美元是我们的货币，但它是你们的问题
https://www.ipe.com/the-dollar-is-our-currency-but-its-your-problem/25599.article
作者：Kevin Hebner 2007年10月（杂志）
过去几年，拿起报纸，几乎总能看到谴责中国不公平竞争、谴责人民币低估的头条新闻，从而鼓励又一批政客飞往北京，享受拍照和美食。
此外，许多市场专家认为，鉴于美国的经济困境和多重失衡，美元即将再次大幅贬值——尤其是美元兑明显低估的人民币、日元和其他亚洲货币的贬值。
美元兑一篮子亚洲货币大幅贬值，需要布雷顿森林体系II的崩溃。根据“第二版货币战假说”，美国与几个奉行重商主义的亚洲国家之间存在着一种非正式的安排，这些国家密切管理本币兑美元的汇率，亚洲的经常账户盈余被循环利用，为美国结构性经常账户赤字提供廉价融资。
保罗·克鲁格曼对此做出了更简洁的解释：“美国人靠互相出售房屋为生，而这些房屋的付款方式是从中国人那里借来的。” 鉴于“第二版货币战假说”的根本缺陷，“第二版货币战假说”的崩溃不可避免，并且必然会导致美元大幅贬值。然而，崩溃的具体时间尚不确定，也不太可能很快到来。
显然，确定“第二版货币战假说”的瓦解以及随之而来的美元贬值的时间绝非易事。在我看来，寻找线索的最佳途径是那些最终导致其前身——“第二版货币战假说”——终结的事件。只需看看当时和现在的诸多相似之处（国内经济疲软、全球失衡以及主要贸易伙伴维持着被严重低估的货币）。
布雷顿森林体系于1946年正式实施，其主要特征包括将美元与黄金价格固定在每盎司35美元，并要求其他国家维持与美元（即黄金）的固定且约定的平价。然而，早在1958年，随着欧洲货币实现完全可兑换且私人资本流动开始加速，布雷顿森林体系就注定要走向衰亡。1970年，当美国经济遭遇一系列弊病时，布雷顿森林体系的瓦解达到了临界点：通胀率接近6%，GDP增长率低于1%，经常账户赤字不断显现，黄金覆盖率从55%下降到22%。
不久之后，理查德·尼克松总统于1971年8月15日宣布了臭名昭著的“新经济政策”。“尼克松冲击”的主要策划者是财政部长约翰·康纳利，其中包括明目张胆地单方面对所有应税进口商品征收10%的附加税（这是一个强有力的谈判筹码）、削减10%的对外援助支出、关闭“黄金窗口”（使美元不再自由兑换）以及实施90天的工资和价格管制。
如果其意图是震惊、宣扬现状的不可接受性，并激励其海外同行（包括德国人，他们只希望从其货币中获得一件事：稳定），那么很少有经济政策能如此成功。当时，大西洋两岸（以及太平洋两岸）的金融官员都意识到，一场全面的美元危机随时可能爆发，并纷纷涌上谈判桌。
“台风”康纳利（他的日本同辈如此称呼他）是一位天生的强者，也是重量级人物中的重量级人物。他的美国同事中不乏杰出人物，例如国家安全顾问亨利·基辛格、副国务卿保罗·沃尔克以及乔治·舒尔茨（他于1971年因宣称“圣诞老人已死”而闻名）。即使没有在财政部任职的经历，康纳利也应该在美国政坛占据一席之地——他曾于1963年至1969年担任德克萨斯州州长（民主党人），并且在约翰·F·肯尼迪在达拉斯遇刺时随车而来（康纳利本人身中两枪，伤势严重）。
康纳利在经济学和金融学方面都拥有深厚的知识（在回答关于其资历的问题时，他打趣道：“我可以补充一下”），在任职期间，他始终如一地有效地将十国集团的讨论重点集中在三个关键领域：汇率调整（早就应该进行了）、贸易自由化（改善美国出口商的机会）以及更公平的负担分担（共同的国防支出和发展援助，而美国长期以来承担了其中的大部分）。
在1971年末举行的十国集团罗马会议上，康纳利向震惊的各国同行宣称：“美元是我们的货币，但它是你们的问题。” 其预期后果是，在布雷顿森林体系的棺材上再钉一颗钉子，并很快导致美元贬值约20%。罗马会议的关键成果是
达成协议，立即解决货币和贸易问题（美国取消10%的进口附加税）。三周后，十国集团部长在华盛顿史密森尼学会再次会面，就汇率政策达成了一项重要协议，尼克松谦虚地称之为“世界历史上最重要的货币协议”。
“第二版货币政策”的终结是由三大宏观背景特征（私人资本流动加速、失衡加剧、货币被严重低估）和三大关键催化剂（经济危机感、对美元全面崩溃的担忧以及几位杰出人物）推动的。
这些特征如今是否已经具备？它们是否也是“第二版货币政策”崩溃的先决条件？亚洲确实存在一些被低估的货币，而且全球失衡达到了前所未有的程度。然而，中国私人资本流动仍然受到严格监管和控制，危机感尚未显现（尽管如此，一些评论员仍将中美谈判称为“核”对峙）。
尽管“第二波”冲击已然紧张，但要最终打破这个本质上脆弱且存在根本缺陷的体系，需要大幅削弱中国的资本管制和监管，并进一步发展其国内金融市场和机构。这正在发生，但进展缓慢。
似乎可以肯定地说，无论好坏，“第二波”冲击仍将持续一段时间。鉴于此，明智的投资策略是进行适度的结构性押注，做空美元兑一篮子亚洲货币，并计划在中国私人资本流动开始加速时，尤其是在美国出现经济危机的情况下，大幅增加押注规模。与此同时，中国货币当局最好习惯于接待络绎不绝的美国政客，并不断被提醒“美元是我们的货币，但也是你们的问题”。
Kevin Hebner 是康涅狄格州格林威治 Third Wave Global Investors 的宏观策略师。我们很高兴看到您的新闻内容能够激励他人。我们要求您仅将我们的内容用于个人用途，以免违反我们的条款和条件。否则，请通过 lorenzo.passarella@ipe.com 咨询我们的团体会员资格。原文摘自：https://www.ipe.com/the-dollar-is-our-currency-but-its-your-problem/25599.article
