派往中国的公务员可以接受长达两年的全日制一对一语言培训，以达到工作水平。能够提供这种培训至关重要，但培训的持续时间和强度凸显了达到具有战略意义的普通话水平所需的大量时间和资金投入。
政府还应该放眼传统的语言学习途径之外。快速发展的翻译技术和新的人工智能模型不仅可以帮助提高公务员的语言能力，还可以增强英国大规模抓取和处理外语情报的能力。对于一个产生大量高度依赖于语境信息的系统来说，这一点尤为重要。
当然，将新技术应用于敏感领域存在潜在的安全风险，但总体而言，多语言开源情报 (OSINT) 系统、翻译记忆软件和语境感知人工智能模型等技术可以为传统能力提供有希望的补充。这一点值得考虑。
纳入长期规划：即使现在还没有合适的解决方案，其中许多技术在未来几年也会更加先进。
更有希望的是，自2021年以来，约有15万香港人通过英国国民（海外）签证计划（BNO）涌入香港，
[14]链接至脚注
其中大多数人能说流利的粤语，许多人还精通普通话和其他中文。对于那些有兴趣的人，应该创建新的渠道，将这些语言专业知识——以及更广泛的文化视角——融入政策制定中。这可能需要对现行的审查程序进行一定程度的审查，目前的审查程序通常会默认排除与中国有密切家庭关系的申请人，但政府的出发点应该是将BNO身份持有者视为值得欢迎的竞争性资产，而不是潜在的安全威胁。
事实上，对审查流程进行更广泛、以中国为重点的审查，可能有助于充分利用现有的中国专业知识。目前，几乎所有拥有最深厚语言和文化专业知识的群体——英国海外公民（BNO）、在中国有家人的人以及在中国生活过很长时间的人——都发现很难获得最高级别的审查许可。
相反，英国政府倾向于在内部培训专家——这在一个旨在奖励通才的体系中尤其棘手，因为该体系往往会在新培训的员工刚开始理解其职责时就将其调离。再加上专业领域内缺乏晋升激励，中国专家的培训成本高昂，而且难以留住。由于英国公民在中国居住的时间相对较少，而且对在中国居住的英国公民的安全程序也越来越严格，因此，英国政府可能难以将真正的中国知识融入到强大的挑战职能中，而主要依赖于仅在内部培训的专家，而这些专家中的许多人在中国的经验有限或根本没有，而且通常只接受相同的信息培训。
这并非英国独有的挑战——我们的许多“五眼联盟”伙伴国也面临着类似的问题。这样做的好处是，在调整风险管理框架以适应以中国为重点的职位独特且不断变化的风险状况方面，存在着扩大合作的空间，从而建立最佳实践。
将专业知识传播到英国政府之外，以提高议员的中国素养
迄今为止，用于中国能力建设的资金翻番似乎几乎完全针对公务员，而不是那些往往是英国中国战略公众形象的议员。
同样，将部分资金引导到英国政府之外，提供量身定制的英语素养培训也具有巨大的潜力。当然，这说起来容易做起来难：议员及其工作人员日程繁忙，而且被期望成为各领域通才。许多人也可能对一个劳动密集型的话题缺乏兴趣，这在很多情况下与他们的选区职责几乎没有直接关系，这也是可以理解的。
但基本的中国素养仍然至关重要。部分原因在于，作为一个跨领域的政策议题，其对选区义务的间接影响往往很大，尤其是在拥有重要学术中心、英国海外公民（BNO）移民比例高或制造业基地发达的地区。此外，无论好坏，英中双边关系都异常依赖舆论。中国当局（以及社交媒体）对所谓的批评高度敏感，并且经常密切关注议会辩论和更广泛的政治辩论。
例如，备受推崇的前北约秘书长、负责监督英国战略防务评估的罗伯逊勋爵（Lord Robertson）声称，中国对英国构成“致命”威胁
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——这与现任和前几届政府的官方评估大相径庭——7月份在中国官方媒体和社交媒体上被广泛报道。
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这些报道大多将罗伯逊勋爵的个人观点与官方政府政策混为一谈，并对新政府领导下的双边关系走向表示悲观。
可以说，这种将个人观点或特别委员会报告与官方政策混为一谈的倾向，恰恰是中国可以从提升其在英国的影响力中受益的领域，而不是反过来。但面向公众的官员仍然应该意识到，两国在密切审查——有时甚至曲解——对方政治活动方面存在着明显的不对称，尤其是在政府更迭等关键时期。
这并不意味着英国应该回避关于中国的辩论，而是应该确保这些辩论尽可能地基于充分的信息。詹姆斯·克莱弗利在2023年8月访问北京之前，面临着一些激烈的批评，尽管英国一些最亲密的合作伙伴——其中一些将
英国对华政策远比英国强硬，因此推动了更积极的接触。批评接触行为本身，而不是关注基于问题的批评，从根本上误解了推动中国体制在英国关键优先事项上取得进展的最有效途径，例如取消中国对英国议员的制裁，或提起目前正在等待审判的香港媒体大亨黎智英的案件。
当然，目标绝不应是议会在中国问题上达成一致，但议会压力也不应达到阻碍高层对话的程度，而高层对话对于最大限度地利用双边机会和增强英国在分歧问题上推动真正变革的能力至关重要。哗众取宠和耸人听闻的做法收效甚微，反而为北京创造了机会，使其有机会向英国民众和全球南方的主要合作伙伴诋毁英国的意图。
要确保辩论信息充分，需要仔细考虑议员及其工作人员获取中国信息的方式。传统上，激进组织和商业利益集团一直是主要的信息来源，在新政府等待完成对英中关系的审计以充实和传达其战略之际，这种情况很可能将继续存在。两者都服务于有价值的目的，但往往追求相对狭隘的利益。这些团体和组织的简报应辅以清晰、定期的英国整体战略利益阐述。
英国政府应尽可能使其对华简报与议员的选区相关——这是与时间紧迫的议员沟通的最有效方式。事实上，确定受中国影响最大的选区——无论是通过贸易、投资还是民间联系——都可以成为正在进行的对华审计的重要组成部分。
在此基础上，政府应致力于在多个层面提供简报，确保所有议员都能接受基础的素养培训，并为感兴趣或拥有直接相关简报的议员提供便捷的途径，以便他们进一步了解更深层次的信息。
实现这一目标无需另辟蹊径。政府可以扩展现有架构，特别是英中中心（GBCC）。该中心成立于1974年，是一个旨在支持英中关系的独立机构。GBCC已通过定期项目提供广泛的培训和国内交流机会，在关注中国的社群（以及中国国内）中拥有强大的号召力，并且完全有能力为议员提供更有针对性的培训。
鉴于GBCC现有的基础设施和网络，扩大其职权范围可能是对能力建设支出进行成本效益高的利用。但这也需要采取更可持续的资金管理方式：GBCC的政府拨款在2022年6月被完全削减，并在2023年1月悄悄恢复到之前的70%
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——这限制了其在此过程中提前规划的能力。
公务员也可以通过其他途径与议员更直接地分享信息。例如，中国审计工作可能于明年初完成，这将为英国对外关系办公室（FCDO）和其他相关部门提供一个现成的机会，使其能够与议员接触，就英国的对华战略达成共识，超越当前的“竞争、挑战与合作”。
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再次强调，目标不应是阻碍议会辩论，而应确保辩论尽可能信息充分，并确保议员们能够清晰地表达政府如何看待英国的战略利益，这与前几届政府不同。
创建一个新的机构，协调政府内外的专业知识
英国对华政策常常出现分歧，部分原因在于缺乏强有力的交叉协调机制。以可持续、经济高效的方式构建能力，需要某种“倡导者”，推动政府内外不同机构的变革。
英国并非唯一面临这一挑战的国家。例如，美国国务院于2022年成立了中国事务协调办公室（非正式名称为“中国之家”），旨在整合各自分散的对华政策，并协调安全、经济和外交优先事项。
正如专业评论网站“北京对英国”和牛津中国政策实验室所指出的，一个类似的机构——或许可以借鉴外交关系协调办公室和内阁办公室的现有专业知识——将在很大程度上兑现工党“彻底改革”英中关系的承诺，并结束“在强硬言论和混乱行动之间摇摆不定”的局面。
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同样，政府可以赋能现有机构，例如“中国干部”（China Cadre），这是一个跨英国政府的团体，拥有400多名成员，他们对中国的经验水平各不相同。
无论如何
正如北京对英国事务的萨姆·霍格所指出的那样，
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英国已证明自己有能力建立富有创意的新架构来应对人工智能——这是另一个跨领域的政策挑战，难以轻易映射到现有的公务员结构中。中国是一个政策问题，需要采取同样开放的态度，以确保将合适的能力引入政府（尽管几乎所有高层政府讨论都需要获得批准，这是大多数人工智能讨论无需面对的一个关键制约因素）。
但无论是“中国之家”还是其他协调机制，建立合适的架构来评估能力并在政府内部和外部分配资金至关重要。目前用于中国能力的资金翻倍可能只会持续到2025年，但英国将在未来更长时间内面临这些挑战。抢占先机将是关键。
围绕政府：构建充满活力的中国生态系统，助力政府政策
英中关系超越政府层面：英国大学培养了超过15万名中国学生，
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据估计，超过9000家英国企业
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在中国运营，伦敦金融城是中国境外最大的人民币清算中心。
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这意味着，要有效地促进英国的利益，就需要在政府周围建立一个充满活力、了解中国的社群，该社群能够融入政府战略，并在必要时挑战政府战略。
发挥智库和学术界的作用
“中国之家”模式只有在更广泛的中国生态系统能够有效地与政府互动的情况下才能发挥作用。但英国目前缺乏两个关键要素：为智库专业人士和学者提供清晰的准入途径以支持政府政策制定，以及首先缺乏足够数量的外部中国相关职位。要弥合这一差距，并使英国成为世界领先的思想领导力中心，政府和智库自身都需要增强创业精神。
英国应借鉴美国“旋转门”政策制定方法的要素，即学科专家在政府、学术界和智库职位之间频繁流动。
然而，在英国，目前几乎没有直接进入外交和联邦事务部（FCDO）的中国专家的中期职业晋升途径，其他公务员队伍中也很少有这样的途径。现有的晋升途径是基于公务员能力框架，
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而非专业知识，这使得更熟悉该体系的现有公务员更具优势。对这一体系进行审查，并建立内部激励机制，以在进入公务员队伍后保留专业知识，将有助于解决第一个关键问题。
英国还可以从更清晰地了解如何整合外部专业知识中受益。根据2023年的一份新闻稿，
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一个“中国专家咨询小组”于2022年成立，旨在“测试并为政府政策制定提供参考”，但该小组的成员构成或活动细节尚未公开。这些能力计划的资金来源也同样缺乏透明度：2023年综合评估更新报告承诺将资金翻一番，但并未透露之前或新的资金数额。
英国不可能完全复制美国的“旋转门”系统，但这也未必是完全适合英国的模式。与英国相比，美国在向政策机构提供慈善捐赠方面拥有更成熟的文化，而且联邦政府会特意将资金拨给智库，以确保它们致力于解决与国家利益相关的问题。在中国问题上尤其如此，因为越来越多的人（即便在具体细节上，也在实质上）认为中国构成了“步调上的挑战”。
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并且，对这一挑战进行更深入的理解将直接惠及美国的国家利益。
但英国也拥有一些优势：英国政府、商界和学术界人士高度集中于一个城市，这使得跨部门对话更加容易，而且从某些方面来看，与美国两党对华立场相对一致的情况相比，英国拥有一个更加开放的辩论空间，能够接纳更广泛的中国观点。
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公务员和智库都拥有强大的号召力。
但要充分利用这些优势，需要在资金分配方面超越政府的局限。这可能包括：
为专注于中国事务的公务员提供智库借调。资助借调可以为公务员提供喘息空间，使其能够深化专业技能，并在此过程中提升英国在中国思想领导力方面的对外声誉。
通过专门的内部智库引进外部专家。欧盟的IDEA和印度的合作中心
当代中国研究既为外部专家进入政府部门，在与国家利益直接相关的领域开展工作开辟了途径。英国可以探索自己的模式。
为学生和未来公务员提供奖学金，支持他们在国内的学习，并为他们开辟政府职位的途径。这些奖学金可以效仿美国的博伦奖（Boren Awards），该奖项为研究关键语言和代表性不足的文化的学生提供高达2.5万美元的奖学金，条件是承诺至少一年的联邦政府服务。这些奖学金可以与公务员招聘中潜在的中国快速通道项目相结合。
支持帮助学生和学者发展政策技能的机构。英国大学的课程比美国大学的专业化程度和学术性要高得多，而且往往无法让学生掌握实际的政策技能。牛津政策参与网络（Oxford Policy Engagement Network）或更专业的牛津中国政策实验室（Oxford China Policy Lab）等组织致力于弥合学术界与政策界之间的差距。
将资金分配到政府之外，无疑有助于英国的能力建设更加可持续，因为这可以确保公务员（他们通常轮换任职）能够得到强大的外部职业专家网络的补充。
提升智库产出也是一种软实力激励：英国应该致力于使其机构成为全球领导人决策的首选参考。但正如奥利维亚·奥沙利文和布朗温·马多克斯在查塔姆研究所最近的一份报告中所述，在涉及中国问题时，英国的“公共和政治辩论往往依赖于美国、欧洲和澳大利亚的研究”。
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目前，英国正在流失大量潜在的中国人才，要么流失到其他国家（尤其是那些在外部研究方面领先的国家），要么流失到不面向中国的职位。吸引和留住海外人才更加困难，其中包括在英国大学学习中国和汉语的大量外国学生——他们占2022/2023学年中国研究专业学生总数的25%以上。
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公务员招聘改革进展缓慢是可以理解的，但与此同时，加大政府对外部机构的支持力度，可以同时在这两个方面提供帮助，确保英国拥有足够的能力吸收中国人才，并在此过程中提升软实力。英国应该在这方面雄心勃勃——它拥有成为全球最重要对话之一中最具影响力的参与者之一的必要条件。
与商界建立更有效的双向沟通??
近年来，英国与中国的部长级接触几乎处于真空状态，导致英国商界往往在疫情后重新与中国接触方面发挥了带头作用。
加强企业与政府之间的对话机制是长期能力建设的关键，这既可以防止政府和企业追求目标分歧，又能确保企业自身的观点和专业知识被纳入政策制定。
事实上，在华业务规模较大的公司，专家的中国知识水平往往与公务员同行不相上下，甚至更高。这是招聘结构的必然结果：私营部门的专家能够保留其专业领域，而不必像公务员那样在不同部门之间轮换；丰富的国内经验被视为竞争优势，而不是审查流程中的复杂因素。在商业环境中，专家对其洞察力的质量也更直接负责。
这意味着政府能够提供的最有价值的指导不一定是帮助培养传统的中国能力。相反，其目标应该是增强企业理解和应对政府优先事项的能力。例如，2021年《国家安全与投资法》（NSI法）引入了一项新的法定制度，以国家安全为由审查并可能阻止17个关键领域的收购和投资，使英国与许多关键合作伙伴保持一致。
然而，关于哪些项目需要“受理”审查的决策机制不透明（2022/23年度超过40%的受理项目涉及中国企业
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）导致一些企业难以进行前瞻性规划。上届政府难以清晰地传达《国家安全与投资法》的意图，以至于工党指责2023年11月对该法案的审查旨在削弱对华强硬立场，
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而中国大使馆则表示担心该法案实际上会被用来加强控制。
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一般来说，在这种情况下，更清晰地传达政府目标——以及红线——将大大有助于企业和政府采取一致行动。
即将公布的中国审计结果。
在制定此类政策的过程中，还应更积极地咨询企业以及更广泛的非政府利益相关者。目前的对话往往是非正式或临时性的，在某些情况下可能有效，但应辅以更有条理的渠道——可能由中国之家等机构或其他能力倡导者监督。
对于目前在中国的利益相关者来说尤其如此。在提升英国能力方面，实地视角至关重要。但英国目前面临着一个悖论：在中国待的时间越长，他们的见解往往越有价值——但这种长期性也使得获得充分利用这些见解所需的批准变得更加困难。
这使得开辟新的磋商渠道变得更加重要。例如，英国商会和英中贸易协会等贸易机构是最擅长与中国当局定期接触的机构之一——尤其是在英国长期缺乏高层对话之后。他们还定期发布分析和民意调查，提供英国企业在华经验的详细资料，而这仅凭英国外交网络是无法获得的。
最后，或许最重要的是认识到政府和企业对中国研究能力有着共同的兴趣。无论是政府内部还是企业员工，对大中华区知识的了解，对于在华业务规模庞大的企业都具有战略意义。一些企业在支持以中国为重点的智库和教育项目方面发挥了关键作用。尤其是太古集团，它投入了大量资源，资助了英国最大的普通话项目，并最近在牛津大学捐赠了一个新的普通话教育中心。更紧密的合作，将公共和私营部门的优秀项目结合起来，将是发展英国真正需要的可持续的中国研究能力的关键。
政府面前：促进中国研究的无摩擦教育进步
在政府内部和周边培养合适的能力意味着要提前做好准备。英国需要一批对中国感兴趣并愿意利用这些专业知识造福英国的年轻人。
在学校打造人才输送渠道
目前，中文的普及率正在下降——而与此同时，英国正将中国视为一项“划时代”的挑战。截至2022年，只有7%的公立学校和22%的私立学校将普通话作为Key Stage 3课程的正式科目进行教学。
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自2019年以来，A-Level考试的报考人数大幅下降，
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大学报告称，学生对普通话的兴趣也在下降。
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尽管普通话教育也具有很高的成本效益：据估计，2022年，英国经济的收益成本比至少为2:1。
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相比之下，中国拥有约4亿英语学习者，超过了美国的总人口。在关键的国内学习体验方面，英国也存在巨大的不对称性：截至2022年，据估计英国在中国大陆只有几百名学生，而2022/23学年，英国有15.4万名中国大陆学生。
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英国关于普通话教育的争论主要集中在孔子学院——中国政府运营的语言和文化机构——上。这是一个重要的问题，但它可能会掩盖一个更重要、更关键的问题：在每个教育阶段，应该如何让学习者尽可能轻松地开始或继续学习中国？又需要如何让学生有信心，相信他们的技能将会受到追捧？
正如牛津大学中国中心前主任拉纳·米特教授在其高等教育政策研究所2022年汉语教育报告的前言中指出的那样，
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英国需要两种类型的中国通才：一类是规模较小、专心致志的专家，他们通常拥有深厚的语言能力；另一类是规模较大、对中国体系有着深入理解的通才。
教育体系应体现这两种需求，并共同关注以下方面：
拓宽学习中国（包括语言和文化研究）的途径
将中国纳入核心课程的主流，以提升更广泛的中国通才水平
实现上述目标的第一步是消除现行体系中的重大障碍。有些障碍是全国性的，有些则对弱势地区或社区的影响尤为严重。扩大汉语学习渠道至关重要：最终目标应该是让普通话成为一门包容性语言，而非精英语言。
表2 – 中国研究如何
普通话和汉语可以在关键教育阶段得到促进
阶段
现状
关键建议
GCSE 考试前
只有一小部分学习者有机会尝试学习普通话。能否获得学习机会往往取决于学校是否参与了多项不同的计划。政府的“普通话卓越计划”尤其在较富裕地区开展。
太古集团旗下的中文语言基金会（最大的普通话项目）的资助周期将于 2026 年结束。鉴于太古集团的项目专注于扩大弱势群体的学习机会，政府应尽快探索如何防止提供普通话的学校数量下降。
GCSE
在英格兰，学习者随后将进入 GCSE 考试。报考人数正在快速增长——2023年有超过7000名学生参加了GCSE考试，是2019年的两倍多。这部分（但并非全部）增长很可能是由于持有BNO（英国国民海外侨民）签证从香港移居到英国的学生。
目前，对于非普通话母语人士，GCSE考试尚无明确的升学途径，原因如下。需要进行A-Level改革，以创建这条途径，并说服更多学校相信GCSE考试在经济上是可行的。
A-Level
这是最棘手的阶段：此前只面向非普通话母语人士的大学预科普通话资格已于2023年取消，这使得中文A-Level成为英格兰学生唯一的选择（苏格兰学生仍然可以选择备受好评的高级课程）。几乎所有高分都出自母语人士之手，这意味着非母语学习者如果想在顶尖大学学习中文（或任何其他课程），应该避免参加A-Level考试——因为这会导致在结构化学习中出现不必要的两年空档。
改进五年级关键阶段（Key Stage 5）课程设置的方案包括：
- 改革现有A-Level考试，使其包含非语言成分
- 批准拟议的“中华文明A-Level考试”，该考试不包含语言成分
- 设立一个新的、理想情况下由大学支持的中文资格证书，可能效仿音乐评分制
高等教育
选择包含中国元素课程的学生越来越少——2022年只有815人，
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自2014年以来下降了25%以上。
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这可能是翻译技术进步和中国软实力相对较弱（例如与日本或韩国相比）的结果。其中许多也是联合荣誉课程，往往无法培养学生的普通话专业工作能力。
需要改革以中国为重点的课程设置，以适应不断变化的学生和就业市场需求。此外，还应将中国研究更多地纳入其他学位课程的主流，以培养具备混合技能的毕业生，包括提供诸如“中国联系奖学金”之类的出国留学机会。
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毕业
毕业生经常面临需求侧的问题。私营部门的职位空缺有限，而且，除了安全部门外，目前没有政府职位提供给应届毕业生，让他们能够运用并保留其中国专业知识。发达审查的审批过程可能需要一年多的时间，这对于许多应届毕业生来说往往在经济上难以承受。
需要让学生们确信他们的技能是有需求的，最好从六年级开始。政府应提升毕业生的吸纳能力，包括拟定的中国快速通道（以之前的欧盟快速通道为蓝本），以吸纳中国毕业生和母语为母语的毕业生，因为他们不仅具备语言技能，还具备更广泛的技能。目前也是鼓励毕业生获得重要国内经验的关键时期。
所有这一切的根源在于一个供给侧问题：教师队伍。新政府承诺培训6500名新的中学教师，目标是“培养孩子们为生活、工作和未来做好准备的关键科目”。
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普通话应成为其中的核心，牛津大学教育系最近宣布成立的中文学习与教学中心，由太古集团提供初始资金，将有力地推动这一进程。该中心预计将于2026年投入运营，提供普通话研究生教育证书（PGCE）课程，并引领教学最佳实践的研究。
但英国高级普通话水平的人才库规模较小，这必然导致招聘难度高于其他科目——这意味着留住现有教师至关重要。太古中文基金的资助周期在2026年结束后，一些学校——尤其是那些资金严重紧张的学校——可能会不再提供普通话课程。防止普通话课程的减少至关重要。
利用新的学习方式
除此之外，政府还应探索两条额外的途径，以最大限度地扩大普通话学习的覆盖面，并解决一些问题。
当前教育体系中存在严重的地区和社会经济不平等。
数字化学习：普通话教学传统上非常耗费人力。例如，学习声调需要大量的一对一发音练习，而其他常用语言则不需要。但新的教育科技工具可以为传统课堂教学提供高度个性化的补充：像HelloChinese这样的应用程序使用语音识别软件进行声调练习，而某些大型语言模型可以提供个性化的书面练习或实时对话练习，内容针对学习者的兴趣，反馈也针对他们的水平。
正如TBI在其关于提供技术支持教育的报告中所述，将人工智能融入课堂需要精心构建合适的赋能环境。但普通话可能是一个特别有前景的用例。英国政府已宣布投资400万英镑，用于训练新的人工智能模型，使其能够根据国家课程指导制定新的教案和内容。
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而国立台湾大学的国际汉语课程正在利用生成式人工智能创建专门的普通话教学材料。
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教育部应考虑如何利用基于国家课程普通话内容训练的新型人工智能模型来支持教师和学习者。
同样，加强远程教学的整合也有助于解决目前普通话教师地区分布不均的问题，并有可能为吸引中国大陆和台湾的母语人士提供更多支持提供途径。
终身学习：为年长学习者创造更多学习途径也至关重要。加强对来自与中国无关职业道路的人员的中后期职业培训，有助于培养必要的混合技能，以应对中国带来的交叉政策挑战。再次强调，教育科技工具有着巨大的潜力，可以帮助英国将学习与现有的工作和育儿安排结合起来。
第四章
结论
如果没有正确的计划，英国就有可能在对华政策上被摆布。北京（以及华盛顿）对英国的对华政策有着清晰的认识。英国也应该制定一个这样的政策。
希望此次对华审计能够代表英国朝着明确表达其对华期望以及实现这一目标所需条件迈出的重要一步。但此次审计必须被视为能力建设的第一步，而非最终一步。中国——以及世界各国应对中国的方式——将继续给英国带来一系列不断变化的交叉挑战。目前行之有效的方法不太可能在短短几年内仍然有效。
正因如此，构建一套具有长远眼光的灵活能力至关重要。同样重要的是要认清财务现实：英国的能力战略必须具有成本效益，并且尽可能实现自我维持。
因此，英国必须超越目前对政府内部能力建设的关注，采取以下综合视角：
重新思考语言需求，弥合英国政府和英国议会之间关于中国文化素养的差距
致力于将能力建设支出拨给政府外部，以培育世界领先的智库和商业生态系统
创建一个联合的教育渠道，使中国和汉语研究更加易于理解和包容
这些举措的背后应该是一位能够推动政府内外变革的领军人物，甚至可能为其他关键的跨领域政策挑战提供经验教训。
好消息是，政府并非从零开始；这主要关乎构建正确的架构和激励机制。事实上，构建中国能力既是机遇，也是挑战：只要采取正确的方法，英国就具备成为未来十年最紧迫对话之一的领军人物所需的条件。
Reimagining the UK's China Capabilities: A Joined-Up Approach to an "Epoch-Defining Challenge"
https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/reimagining-the-uks-china-capabilities-a-joined-up-approach-to-an-epoch-defining-challenge
By Multiple experts Nov 15 2024
CHAPTER 1
The need to build the United Kingdom’s China capabilities is a rare point of agreement in an otherwise fractious debate: whether China represents the UK’s biggest strategic opportunity or biggest strategic threat, we need to understand it.