By Kevin Hebner October 2007 (Magazine)
https://www.ipe.com/the-dollar-is-our-currency-but-its-your-problem/25599.article
作者：Kevin Hebner 2007年10月（杂志）
过去几年，拿起报纸，几乎总能看到谴责中国不公平竞争、谴责人民币低估的头条新闻，从而鼓励又一批政客飞往北京，享受拍照和美食。
此外，许多市场专家认为，鉴于美国的经济困境和多重失衡，美元即将再次大幅贬值——尤其是美元兑明显低估的人民币、日元和其他亚洲货币的贬值。
美元兑一篮子亚洲货币大幅贬值，需要布雷顿森林体系II的崩溃。根据“第二版货币战假说”，美国与几个奉行重商主义的亚洲国家之间存在着一种非正式的安排，这些国家密切管理本币兑美元的汇率，亚洲的经常账户盈余被循环利用，为美国结构性经常账户赤字提供廉价融资。
保罗·克鲁格曼对此做出了更简洁的解释：“美国人靠互相出售房屋为生，而这些房屋的付款方式是从中国人那里借来的。” 鉴于“第二版货币战假说”的根本缺陷，“第二版货币战假说”的崩溃不可避免，并且必然会导致美元大幅贬值。然而，崩溃的具体时间尚不确定，也不太可能很快到来。
显然，确定“第二版货币战假说”的瓦解以及随之而来的美元贬值的时间绝非易事。在我看来，寻找线索的最佳途径是那些最终导致其前身——“第二版货币战假说”——终结的事件。只需看看当时和现在的诸多相似之处（国内经济疲软、全球失衡以及主要贸易伙伴维持着被严重低估的货币）。
布雷顿森林体系于1946年正式实施，其主要特征包括将美元与黄金价格固定在每盎司35美元，并要求其他国家维持与美元（即黄金）的固定且约定的平价。然而，早在1958年，随着欧洲货币实现完全可兑换且私人资本流动开始加速，布雷顿森林体系就注定要走向衰亡。1970年，当美国经济遭遇一系列弊病时，布雷顿森林体系的瓦解达到了临界点：通胀率接近6%，GDP增长率低于1%，经常账户赤字不断显现，黄金覆盖率从55%下降到22%。
不久之后，理查德·尼克松总统于1971年8月15日宣布了臭名昭著的“新经济政策”。“尼克松冲击”的主要策划者是财政部长约翰·康纳利，其中包括明目张胆地单方面对所有应税进口商品征收10%的附加税（这是一个强有力的谈判筹码）、削减10%的对外援助支出、关闭“黄金窗口”（使美元不再自由兑换）以及实施90天的工资和价格管制。
如果其意图是震惊、宣扬现状的不可接受性，并激励其海外同行（包括德国人，他们只希望从其货币中获得一件事：稳定），那么很少有经济政策能如此成功。当时，大西洋两岸（以及太平洋两岸）的金融官员都意识到，一场全面的美元危机随时可能爆发，并纷纷涌上谈判桌。
“台风”康纳利（他的日本同辈如此称呼他）是一位天生的强者，也是重量级人物中的重量级人物。他的美国同事中不乏杰出人物，例如国家安全顾问亨利·基辛格、副国务卿保罗·沃尔克以及乔治·舒尔茨（他于1971年因宣称“圣诞老人已死”而闻名）。即使没有在财政部任职的经历，康纳利也应该在美国政坛占据一席之地——他曾于1963年至1969年担任德克萨斯州州长（民主党人），并且在约翰·F·肯尼迪在达拉斯遇刺时随车而来（康纳利本人身中两枪，伤势严重）。
康纳利在经济学和金融学方面都拥有深厚的知识（在回答关于其资历的问题时，他打趣道：“我可以补充一下”），在任职期间，他始终如一地有效地将十国集团的讨论重点集中在三个关键领域：汇率调整（早就应该进行了）、贸易自由化（改善美国出口商的机会）以及更公平的负担分担（共同的国防支出和发展援助，而美国长期以来承担了其中的大部分）。
在1971年末举行的十国集团罗马会议上，康纳利向震惊的各国同行宣称：“美元是我们的货币，但它是你们的问题。” 其预期后果是，在布雷顿森林体系的棺材上再钉一颗钉子，并很快导致美元贬值约20%。罗马会议的关键成果是
达成协议，立即解决货币和贸易问题（美国取消10%的进口附加税）。三周后，十国集团部长在华盛顿史密森尼学会再次会面，就汇率政策达成了一项重要协议，尼克松谦虚地称之为“世界历史上最重要的货币协议”。
“第二版货币政策”的终结是由三大宏观背景特征（私人资本流动加速、失衡加剧、货币被严重低估）和三大关键催化剂（经济危机感、对美元全面崩溃的担忧以及几位杰出人物）推动的。
这些特征如今是否已经具备？它们是否也是“第二版货币政策”崩溃的先决条件？亚洲确实存在一些被低估的货币，而且全球失衡达到了前所未有的程度。然而，中国私人资本流动仍然受到严格监管和控制，危机感尚未显现（尽管如此，一些评论员仍将中美谈判称为“核”对峙）。
尽管“第二波”冲击已然紧张，但要最终打破这个本质上脆弱且存在根本缺陷的体系，需要大幅削弱中国的资本管制和监管，并进一步发展其国内金融市场和机构。这正在发生，但进展缓慢。
似乎可以肯定地说，无论好坏，“第二波”冲击仍将持续一段时间。鉴于此，明智的投资策略是进行适度的结构性押注，做空美元兑一篮子亚洲货币，并计划在中国私人资本流动开始加速时，尤其是在美国出现经济危机的情况下，大幅增加押注规模。与此同时，中国货币当局最好习惯于接待络绎不绝的美国政客，并不断被提醒“美元是我们的货币，但也是你们的问题”。
Kevin Hebner 是康涅狄格州格林威治 Third Wave Global Investors 的宏观策略师。我们很高兴看到您的新闻内容能够激励他人。我们要求您仅将我们的内容用于个人用途，以免违反我们的条款和条件。否则，请通过 lorenzo.passarella@ipe.com 咨询我们的团体会员资格。原文摘自：https://www.ipe.com/the-dollar-is-our-currency-but-its-your-problem/25599.article