As China shifts gears on several fronts, this is truer than ever. Beijing’s all-out push for technological innovation at home and more sophisticated toolbox overseas both promise to rework the terms on which the UK deals with China. At the same time, complex new dynamics are emerging as key partners forge ahead with their own, at points conflicting, responses to China’s global role.
Successive governments have recognised the task facing the UK. The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 labelled China an “epoch-defining challenge” and committed to doubling funding for China capabilities. The new government has similarly called for an audit of the UK-China relationship that will assess the UK’s current China toolbox.
The audit is due to be completed early next year, by which time there will be a new US administration with clear ideas on what it expects from the UK on China. That means the UK needs to urgently establish what we ourselves want from the relationship with China – and the tools we need to get there.
Adopting the right approach is crucial. The challenges and opportunities China presents are fundamentally intersectional; ensuring the appropriate set of agile, cross-disciplinary capabilities are in place is key to navigating our relationship – and will deliver a return on investment in the years to come.
To do this the UK must spend smarter, not just spend more. Historically, the UK’s capabilities work has focused disproportionally on learning and development within the civil service in Whitehall, often on part-time language courses that have little strategic benefit to the UK.
A more holistic view of capability building that recognises the diversity of the UK’s points of contact with China is needed. These points of contact include members of parliament, the public face of the UK’s political engagement (335 of whom are new), and the business community, which has often spearheaded post-Covid engagement in the absence of ministerial visits. Another brewing issue should also be recognised: the number of China-focused students is falling, compromising the UK’s ability to build a sustainable pipeline of new talent.
In other words, the UK needs a strategy that is not only focused on government, but on ecosystems around it and on the pipeline of talent into it. This paper suggests three over-arching goals that should form the foundation of the UK’s work to build capabilities:
Together, these goals can help the UK meet the scale of the challenges and opportunities laid out in the Integrated Review and build out a coherent strategy worthy of an “epoch-defining challenge”.
If, as the cliche goes, China thinks in decades, then the UK probably should too. That does not mean locking us into a rigid plan, but developing agile capabilities that recognise that the China the UK will deal with in ten years’ time could be markedly different to the China of today – presenting a different set of policy challenges and opportunities.
Of course, the UK’s relationship with China does not exist in a vacuum. The UK also requires a set of capabilities that can adapt to China’s evolving role in the world more broadly.
This will depend on the UK developing a robust understanding of other countries’ emerging capabilities. Nowhere is that truer than for China, a player large enough that decisions taken in Beijing reshape global markets and supply chains. China is currently directing significant resources to areas ranging from artificial intelligence and nuclear capabilities to critical-minerals’ processing and semiconductor production – all of which should be factored into the UK’s own strategies.
Take electric vehicles (EVs) as an example. The UK’s challenge is not just navigating China’s immense production capacity – EV exports increased 80 per cent from 2022 to 2023, making China the world’s largest auto-exporter
– but also navigating delicate relationships with other key players. This challenge will require developing a sovereign approach: what works for the European Union, with its large auto-manufacturing base, or the US, which is pushing more broadly to retain technological leadership, will not necessarily work for the UK. Beijing’s favoured approach of unrestricted trade is unlikely to be right for the UK either: the US and EU are likely to pressure the UK not to become a “dumping ground” for Chinese EVs, and the UK would risk creating over-dependency on a sole supplier of a product key to the net-zero transition.The EV example will likely be the first of many as emerging technologies present tricky questions on how to achieve the right balance between climate, growth, security and diplomatic priorities. In the past few years the UK has fallen behind other players – including China itself – in outlining strategies that articulate how it will protect competitive advantages and safeguard against vulnerabilities in key sectors.
But this need for technological competitiveness is unlikely to let up. In Beijing, the view that China’s long-term security and stability is dependent on innovation in critical technologies is now embedded at the highest levels of power. Eight out of China’s 24 top leaders are STEM technocrats, with many more rising through the ranks. And while there is much that divides the two parties in the US, one point of consensus is that the US must maintain “as large of a lead as possible” over China in the technologies critical to future competitiveness.
As the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (TBI) has set out in its New National Purpose series, the UK enjoys significant competitive advantages in key areas – especially biotech, AI and data. But trade-offs will still be inevitable. Making the right calls to maintain competitiveness will require nurturing new talent with hybrid skillsets that bring together the best of the UK’s technical expertise with more sophisticated understandings of how key Chinese systems work.
China is currently shifting away from its traditional model of overseas engagement, which has often been described as serving as a “no strings attached” economic partner.
Instead, Beijing is taking an increasingly proactive approach to global governance, aiming to build consensus on China’s core principles of “mutual non-interference” and the rights of countries to carve out their own development paths – all under the banner of “building a community with a shared future for mankind”.
The flagship Belt and Road Initiative is becoming “leaner, cleaner and greener”,
and is being supplemented by a sophisticated range of new initiatives that expand China’s offer in everything from conflict mediation to vocational training.
This shift has significant implications for how the UK engages both China and development partners. The international community was slow to grasp the Belt and Road Initiative’s scope after its 2013 launch; the UK must avoid repeating this mistake. As China enters a new phase of trial and error, the UK should act early to start disaggregating where the risks and opportunities lie.
Take international development, where China is ramping up resources, including a $5 billion special fund under the auspices of the new Global Development Initiative. In some areas, particularly digital infrastructure, there might be areas where the UK feels more needs to be done to support partner countries in avoiding lock-in effects or security risks. But there will be others where there is significant complementarity between the UK’s depth of development expertise and China’s ability to deliver at speed and scale.
The same is true of China’s Global Security Initiative, already credited with Beijing’s mediation of the final stages of Iran-Saudi normalisation in March 2023
and the brokering of an agreement between 14 Palestinian factions in July 2024.There will be limits to how much China moves from its current low-risk model of conflict mediation, but Beijing’s desire to be seen as a “responsible great power”means the UK should be anticipating a more active Chinese role in “global hotspot issues”.There are certain to be ongoing areas of disagreement. But the UK should not look past the fact that there is often an underappreciated shared interest in stability between the UK and China too, whether that is in managing the risks of frontier AI, keeping global financial systems stable or advancing the green transition. Building up the ability to distinguish between the two will not only make for a more constructive bilateral relationship, but it will also make the UK far more credible to its partners in the Global South, where China is already strides ahead.
But together these scenarios give a sense of the range of intersectional challenges the UK is likely to face in the coming decade – and the potential costs of not having the right structures in place. These are challenges that not only cut across department, but beyond government too. A successful response will depend not just on pockets of departmental expertise, but on the UK’s ability to align action across Whitehall, Parliament and key private actors.
The UK has an enviable foundation for building capabilities: a world-leading Sinology academic community and strong pools of expertise concentrated within the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Department for Business and Trade, the Cabinet Office and the security services, with emerging capabilities within the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology too. The government also has budget for it: the Integrated Review Refresh 2023 committed to doubling funding for China capabilities.
But the government has consistently struggled to diffuse expertise beyond these silos – and the UK’s ability to respond coherently to China has suffered as a result.
Under consecutive Conservative governments, the UK occupied a spectrum of positions on China. Under David Cameron, the relationship enjoyed a so-called “golden era” of deepened economic and diplomatic ties, but by 2022 Rishi Sunak was claiming “China and the Chinese Communist Party represent the largest threat to Britain and the world’s security and prosperity”.
Sunak may have softened his position once in power – then foreign secretary James Cleverly claimed that labelling China a threat would be a “betrayal of our national interest and a wilful misunderstanding of the modern world”– but the inconsistent approach nonetheless constrained Whitehall’s ability to forward plan and gained the UK a reputation for “wavering” in Beijing.This inconsistency has not been helped by unusually limited official engagement either: before Foreign Minister David Lammy visited China in October 2024, the UK had had just three ministerial visits to China in the previous six years, and Cleverly was labelled a “Chinese stooge” ahead of his 2023 Beijing trip.
In the meantime, key partners have forged ahead on two fronts, both engaging more with China – the US, Germany, France, Australia and Italy have all had post-Covid head of state meetings – and by putting more substantial measures in place to protect key areas of vulnerability. The UK’s relative inaction on both fronts has harmed no-one but the UK itself.
The new government has committed to addressing the UK’s “divided and inconsistent” China strategies,
but this is easier said than done. One key component will be re-engaging (and making the case to Westminster that engagement does not equal acquiescence), but an equally important component will be ensuring that this engagement is underpinned by a robust set of capabilities enabling it to genuinely work in the UK’s interest.To that end, the UK should move beyond its current government-centric approach towards a three-pronged approach that aims to build a sustainable, mutually reinforcing set of China capabilities that recognise the breadth of this “epoch-defining challenge”.
There is often a mismatch between Whitehall and Westminster; parliamentary debates are often significantly out of step with specialist assessments and sometimes rely on outdated or misinformed information.
Bridging this gap is increasingly important as the UK welcomes a record 335 new MPs who will be the public face of the UK’s China policy. The better informed the debate, the better the UK can pursue its interests.
The US Foreign Service Institute classes Mandarin as a “super-hard language”
that requires roughly 2,200 hours of study to reach professional working proficiency, compared to just 750 hours for French and 1,100 hours for Russian. On top of that, the ability to fully understand Chinese party-state discourse requires additional specialist linguistic and contextual training.Instead, the priority should be English-language training that builds broad-based China literacy. There are relatively few roles in which knowledge of Mandarin, especially at a level below working proficiency, is relevant. There are many more, however, in which a more sophisticated understanding of Chinese systems would allow civil servants to operate more effectively in key areas of UK interest: critical technologies, trade, international development and global health, among others.
The government has been trialling more of this sort of training since 2021, and the FCDO’s China Capabilities Unit has been central to driving forward a more strategic approach to capacity-building, offering training to almost 1,000 civil servants in 2023. These English-language programmes are reportedly consistently oversubscribed. Expanding access to these, not entry-level language learning, should continue to be prioritised going forward.
The government should also be looking beyond traditional language-learning routes. Quickly advancing translation technology and new AI models can not only help individual civil servants’ language capabilities, but can also boost the UK’s ability to scrape and process foreign-language intelligence at scale. This is particularly important when dealing with a system that produces vast amounts of highly context-dependent information.
There are of course potential security risks from incorporating new technologies into sensitive areas, but in general technologies such as multi-language open-source intelligence (OSINT) systems, translation memory software and context-aware AI models offer promising supplements to conventional capabilities. This is something to factor into long-term planning: even if the right solutions are not available now, many of these technologies will be significantly more advanced in a few years’ time.
Even more promising is the influx of about 150,000 Hong Kongers since 2021 as part of the UK’s British National (Overseas) (BNO) visa scheme,
the majority of whom are fluent Cantonese speakers and many of whom are highly proficient in Mandarin and other Chinese languages. For those interested, new channels should be created to integrate this linguistic expertise – as well as integrate broader cultural perspectives – into policymaking. This will likely require a certain level of review to current vetting procedures, which often rule out by default applicants with close family ties to China, but the government’s starting position should be to approach BNO-status holders as a competitive asset to be welcomed, not as potential security threats.In fact, a broader, China-focused review of vetting processes could go a long way to tapping into existing China expertise. Currently, almost all groups with the deepest linguistic and cultural expertise – BNOs, those with family in China and those who have spent significant time in China – find it extremely difficult to get the highest levels of clearance.
Instead, Whitehall tends to have to train specialists in-house – something that is especially tricky in a system designed to reward generalists and which tends to move on newly trained staff just as they are starting to understand their brief. This, combined with poor progression incentives within specialisms, makes China specialists both costly to train and difficult to retain. As a relatively small number of UK citizens spend time in China to begin with, and security processes tighten for those who do, there is a risk that Whitehall struggles to incorporate real China knowledge into a robust challenge function and instead relies primarily on specialists trained solely in-house, many of whom have limited or no in-country exposure and are often trained on the same information sets.
This is not a challenge unique to the UK – many of our Five Eyes partners are facing similar issues. The upside of this is that there is scope for greater collaboration to establish best practice when it comes to adapting risk-management frameworks suited to the unique – and evolving – risk profile of China-focused roles.
Again, there is significant potential to direct some of this funding beyond Whitehall to provide tailored English-language literacy training. This, of course, is easier said than done: MPs and their staff have demanding schedules and are expected to be subject-matter generalists. Many are also likely to have an understandable lack of interest in a labour-intensive topic that, in many cases, has little direct bearing on their constituency duties.
But a baseline of China literacy is still crucial. That is partly because, as a cross-cutting policy issue, the indirect bearing on constituency duties is often substantial, particularly in areas with significant academic centres, high levels of BNO migration or major manufacturing bases. It is also because, for better or worse, the UK-China bilateral relationship is unusually dependent on optics. Chinese authorities (and social media) are highly sensitive to perceived criticism, and often pay close attention to parliamentary debates and broader political debate.
For example, an assertion from Lord Robertson, the highly regarded former NATO chief who is overseeing the UK’s strategic defence review, that China presents a “deadly” threat to the UK
– a significant departure from both the current and previous governments’ official assessments – was widely reported in Chinese state and social media in July.Much of this reporting conflated Lord Robertson’s personal views with official government policy and expressed pessimism over the direction of the bilateral relationship under the new government.Arguably, this tendency to conflate personal views or select-committee reports with official policy is an area where China could benefit from boosting its UK capabilities, rather than vice-versa. But public-facing officials should still be aware of the stark asymmetry in how closely each country scrutinises – and at times misinterprets – the other’s political activity, particularly during key periods such as a change in government.
None of this means that the UK should avoid debate on China, but rather that it should ensure those debates are as well-informed as possible. James Cleverly faced pockets of fierce criticism ahead of his Beijing trip in August 2023, even as some of the UK’s closest partners – some with far more assertive China policies than the UK – pushed ahead on more active engagement. Criticising the act of engagement itself – rather than focusing on issue-based criticism – fundamentally misunderstands the most effective ways to push for progress in the Chinese system on key UK priorities, such as removing Chinese sanctions on UK parliamentarians or raising the case of Hong Kong media mogul Jimmy Lai, who is currently awaiting trial.
The aim, of course, should never be parliamentary unity on China, but nor should parliamentary pressure reach the point that it prevents the high-level dialogue necessary both for maximising bilateral opportunities and enhancing the UK’s ability to affect genuine change on issues of disagreement. Grandstanding and sensationalism achieve little – and create opportunities for Beijing to discredit the UK’s intentions, both to its own population and to key partners in the Global South.
Ensuring debates are well informed requires careful consideration of how MPs and their staff access information on China. Traditionally, activist organisations and business interest groups have been the primary sources of information, and this will likely remain the case as the new government waits for the completion of its audit of the UK-China relationship to flesh out and communicate its strategy. Both serve valuable purposes, but also often pursue a relatively narrow set of interests. Briefings from these groups and organisations should be complemented by clear, regular articulation of the UK’s overall strategic interest.
Wherever possible, Whitehall should make its China briefing relevant to MPs’ constituencies – the most effective way to cut through to time-constrained lawmakers. In fact, identifying the constituencies most impacted by China – whether through trade, investment or people-to-people ties – could form an important element of the ongoing China audit.
With this in place, the government should aim to provide briefings at multiple levels, ensuring all MPs are exposed to a baseline level of literacy training and providing easy avenues for those interested or with directly relevant briefs to progress to deeper levels.
There is no need to reinvent the wheel to deliver this. Government could expand existing architecture, in particular the Great Britain-China Centre (GBCC), an arms-length body established in 1974 to support UK-China relations. The GBCC, which already provides extensive training and in-country exposure through regular programmes, has significant convening power among the China-watching community (and in China itself), and would be well-placed to offer more targeted training to MPs.
Given its existing infrastructure and networks, an expanded remit for GBCC would likely be a cost-effective use of capabilities spending. But this would also require a more sustainable approach to its funding: the GBCC had its government funding cut completely in June 2022 and quietly restored to just 70 per cent of its previous funding in January 2023
– constraining its ability to plan ahead in the process.There are also routes for the civil service to share information more directly with MPs. The completion of the China audit, for example, potentially early next year, will provide a ready-made opening for the FCDO and other relevant departments to engage parliamentarians and build out a shared understanding of the UK’s China strategy beyond the current “compete, challenge and cooperate”.
Again, the aim should not be to hinder parliamentary debate, but to ensure that debate is as well-informed as possible and that MPs, unlike under previous governments, have a clear articulation of how the government sees the UK’s strategic interest to respond to.Creating a New Body to Align Expertise Across Government – and Beyond
Part of the reason for the UK’s often divergent approaches to China is the absence of a strong mechanism for cross-coordination. Building out capabilities in a sustainable, cost-effective way will require some sort of “champion” that can drive change across different bodies within and around government.
The UK is not alone in facing this challenge. In 2022, for example, the US Department of State founded the Office of China Coordination, informally known as China House, to bring together fragmented approaches to China and align security, economic and diplomatic priorities.
As specialist commentary site Beijing to Britain and the Oxford China Policy Lab have pointed out, a similar body – perhaps drawing on existing expertise in the FCDO and Cabinet Office – could go a long way to delivering on Labour’s commitment to “overhaul” the UK-China relationship and put an end to “flip-flopping between tough talk and muddled actions”.
Equally, government could empower existing structures such as the China Cadre, a cross-Whitehall group with more than 400 members with varying levels of China experience.Either way, as Beijing to Britain’s Sam Hogg also points out,
the UK has proven itself capable of setting up inventive new structures to address AI – another cross-cutting policy challenge that does not map easily onto existing civil-service structures. China is a policy issue that requires a similarly open-minded approach to ensure that the right capabilities are brought into government (although the need for clearance for almost all high-level government discussions is a key constraint that most AI discussions do not face).But whether a China House or another co-ordination mechanism, having the right structures in place to assess capabilities and allocate funding within and around government will be crucial. The current doubling of funding for China capabilities may only be due to last until 2025, but the UK will be facing these challenges for far longer. Pre-empting demand will be key.
more than 9,000 British businessesare estimated to operate in China itself and the City of London is the biggest renminbi (RMB) clearing centre beyond China.That means effectively promoting the UK’s interests requires building up a vibrant, China-literate community around government that is able to feed into and, where necessary, challenge government strategy.Harnessing the Think-Tank and Academic Communities
A China House model will only work if the wider China ecosystem is capable of effectively engaging with the government. But the UK currently lacks two crucial elements: clear avenues of entry for think-tank professionals and academics to support government policymaking, and a sufficient number of external China-focused roles in the first place. A greater sense of entrepreneurialism, both from the government and think-tanks themselves, is needed to bridge this gap – and make the UK a world-leading centre for thought leadership.
The UK should aim to borrow elements of the US’s “revolving door” approach to policy, where it is common for subject experts to move between government, academic and think-tank positions.
In the UK, however, there are currently almost no direct mid-career entry routes into the FCDO for China specialists and relatively few elsewhere in the civil service. Those that do exist recruit based on the civil service competency framework,
rather than specialist expertise, giving existing civil servants more familiar with the system an advantage. A review of this system, as well as internal incentives to retain expertise once in the civil service, would help address the first of these key problems.The UK could also benefit from greater clarity on how it integrates external expertise. According to a 2023 press release,
a “China experts’ advisory group” was formed in 2022 to “test and inform government policymaking”, but no details have been made public on the group’s membership or activities. There is a similar lack of transparency when it comes to the funding of these capabilities initiatives: the Integrated Review Refresh 2023 committed to doubling funding but without any indication of the previous or new figures.A like-for-like replication of the US’s “revolving door” system is not possible – but nor is it necessarily quite the right model for the UK. The US has a more established culture of philanthropic giving to policy institutes than the UK and the federal government purposefully directs funds to think-tanks to ensure they work on problems relevant to the national interest. This is especially true when it comes to China, given there is a growing consensus (on the substance, if not the specifics) that China poses a “pacing challenge”
and that investment in greater understanding of that challenge directly benefits the US’s national interest.But the UK also has some advantages: a high concentration of China-facing government, business and academic professionals in a single city, making cross-sectoral dialogue easier, and by some measures, a more open debate space that welcomes a broader spectrum of views on China – compared to relative bipartisan consensus
on China in the US. Both the civil service and think-tanks also enjoy remarkable convening power.But making the most of these advantages will require a commitment to thinking beyond government when it comes to allocating pots of funding. This could include:
There is also a soft-power incentive to boost think-tank output: the UK should be aiming to make its institutions a go-to for informing global leaders’ decision-making. But as Olivia O’Sullivan and Bronwen Maddox set out in a recent Chatham House report, when it comes to China, the UK’s “public and political debate often relies on US, European and Australian research”.
Currently the UK is losing substantial potential China talent either to other countries – especially those that lead on external research – or to non-China-facing positions. It is even harder to attract and retain talent from abroad, including the significant number of foreign students who study China and Chinese languages at UK universities – accounting for more than 25 per cent of all Chinese Studies students enrolled in the academic year 2022/2023.
Reforms of civil-service recruitment can be understandably slow-moving, but directing greater government support to external organisations in the meantime could help on both those fronts, ensuring the UK has the right absorption capacity for China talent and providing a soft-power boost in the process. The UK should be ambitious here – it has the right raw ingredients to be one of the most relevant players in one of the most relevant global conversations.
Strengthening the dialogue mechanisms between business and government is key to long-term capability building, both to prevent government and business pursuing divergent objectives, and also to ensure that business’ own perspectives and expertise are factored into policymaking.
In fact, specialists at companies with significant China operations are often just as, or more, China-literate than their civil-service counterparts. This is a natural consequence of hiring structures: private-sector experts are able to retain their specialisms, rather than being rotated between briefs as in the civil service, and a significant amount of in-country experience is seen as a competitive advantage, rather than a complicating factor in vetting processes. In a business environment, specialists are also more directly on the hook for the quality of their insight.
That means that the most valuable guidance government can provide is not necessarily helping to train up conventional China capabilities. Instead, the aim should be to build up business’ capability to understand and navigate government priorities. The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (NSI Act), for example, introduced a new statutory regime to scrutinise and potentially block acquisitions and investments in 17 key sectors on national-security grounds, bringing the UK in line with many key partners.
But opaque decision-making structures regarding which projects are “called in” for scrutiny (more than 40 per cent of call-ins in 2022/23 involved Chinese firms
) have made forward planning difficult for some businesses. The previous government struggled to clearly communicate the intention of the NSI Act, to the point that Labour accused a review of the act in November 2023 of aiming to water down toughness on China,while the Chinese embassy expressed concern it would in fact be used to tighten control.In general, clearer communication of government objectives – and red lines – in cases like this would go a long way to helping business and government act in concert. The same goes for the upcoming findings from the China audit.
Business, and non-governmental stakeholders more broadly, should also be consulted more robustly in these sorts of policy processes. Current dialogue tends to be informal or ad hoc, which can be effective in some cases, but should be complemented by more structured channels – potentially overseen by a China House equivalent or other capabilities champion.
This is particularly true for those stakeholders currently in China. On-the-ground perspectives are immensely valuable when it comes to boosting the UK’s capabilities. But the UK currently faces a paradox: the longer someone has spent in China, the more useful their insight often is – but this longevity also makes it harder to get the clearance necessary to make the most of that insight.
This makes creating new avenues for consultation all the more vital. Trade bodies such as the British Chambers of Commerce and the China-Britain Business Council, for example, are among the best-versed in regular engagement with Chinese authorities – especially after the UK’s prolonged lack of high-level dialogue. They also regularly publish analysis and sentiment surveys that provide a level of granularity on the experiences of British businesses in China that would be impossible to obtain from the UK’s diplomatic networks alone.
Finally, it is perhaps most important to recognise that government and business have a shared interest in China capabilities. Greater China literacy, both within government and among their own hires, is strategically useful for companies with significant China operations, and some businesses have played a key role in supporting China-focused think-tanks and educational initiatives. Swire in particular has dedicated significant resources to funding the UK’s largest Mandarin programme and recently endowed a new centre for Mandarin education at the University of Oxford. Closer collaboration to bring together the best of public and private initiatives will be key to developing the genuinely sustainable China capabilities the UK needs.
A-Level entries have fallen significantly since 2019,and universities report a decline in interest.That is despite the fact that Mandarin education is highly cost-effective too: the benefit-to-cost ratio for the UK economy was estimated to be at least 2:1 in 2022.Compare that to China, which boasts an estimated 400 million English learners – more than the entire population of the US. There is also a huge asymmetry in crucial in-country exposure: as of 2022, the UK was thought to have just a few hundred students in mainland China, compared to 154,000 mainland Chinese students in the UK in 2022/23.
Debate over Mandarin education in the UK focuses disproportionately on Confucius Institutes – language and cultural institutes run by the Chinese government – an important question, but one that risks overshadowing a better, over-arching question: what should be done at each educational stage to make beginning or continuing the study of China as frictionless as possible for a learner? And what needs to be done to give students the confidence that their skillsets will be in demand?
As Professor Rana Mitter, the former director of Oxford University’s China Centre, points out in the foreword of the Higher Education Policy Institute’s 2022 report on Mandarin education,
the UK needs two types of China-literate talent: a smaller pool of committed specialists, often with deep linguistic ability, and a wider pool of generalists with a sophisticated understanding of the Chinese system.These dual needs should be reflected in the education system, with a joint focus on:
Underpinning all this is a supply-side question: a pipeline of teachers. The new government has pledged to train 6,500 new secondary-school teachers, targeting “key subjects to set children up for life, work and the future”.
Mandarin should be at the heart of this, and a recently announced centre for the learning and teaching of Chinese at the University of Oxford’s Department of Education, with initial funding from Swire, is well placed to drive this forward. The centre, which is expected to be operational from 2026, will provide a Mandarin postgraduate certificate in education (PGCE) programme and lead research into pedagogical best practice.
But the UK’s small pool of advanced Mandarin speakers will always make recruitment trickier than in other subjects – meaning retention of existing teachers is key. There is a risk that when the Swire Chinese Language Foundation’s funding cycle ends in 2026, some schools – particularly those under serious financial constraints – will no longer be able to offer Mandarin. Preventing a drop-off here will be crucial.
Digital learning: Mandarin tuition is traditionally very human-capital intensive. Learning tones, for example, requires extensive one-to-one pronunciation drills in a way no other commonly taught language does. But new edtech tools could offer hyper-personalised supplements to traditional classroom teaching: apps such as HelloChinese use voice-recognition software for tone practice, while certain large language models can provide personalised written exercises or live conversation practice, with content targeted to a learner’s interests and feedback targeted to their level.
As TBI set out in its report on delivering tech-enabled education, integrating AI into classrooms requires careful work to build the right enabling environment. But Mandarin could prove a particularly promising use case. The UK government has already announced £4 million in investment to train new AI models on national-curriculum guidance to produce new lesson plans and content,
while the National Taiwan University’s International Chinese Language Program is using generative AI to create Mandarin-specific educational materials.The Department for Education should consider how new AI models, trained on national-curriculum Mandarin content, could be used to support teachers and learners.Similarly, greater integration of remote teaching could also help address the current unequal regional distribution of Mandarin teachers – and provide a potential avenue to bring in additional support from native speakers in China and Taiwan.
Lifelong learning: Creating additional avenues of entry for older learners is also key. Greater mid- and late-career training of people from non-China-related career paths can help create the hybrid skillsets necessary to address the intersectional policy challenges China presents. Again, there is promising potential for edtech tools that can help fit learning around existing work and childcare commitments.
That is why building out an agile set of capabilities with a long-term view is crucial. So is recognising financial realities: the UK’s capability strategy must be cost-effective and, wherever possible, self-sustaining.
As such, the UK must move beyond its current focus on in-government capabilities and take a joined-up view of capabilities that:
The good news is that the government is not starting from a blank slate; this is primarily a question of building out the right structures and incentives. In fact, building China capabilities is an opportunity as much as a challenge: with the right approach, the UK has the right raw ingredients to become a leading voice in one of the next decade’s most pressing conversations.
As China shifts gears on several fronts, this is truer than ever. Beijing’s all-out push for technological innovation at home and more sophisticated toolbox overseas both promise to rework the terms on which the UK deals with China. At the same time, complex new dynamics are emerging as key partners forge ahead with their own, at points conflicting, responses to China’s global role.
Successive governments have recognised the task facing the UK. The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 labelled China an “epoch-defining challenge” and committed to doubling funding for China capabilities. The new government has similarly called for an audit of the UK-China relationship that will assess the UK’s current China toolbox.
The audit is due to be completed early next year, by which time there will be a new US administration with clear ideas on what it expects from the UK on China. That means the UK needs to urgently establish what we ourselves want from the relationship with China – and the tools we need to get there.
Adopting the right approach is crucial. The challenges and opportunities China presents are fundamentally intersectional; ensuring the appropriate set of agile, cross-disciplinary capabilities are in place is key to navigating our relationship – and will deliver a return on investment in the years to come.
To do this the UK must spend smarter, not just spend more. Historically, the UK’s capabilities work has focused disproportionally on learning and development within the civil service in Whitehall, often on part-time language courses that have little strategic benefit to the UK.
A more holistic view of capability building that recognises the diversity of the UK’s points of contact with China is needed. These points of contact include members of parliament, the public face of the UK’s political engagement (335 of whom are new), and the business community, which has often spearheaded post-Covid engagement in the absence of ministerial visits. Another brewing issue should also be recognised: the number of China-focused students is falling, compromising the UK’s ability to build a sustainable pipeline of new talent.
In other words, the UK needs a strategy that is not only focused on government, but on ecosystems around it and on the pipeline of talent into it. This paper suggests three over-arching goals that should form the foundation of the UK’s work to build capabilities:
- Increase China capabilities within government: Rethink Whitehall’s approach to language learning and increase the provision of English-language training to build broad-based China literacy. Diffuse China literacy more effectively across parliamentarians, including through constituency-relevant briefings.
- Increase China capabilities around government: Commit to allocating pots of capabilities funding beyond government to foster a vibrant ecosystem of China-focused think-tanks and businesses that can augment, not conflict with, government policy.
- Increase China capabilities before government: Make the decision to begin or continue studying China as frictionless as possible at every step of education, to create a robust pipeline of young people with an interest in China. Address key obstacles such as A-level provision and make full use of edtech solutions.
Together, these goals can help the UK meet the scale of the challenges and opportunities laid out in the Integrated Review and build out a coherent strategy worthy of an “epoch-defining challenge”.
FIGURE 1
How potential developments in China could affect the UK
Source: TBI analysis
Of course, the UK’s relationship with China does not exist in a vacuum. The UK also requires a set of capabilities that can adapt to China’s evolving role in the world more broadly.
Preparing the UK for a New Age of Technological Competitiveness
The UK needs to be ready to stake out its own interests in a decade set to be defined by global pushes for technological competitiveness and resilience.This will depend on the UK developing a robust understanding of other countries’ emerging capabilities. Nowhere is that truer than for China, a player large enough that decisions taken in Beijing reshape global markets and supply chains. China is currently directing significant resources to areas ranging from artificial intelligence and nuclear capabilities to critical-minerals’ processing and semiconductor production – all of which should be factored into the UK’s own strategies.
Take electric vehicles (EVs) as an example. The UK’s challenge is not just navigating China’s immense production capacity – EV exports increased 80 per cent from 2022 to 2023, making China the world’s largest auto-exporter
– but also navigating delicate relationships with other key players. This challenge will require developing a sovereign approach: what works for the European Union, with its large auto-manufacturing base, or the US, which is pushing more broadly to retain technological leadership, will not necessarily work for the UK. Beijing’s favoured approach of unrestricted trade is unlikely to be right for the UK either: the US and EU are likely to pressure the UK not to become a “dumping ground” for Chinese EVs, and the UK would risk creating over-dependency on a sole supplier of a product key to the net-zero transition.The EV example will likely be the first of many as emerging technologies present tricky questions on how to achieve the right balance between climate, growth, security and diplomatic priorities. In the past few years the UK has fallen behind other players – including China itself – in outlining strategies that articulate how it will protect competitive advantages and safeguard against vulnerabilities in key sectors.
But this need for technological competitiveness is unlikely to let up. In Beijing, the view that China’s long-term security and stability is dependent on innovation in critical technologies is now embedded at the highest levels of power. Eight out of China’s 24 top leaders are STEM technocrats, with many more rising through the ranks. And while there is much that divides the two parties in the US, one point of consensus is that the US must maintain “as large of a lead as possible” over China in the technologies critical to future competitiveness.
As the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (TBI) has set out in its New National Purpose series, the UK enjoys significant competitive advantages in key areas – especially biotech, AI and data. But trade-offs will still be inevitable. Making the right calls to maintain competitiveness will require nurturing new talent with hybrid skillsets that bring together the best of the UK’s technical expertise with more sophisticated understandings of how key Chinese systems work.
Preparing for a New Phase of Chinese Global Engagement
Planning ahead will also mean looking beyond the great-power competition between the US and China. Despite the UK’s wealth of development expertise and its commitment to engage more proactively with emerging and middle powers in the Integrated Review Refresh 2023, Global South countries consistently feature higher on Beijing’s agenda than on Westminster’s.China is currently shifting away from its traditional model of overseas engagement, which has often been described as serving as a “no strings attached” economic partner.
Instead, Beijing is taking an increasingly proactive approach to global governance, aiming to build consensus on China’s core principles of “mutual non-interference” and the rights of countries to carve out their own development paths – all under the banner of “building a community with a shared future for mankind”.
The flagship Belt and Road Initiative is becoming “leaner, cleaner and greener”,
and is being supplemented by a sophisticated range of new initiatives that expand China’s offer in everything from conflict mediation to vocational training.
Table 1 – How China’s overseas engagement is evolving
| Initiative | What it comprises |
|---|---|
| Belt and Road Initiative (2013) | Up to US$1 trillion in global infrastructure projects to boost global connectivity and increase China’s geostrategic influence |
| Global Development Initiative (2021) | Framework to help countries meet UN Sustainable Development Goals and reshape the global development agenda in line with Chinese priorities |
| Global Security Initiative (2022) | Attempt to redefine global security norms and challenge Western security concepts |
| Global Civilisation Initiative (2023) | Effort to promote “civilisational diversity” and challenge Western ideological dominance |
| Global AI Governance Initiative (2023) | Bid to shape international AI standards and increase representation of Global South |
Take international development, where China is ramping up resources, including a $5 billion special fund under the auspices of the new Global Development Initiative. In some areas, particularly digital infrastructure, there might be areas where the UK feels more needs to be done to support partner countries in avoiding lock-in effects or security risks. But there will be others where there is significant complementarity between the UK’s depth of development expertise and China’s ability to deliver at speed and scale.
The same is true of China’s Global Security Initiative, already credited with Beijing’s mediation of the final stages of Iran-Saudi normalisation in March 2023
and the brokering of an agreement between 14 Palestinian factions in July 2024.There will be limits to how much China moves from its current low-risk model of conflict mediation, but Beijing’s desire to be seen as a “responsible great power”means the UK should be anticipating a more active Chinese role in “global hotspot issues”.There are certain to be ongoing areas of disagreement. But the UK should not look past the fact that there is often an underappreciated shared interest in stability between the UK and China too, whether that is in managing the risks of frontier AI, keeping global financial systems stable or advancing the green transition. Building up the ability to distinguish between the two will not only make for a more constructive bilateral relationship, but it will also make the UK far more credible to its partners in the Global South, where China is already strides ahead.
China’s Impact Is Wide-Ranging – Our Capabilities Must Reflect That
The scenarios outlined earlier in this paper may not all materialise, while others not described here will inevitably emerge. Few, for example, could have predicted how deeply the Covid-19 pandemic would reshape global conversations on China regarding supply chains and diplomatic engagement.But together these scenarios give a sense of the range of intersectional challenges the UK is likely to face in the coming decade – and the potential costs of not having the right structures in place. These are challenges that not only cut across department, but beyond government too. A successful response will depend not just on pockets of departmental expertise, but on the UK’s ability to align action across Whitehall, Parliament and key private actors.
But the government has consistently struggled to diffuse expertise beyond these silos – and the UK’s ability to respond coherently to China has suffered as a result.
Under consecutive Conservative governments, the UK occupied a spectrum of positions on China. Under David Cameron, the relationship enjoyed a so-called “golden era” of deepened economic and diplomatic ties, but by 2022 Rishi Sunak was claiming “China and the Chinese Communist Party represent the largest threat to Britain and the world’s security and prosperity”.
Sunak may have softened his position once in power – then foreign secretary James Cleverly claimed that labelling China a threat would be a “betrayal of our national interest and a wilful misunderstanding of the modern world”– but the inconsistent approach nonetheless constrained Whitehall’s ability to forward plan and gained the UK a reputation for “wavering” in Beijing.This inconsistency has not been helped by unusually limited official engagement either: before Foreign Minister David Lammy visited China in October 2024, the UK had had just three ministerial visits to China in the previous six years, and Cleverly was labelled a “Chinese stooge” ahead of his 2023 Beijing trip.
In the meantime, key partners have forged ahead on two fronts, both engaging more with China – the US, Germany, France, Australia and Italy have all had post-Covid head of state meetings – and by putting more substantial measures in place to protect key areas of vulnerability. The UK’s relative inaction on both fronts has harmed no-one but the UK itself.
The new government has committed to addressing the UK’s “divided and inconsistent” China strategies,
but this is easier said than done. One key component will be re-engaging (and making the case to Westminster that engagement does not equal acquiescence), but an equally important component will be ensuring that this engagement is underpinned by a robust set of capabilities enabling it to genuinely work in the UK’s interest.To that end, the UK should move beyond its current government-centric approach towards a three-pronged approach that aims to build a sustainable, mutually reinforcing set of China capabilities that recognise the breadth of this “epoch-defining challenge”.
Within Government: Diffuse China Literacy Across Westminster
It is not necessarily the case, as is often thought, that the UK government lacks China expertise: there are more than 50 China-focused roles in the FCDO alone. But the persistent perception points to a problem: pockets of expertise are not being effectively diffused across Westminster.There is often a mismatch between Whitehall and Westminster; parliamentary debates are often significantly out of step with specialist assessments and sometimes rely on outdated or misinformed information.
Bridging this gap is increasingly important as the UK welcomes a record 335 new MPs who will be the public face of the UK’s China policy. The better informed the debate, the better the UK can pursue its interests.
Reassessing the UK’s Language Needs
First, there is more work to be done to build the right capabilities within Whitehall. Counterintuitively, the right answer is not necessarily more Mandarin speakers. Capabilities funding has traditionally skewed to language courses, in particular part-time or short-term Mandarin programmes. This is an inefficient use of resources. The UK needs a more honest conversation about the difficulty of reaching working proficiency in Mandarin – juggled alongside their usual responsibilities, short-term courses, especially for beginners or intermediate learners, are highly unlikely to produce learners with a level of Chinese language strategically useful to the UK.The US Foreign Service Institute classes Mandarin as a “super-hard language”
that requires roughly 2,200 hours of study to reach professional working proficiency, compared to just 750 hours for French and 1,100 hours for Russian. On top of that, the ability to fully understand Chinese party-state discourse requires additional specialist linguistic and contextual training.Instead, the priority should be English-language training that builds broad-based China literacy. There are relatively few roles in which knowledge of Mandarin, especially at a level below working proficiency, is relevant. There are many more, however, in which a more sophisticated understanding of Chinese systems would allow civil servants to operate more effectively in key areas of UK interest: critical technologies, trade, international development and global health, among others.
The government has been trialling more of this sort of training since 2021, and the FCDO’s China Capabilities Unit has been central to driving forward a more strategic approach to capacity-building, offering training to almost 1,000 civil servants in 2023. These English-language programmes are reportedly consistently oversubscribed. Expanding access to these, not entry-level language learning, should continue to be prioritised going forward.
Building the Right Language Capabilities
Building the right linguistic capabilities of course remains crucial, and the government should deepen the scope of targeted language programmes for a small number of committed linguists. For example, certain civil servants going on postings to China can receive up to two years of full-time, one-to-one language tuition to reach working proficiency. The ability to provide this is extremely valuable, but the duration and intensity of the training underline the significant time and financial commitments needed to reach a strategically useful level of Mandarin.The government should also be looking beyond traditional language-learning routes. Quickly advancing translation technology and new AI models can not only help individual civil servants’ language capabilities, but can also boost the UK’s ability to scrape and process foreign-language intelligence at scale. This is particularly important when dealing with a system that produces vast amounts of highly context-dependent information.
There are of course potential security risks from incorporating new technologies into sensitive areas, but in general technologies such as multi-language open-source intelligence (OSINT) systems, translation memory software and context-aware AI models offer promising supplements to conventional capabilities. This is something to factor into long-term planning: even if the right solutions are not available now, many of these technologies will be significantly more advanced in a few years’ time.
Even more promising is the influx of about 150,000 Hong Kongers since 2021 as part of the UK’s British National (Overseas) (BNO) visa scheme,
the majority of whom are fluent Cantonese speakers and many of whom are highly proficient in Mandarin and other Chinese languages. For those interested, new channels should be created to integrate this linguistic expertise – as well as integrate broader cultural perspectives – into policymaking. This will likely require a certain level of review to current vetting procedures, which often rule out by default applicants with close family ties to China, but the government’s starting position should be to approach BNO-status holders as a competitive asset to be welcomed, not as potential security threats.In fact, a broader, China-focused review of vetting processes could go a long way to tapping into existing China expertise. Currently, almost all groups with the deepest linguistic and cultural expertise – BNOs, those with family in China and those who have spent significant time in China – find it extremely difficult to get the highest levels of clearance.
Instead, Whitehall tends to have to train specialists in-house – something that is especially tricky in a system designed to reward generalists and which tends to move on newly trained staff just as they are starting to understand their brief. This, combined with poor progression incentives within specialisms, makes China specialists both costly to train and difficult to retain. As a relatively small number of UK citizens spend time in China to begin with, and security processes tighten for those who do, there is a risk that Whitehall struggles to incorporate real China knowledge into a robust challenge function and instead relies primarily on specialists trained solely in-house, many of whom have limited or no in-country exposure and are often trained on the same information sets.
This is not a challenge unique to the UK – many of our Five Eyes partners are facing similar issues. The upside of this is that there is scope for greater collaboration to establish best practice when it comes to adapting risk-management frameworks suited to the unique – and evolving – risk profile of China-focused roles.
Diffusing Expertise Beyond Whitehall to Improve MPs’ China Literacy
The doubling of funding for China capabilities appears so far to have been targeted almost solely at civil servants, not the MPs who are often the public face of the UK’s China strategy.Again, there is significant potential to direct some of this funding beyond Whitehall to provide tailored English-language literacy training. This, of course, is easier said than done: MPs and their staff have demanding schedules and are expected to be subject-matter generalists. Many are also likely to have an understandable lack of interest in a labour-intensive topic that, in many cases, has little direct bearing on their constituency duties.
But a baseline of China literacy is still crucial. That is partly because, as a cross-cutting policy issue, the indirect bearing on constituency duties is often substantial, particularly in areas with significant academic centres, high levels of BNO migration or major manufacturing bases. It is also because, for better or worse, the UK-China bilateral relationship is unusually dependent on optics. Chinese authorities (and social media) are highly sensitive to perceived criticism, and often pay close attention to parliamentary debates and broader political debate.
For example, an assertion from Lord Robertson, the highly regarded former NATO chief who is overseeing the UK’s strategic defence review, that China presents a “deadly” threat to the UK
– a significant departure from both the current and previous governments’ official assessments – was widely reported in Chinese state and social media in July.Much of this reporting conflated Lord Robertson’s personal views with official government policy and expressed pessimism over the direction of the bilateral relationship under the new government.Arguably, this tendency to conflate personal views or select-committee reports with official policy is an area where China could benefit from boosting its UK capabilities, rather than vice-versa. But public-facing officials should still be aware of the stark asymmetry in how closely each country scrutinises – and at times misinterprets – the other’s political activity, particularly during key periods such as a change in government.
None of this means that the UK should avoid debate on China, but rather that it should ensure those debates are as well-informed as possible. James Cleverly faced pockets of fierce criticism ahead of his Beijing trip in August 2023, even as some of the UK’s closest partners – some with far more assertive China policies than the UK – pushed ahead on more active engagement. Criticising the act of engagement itself – rather than focusing on issue-based criticism – fundamentally misunderstands the most effective ways to push for progress in the Chinese system on key UK priorities, such as removing Chinese sanctions on UK parliamentarians or raising the case of Hong Kong media mogul Jimmy Lai, who is currently awaiting trial.
The aim, of course, should never be parliamentary unity on China, but nor should parliamentary pressure reach the point that it prevents the high-level dialogue necessary both for maximising bilateral opportunities and enhancing the UK’s ability to affect genuine change on issues of disagreement. Grandstanding and sensationalism achieve little – and create opportunities for Beijing to discredit the UK’s intentions, both to its own population and to key partners in the Global South.
Ensuring debates are well informed requires careful consideration of how MPs and their staff access information on China. Traditionally, activist organisations and business interest groups have been the primary sources of information, and this will likely remain the case as the new government waits for the completion of its audit of the UK-China relationship to flesh out and communicate its strategy. Both serve valuable purposes, but also often pursue a relatively narrow set of interests. Briefings from these groups and organisations should be complemented by clear, regular articulation of the UK’s overall strategic interest.
Wherever possible, Whitehall should make its China briefing relevant to MPs’ constituencies – the most effective way to cut through to time-constrained lawmakers. In fact, identifying the constituencies most impacted by China – whether through trade, investment or people-to-people ties – could form an important element of the ongoing China audit.
With this in place, the government should aim to provide briefings at multiple levels, ensuring all MPs are exposed to a baseline level of literacy training and providing easy avenues for those interested or with directly relevant briefs to progress to deeper levels.
There is no need to reinvent the wheel to deliver this. Government could expand existing architecture, in particular the Great Britain-China Centre (GBCC), an arms-length body established in 1974 to support UK-China relations. The GBCC, which already provides extensive training and in-country exposure through regular programmes, has significant convening power among the China-watching community (and in China itself), and would be well-placed to offer more targeted training to MPs.
Given its existing infrastructure and networks, an expanded remit for GBCC would likely be a cost-effective use of capabilities spending. But this would also require a more sustainable approach to its funding: the GBCC had its government funding cut completely in June 2022 and quietly restored to just 70 per cent of its previous funding in January 2023
– constraining its ability to plan ahead in the process.There are also routes for the civil service to share information more directly with MPs. The completion of the China audit, for example, potentially early next year, will provide a ready-made opening for the FCDO and other relevant departments to engage parliamentarians and build out a shared understanding of the UK’s China strategy beyond the current “compete, challenge and cooperate”.
Again, the aim should not be to hinder parliamentary debate, but to ensure that debate is as well-informed as possible and that MPs, unlike under previous governments, have a clear articulation of how the government sees the UK’s strategic interest to respond to.Creating a New Body to Align Expertise Across Government – and Beyond
Part of the reason for the UK’s often divergent approaches to China is the absence of a strong mechanism for cross-coordination. Building out capabilities in a sustainable, cost-effective way will require some sort of “champion” that can drive change across different bodies within and around government.
The UK is not alone in facing this challenge. In 2022, for example, the US Department of State founded the Office of China Coordination, informally known as China House, to bring together fragmented approaches to China and align security, economic and diplomatic priorities.
As specialist commentary site Beijing to Britain and the Oxford China Policy Lab have pointed out, a similar body – perhaps drawing on existing expertise in the FCDO and Cabinet Office – could go a long way to delivering on Labour’s commitment to “overhaul” the UK-China relationship and put an end to “flip-flopping between tough talk and muddled actions”.
Equally, government could empower existing structures such as the China Cadre, a cross-Whitehall group with more than 400 members with varying levels of China experience.Either way, as Beijing to Britain’s Sam Hogg also points out,
the UK has proven itself capable of setting up inventive new structures to address AI – another cross-cutting policy challenge that does not map easily onto existing civil-service structures. China is a policy issue that requires a similarly open-minded approach to ensure that the right capabilities are brought into government (although the need for clearance for almost all high-level government discussions is a key constraint that most AI discussions do not face).But whether a China House or another co-ordination mechanism, having the right structures in place to assess capabilities and allocate funding within and around government will be crucial. The current doubling of funding for China capabilities may only be due to last until 2025, but the UK will be facing these challenges for far longer. Pre-empting demand will be key.
Around Government: Foster a Vibrant China Ecosystem to Augment Government Policy
The UK-China relationship goes beyond government: UK universities teach more than 150,000 Chinese students,more than 9,000 British businessesare estimated to operate in China itself and the City of London is the biggest renminbi (RMB) clearing centre beyond China.That means effectively promoting the UK’s interests requires building up a vibrant, China-literate community around government that is able to feed into and, where necessary, challenge government strategy.Harnessing the Think-Tank and Academic Communities
A China House model will only work if the wider China ecosystem is capable of effectively engaging with the government. But the UK currently lacks two crucial elements: clear avenues of entry for think-tank professionals and academics to support government policymaking, and a sufficient number of external China-focused roles in the first place. A greater sense of entrepreneurialism, both from the government and think-tanks themselves, is needed to bridge this gap – and make the UK a world-leading centre for thought leadership.
The UK should aim to borrow elements of the US’s “revolving door” approach to policy, where it is common for subject experts to move between government, academic and think-tank positions.
In the UK, however, there are currently almost no direct mid-career entry routes into the FCDO for China specialists and relatively few elsewhere in the civil service. Those that do exist recruit based on the civil service competency framework,
rather than specialist expertise, giving existing civil servants more familiar with the system an advantage. A review of this system, as well as internal incentives to retain expertise once in the civil service, would help address the first of these key problems.The UK could also benefit from greater clarity on how it integrates external expertise. According to a 2023 press release,
a “China experts’ advisory group” was formed in 2022 to “test and inform government policymaking”, but no details have been made public on the group’s membership or activities. There is a similar lack of transparency when it comes to the funding of these capabilities initiatives: the Integrated Review Refresh 2023 committed to doubling funding but without any indication of the previous or new figures.A like-for-like replication of the US’s “revolving door” system is not possible – but nor is it necessarily quite the right model for the UK. The US has a more established culture of philanthropic giving to policy institutes than the UK and the federal government purposefully directs funds to think-tanks to ensure they work on problems relevant to the national interest. This is especially true when it comes to China, given there is a growing consensus (on the substance, if not the specifics) that China poses a “pacing challenge”
and that investment in greater understanding of that challenge directly benefits the US’s national interest.But the UK also has some advantages: a high concentration of China-facing government, business and academic professionals in a single city, making cross-sectoral dialogue easier, and by some measures, a more open debate space that welcomes a broader spectrum of views on China – compared to relative bipartisan consensus
on China in the US. Both the civil service and think-tanks also enjoy remarkable convening power.But making the most of these advantages will require a commitment to thinking beyond government when it comes to allocating pots of funding. This could include:
- Think-tank secondments for China-focused civil servants. Funded secondments could give civil servants breathing room to deepen their specialism and boost the UK’s external reputation for China thought leadership in the process.
- Bringing in external expertise through a dedicated in-house think-tank. The EU’s IDEA and India’s Centre for Contemporary China Studies have both created avenues to second external experts into government to work on areas of direct national interest. The UK could explore its own version.
- Scholarships for students and prospective civil servants that support in-country exposure and open avenues to government employment. These could potentially be modelled on the US’s Boren Awards, which provide up to $25,000 for the study of critical languages and under-represented cultures in return for a commitment of at least one year of federal government service, and be integrated with plans for a potential China fast-stream programme within civil-service recruitment.
- Support for bodies that help students and academics develop policy skills. The UK university programmes are far more specialised and academic than those in the US and often fail to equip students with real-world policy skills. Organisations such as the Oxford Policy Engagement Network or the more specialised Oxford China Policy Lab work to bridge the gap between academia and policy.
There is also a soft-power incentive to boost think-tank output: the UK should be aiming to make its institutions a go-to for informing global leaders’ decision-making. But as Olivia O’Sullivan and Bronwen Maddox set out in a recent Chatham House report, when it comes to China, the UK’s “public and political debate often relies on US, European and Australian research”.
Currently the UK is losing substantial potential China talent either to other countries – especially those that lead on external research – or to non-China-facing positions. It is even harder to attract and retain talent from abroad, including the significant number of foreign students who study China and Chinese languages at UK universities – accounting for more than 25 per cent of all Chinese Studies students enrolled in the academic year 2022/2023.
Reforms of civil-service recruitment can be understandably slow-moving, but directing greater government support to external organisations in the meantime could help on both those fronts, ensuring the UK has the right absorption capacity for China talent and providing a soft-power boost in the process. The UK should be ambitious here – it has the right raw ingredients to be one of the most relevant players in one of the most relevant global conversations.
Establishing a More Effective Two-Way Street With Business
A key consequence of the near-vacuum in ministerial contact with China in recent years is that it has often been the UK’s business community that has spearheaded post-Covid re-engagement.Strengthening the dialogue mechanisms between business and government is key to long-term capability building, both to prevent government and business pursuing divergent objectives, and also to ensure that business’ own perspectives and expertise are factored into policymaking.
In fact, specialists at companies with significant China operations are often just as, or more, China-literate than their civil-service counterparts. This is a natural consequence of hiring structures: private-sector experts are able to retain their specialisms, rather than being rotated between briefs as in the civil service, and a significant amount of in-country experience is seen as a competitive advantage, rather than a complicating factor in vetting processes. In a business environment, specialists are also more directly on the hook for the quality of their insight.
That means that the most valuable guidance government can provide is not necessarily helping to train up conventional China capabilities. Instead, the aim should be to build up business’ capability to understand and navigate government priorities. The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (NSI Act), for example, introduced a new statutory regime to scrutinise and potentially block acquisitions and investments in 17 key sectors on national-security grounds, bringing the UK in line with many key partners.
But opaque decision-making structures regarding which projects are “called in” for scrutiny (more than 40 per cent of call-ins in 2022/23 involved Chinese firms
) have made forward planning difficult for some businesses. The previous government struggled to clearly communicate the intention of the NSI Act, to the point that Labour accused a review of the act in November 2023 of aiming to water down toughness on China,while the Chinese embassy expressed concern it would in fact be used to tighten control.In general, clearer communication of government objectives – and red lines – in cases like this would go a long way to helping business and government act in concert. The same goes for the upcoming findings from the China audit.
Business, and non-governmental stakeholders more broadly, should also be consulted more robustly in these sorts of policy processes. Current dialogue tends to be informal or ad hoc, which can be effective in some cases, but should be complemented by more structured channels – potentially overseen by a China House equivalent or other capabilities champion.
This is particularly true for those stakeholders currently in China. On-the-ground perspectives are immensely valuable when it comes to boosting the UK’s capabilities. But the UK currently faces a paradox: the longer someone has spent in China, the more useful their insight often is – but this longevity also makes it harder to get the clearance necessary to make the most of that insight.
This makes creating new avenues for consultation all the more vital. Trade bodies such as the British Chambers of Commerce and the China-Britain Business Council, for example, are among the best-versed in regular engagement with Chinese authorities – especially after the UK’s prolonged lack of high-level dialogue. They also regularly publish analysis and sentiment surveys that provide a level of granularity on the experiences of British businesses in China that would be impossible to obtain from the UK’s diplomatic networks alone.
Finally, it is perhaps most important to recognise that government and business have a shared interest in China capabilities. Greater China literacy, both within government and among their own hires, is strategically useful for companies with significant China operations, and some businesses have played a key role in supporting China-focused think-tanks and educational initiatives. Swire in particular has dedicated significant resources to funding the UK’s largest Mandarin programme and recently endowed a new centre for Mandarin education at the University of Oxford. Closer collaboration to bring together the best of public and private initiatives will be key to developing the genuinely sustainable China capabilities the UK needs.
Before Government: Facilitate Frictionless Educational Progression for Chinese Studies
Building the right capabilities in and around government means starting well in advance. The UK needs a robust pipeline of young people with an interest in China and an interest in using that expertise to the benefit of the UK.Creating a Pipeline in Schools
Currently, the uptake of Chinese language is dropping – just at the point the UK is recognising China as an “epoch-defining” challenge. As of 2022 Mandarin was taught in just 7 per cent of state schools and 22 per cent of independent schools as a full Key Stage 3 curriculum subject.A-Level entries have fallen significantly since 2019,and universities report a decline in interest.That is despite the fact that Mandarin education is highly cost-effective too: the benefit-to-cost ratio for the UK economy was estimated to be at least 2:1 in 2022.Compare that to China, which boasts an estimated 400 million English learners – more than the entire population of the US. There is also a huge asymmetry in crucial in-country exposure: as of 2022, the UK was thought to have just a few hundred students in mainland China, compared to 154,000 mainland Chinese students in the UK in 2022/23.
Debate over Mandarin education in the UK focuses disproportionately on Confucius Institutes – language and cultural institutes run by the Chinese government – an important question, but one that risks overshadowing a better, over-arching question: what should be done at each educational stage to make beginning or continuing the study of China as frictionless as possible for a learner? And what needs to be done to give students the confidence that their skillsets will be in demand?
As Professor Rana Mitter, the former director of Oxford University’s China Centre, points out in the foreword of the Higher Education Policy Institute’s 2022 report on Mandarin education,
the UK needs two types of China-literate talent: a smaller pool of committed specialists, often with deep linguistic ability, and a wider pool of generalists with a sophisticated understanding of the Chinese system.These dual needs should be reflected in the education system, with a joint focus on:
- Increasing avenues of entry to studying China in its own right (both language and cultural studies)
- Mainstreaming China across core curriculum subjects to boost wider China-literacy
Table 2 – How the study of China and Mandarin can be facilitated at key educational stages
| Stage | State of play | Key recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| Pre-GCSE | Only a small proportion of learners have the chance to try Mandarin. Access tends to be dependent on a school being part of one of a number of disparate initiatives. The government’s Mandarin Excellence Programme in particular disproportionately runs in more affluent regions. | The funding cycle for Swire’s Chinese Language Foundation, the biggest Mandarin scheme, ends in 2026. The government should urgently explore how to prevent a drop-off in schools offering Mandarin, especially given Swire’s programme specifically focuses on broadening access to less advantaged communities. |
| GCSE | In England, learners then move on to Chinese GCSE. Entries are rising quickly – over 7,000 students took the GCSE in 2023, more than twice the number in 2019. Some – but not all – of this rise is likely due to students who have moved from Hong Kong under the BNO scheme. | There is currently no clear pathway for onwards progression from GCSE for non-native speakers of Mandarin, for reasons explained below. A-Level reform is needed to create this pathway and persuade more schools that GCSE provision is financially viable. |
| A-level | This is the trickiest stage: the Pre-U Mandarin qualification, which was only available to non-native speakers, was scrapped in 2023, leaving Chinese A-level as the only remaining option for learners in England (Scottish students can still take a well-regarded Higher course). Almost all top grades are taken by native speakers, meaning non-native learners aiming to study Chinese (or any other course) at a top university should avoid taking the A-Level – causing an unnecessary two-year gap in structured learning. | Options to improve Key Stage 5 provision include: - Reform to existing A-level to include non-language components - Approval of the proposed Chinese Civilisation A-Level that has no language component - A new, ideally university-backed Chinese language qualification, potentially modelled on the music-grade system |
| Higher Education | Fewer students are choosing courses with a China element – just 815 in 2022, down by more than 25 per cent since 2014. This is likely the result of advances in translation tech and comparatively low Chinese soft power (compared to Japan or South Korea, for example). Many of these are also joint honours courses, which often fail to give students professional working proficiency in Mandarin. | Reform of the curriculum for China-focused courses is needed to adapt to changing student and job-market demand. There should also be greater mainstreaming of the study of China across other degrees to produce graduates with hybrid skillsets, including study-abroad opportunities such as the China-Link Scholarship. |
| Graduation | Graduates often face a demand-side issue. There are limited private-sector roles available and, with the exception of the security services, there are currently no government jobs available to new graduates that allow them to use and retain their China specialism. The clearance process for developed vetting can take more than a year, which is often financially unsustainable for many recent graduates. | Students need to be reassured that there is demand for their skills, ideally starting at sixth-form level. The government should build out absorption capacity for graduates, including the proposed China fast stream (modelled on the previous EU fast stream), to tap into Chinese graduates and native-speaker graduates who bring a broader set of skills beyond languages. This is also a key period to encourage graduates to gain vital in-country exposure. |
Mandarin should be at the heart of this, and a recently announced centre for the learning and teaching of Chinese at the University of Oxford’s Department of Education, with initial funding from Swire, is well placed to drive this forward. The centre, which is expected to be operational from 2026, will provide a Mandarin postgraduate certificate in education (PGCE) programme and lead research into pedagogical best practice.
But the UK’s small pool of advanced Mandarin speakers will always make recruitment trickier than in other subjects – meaning retention of existing teachers is key. There is a risk that when the Swire Chinese Language Foundation’s funding cycle ends in 2026, some schools – particularly those under serious financial constraints – will no longer be able to offer Mandarin. Preventing a drop-off here will be crucial.
Harnessing New Ways of Learning
Alongside this, the government should explore two additional tracks to maximise Mandarin learning coverage, and address some of the serious regional and socioeconomic inequalities in current educational provision.Digital learning: Mandarin tuition is traditionally very human-capital intensive. Learning tones, for example, requires extensive one-to-one pronunciation drills in a way no other commonly taught language does. But new edtech tools could offer hyper-personalised supplements to traditional classroom teaching: apps such as HelloChinese use voice-recognition software for tone practice, while certain large language models can provide personalised written exercises or live conversation practice, with content targeted to a learner’s interests and feedback targeted to their level.
As TBI set out in its report on delivering tech-enabled education, integrating AI into classrooms requires careful work to build the right enabling environment. But Mandarin could prove a particularly promising use case. The UK government has already announced £4 million in investment to train new AI models on national-curriculum guidance to produce new lesson plans and content,
while the National Taiwan University’s International Chinese Language Program is using generative AI to create Mandarin-specific educational materials.The Department for Education should consider how new AI models, trained on national-curriculum Mandarin content, could be used to support teachers and learners.Similarly, greater integration of remote teaching could also help address the current unequal regional distribution of Mandarin teachers – and provide a potential avenue to bring in additional support from native speakers in China and Taiwan.
Lifelong learning: Creating additional avenues of entry for older learners is also key. Greater mid- and late-career training of people from non-China-related career paths can help create the hybrid skillsets necessary to address the intersectional policy challenges China presents. Again, there is promising potential for edtech tools that can help fit learning around existing work and childcare commitments.
Without the right plan, the UK risks being pushed around on China. Beijing (and Washington, for that matter) have a good idea of what they want the UK’s China policy to be. It is only sensible for the UK to have one too.
The China audit will hopefully represent a significant step towards articulating what the UK wants from China and, crucially, what it needs to achieve it. But the audit must be seen as the first, not final, step towards capability building. China – and the ways the world responds to China – will continue to present an evolving set of intersectional challenges to the UK. What works today is unlikely to remain the right approach in just a few years’ time.That is why building out an agile set of capabilities with a long-term view is crucial. So is recognising financial realities: the UK’s capability strategy must be cost-effective and, wherever possible, self-sustaining.
As such, the UK must move beyond its current focus on in-government capabilities and take a joined-up view of capabilities that:
- Rethinks language needs and addresses the China-literacy gap between Whitehall and Westminster
- Commits to allocating capabilities spending outside government to nurture a world-leading think-tank and business ecosystem
- Creates a joined-up educational pipeline that makes the study of both China and Chinese accessible and inclusive
The good news is that the government is not starting from a blank slate; this is primarily a question of building out the right structures and incentives. In fact, building China capabilities is an opportunity as much as a challenge: with the right approach, the UK has the right raw ingredients to become a leading voice in one of the next decade’s most pressing conversations.
Footnotes
- 1. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2024/trends-in-electric-cars
- 2. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/09/16/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-at-the-special-competitive-studies-project-global-emerging-technologies-summit/
- 3. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Global-South-is-moving-toward-the-center-of-Chinese-foreign-policy
- 4. http://en.people.cn/n3/2023/1016/c90000-20083788.html
- 5. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal
- 6. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3271553/palestinian-factions-agree-end-division-pact-brokered-china
- 7. https://macropolo.org/china-great-power-foreign-policy-covid19/?rp=e
- 8. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202409/14/WS66e5812ba3103711928a819d.html
- 9. https://x.com/RishiSunak/status/1551483420865347585?lang=en
- 10. https://news.sky.com/story/isolating-china-would-be-betrayal-of-our-national-interest-foreign-secretary-to-say-12865631
- 11. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/chris-bryant-government-tom-tugendhat-chinese-beijing-b2356173.html
- 12. https://beijingtobritain.substack.com/p/new-debrief-labours-set-out-its-foreign
- 13. https://2009-2017.state.gov/m/fsi/sls/orgoverview/languages/
- 14. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-system-statistics-year-ending-march-2024/safe-and-legal-humanitarian-routes-to-the-uk#british-national-overseas-bno-route
- 15. https://www.ft.com/content/57333df7-dceb-4eab-a39a-971dfc112b6b
- 16. https://www.sohu.com/a/795496176%5F121997605
- 17. https://www.politico.eu/article/rishi-sunak-restores-funding-uk-great-britain-china-center-liz-truss-cut-gbcc-fcdo/
- 18. https://fabians.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/David-Lammy-Britain-Reconnected-240323.pdf
- 19. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-01/David%20Lammy-Chatham-House-speech-2023-01-23.pdf
- 20. https://beijingtobritain.substack.com/p/end-of-year-note-2023
- 21. https://www.hesa.ac.uk/news/08-08-2024/higher-education-student-statistics-uk-202223-released
- 22. https://www.ptl-group.com/blog/china-from-a-uk-business-perspective/#:~:text=The%20UK%2DChina%20Business%20Council,backed%20by%20their%20respective%20governments
- 23. https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/assets/Business/london-rmb-biannual-may-2024.pdf
- 24. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment%5Fdata/file/500767/Civil%5FService%5FCompetency%5FFramework.pdf
- 25. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-increased-funding-for-china-capabilities-programme
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