The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem
https://www.ipe.com/the-dollar-is-our-currency-but-its-your-problem/25599.articleBy Kevin Hebner October 2007 (Magazine)
During the past couple of years it has been difficult to pick up a newspaper without glimpsing a headline decrying China’s unfair competition, denouncing the undervalued renminbi and thus emboldening yet another expedition of politicians flying to Beijing for a photo op and some great food.
Further, many market pundits have argued that, given America’s economic woes and multiple imbalances, a dramatic decline of the US dollar is once again nigh - especially so against the unambiguously cheap renminbi, as well as the yen and other Asian currencies.
For the dollar to depreciate significantly against a basket of Asian currencies requires a collapse of Bretton Woods II. Under the BW II hypothesis, an informal arrangement exists between the US and several mercantilist Asian countries, which closely manage their currencies against the greenback, with the Asian current account surpluses recycled to provide cheap financing for the structural US current account deficit.
A more succinct interpretation is provided by Paul Krugman: “Americans make a living selling each other houses, paid for with money borrowed from the Chinese.” Given its fundamental flaws, the collapse of BW II is inevitable and will certainly lead to a dramatic decline in the US dollar. However, the timing of this collapse is anything but certain and unlikely to be imminent.
Clearly timing the unraveling of BW II and the accompanying dollar decline will be no easy task. To my eye the best place to look for clues regarding how this plays out are the events that lead inexorably to the demise of its prequel, the BW era. One only has to look at the litany of similarities between then and now (domestic economic weakness, global imbalances and primary trading partners maintaining extremely undervalued currencies).
The Bretton Woods system became operational in 1946, with key features including fixing the US dollar to the price of gold at $35 an ounce and having other countries maintain a fixed and agreed parity vis-à-vis the dollar - ie, gold. However, the BW system was arguably doomed as early as 1958 when the European currencies attained full convertibility and private capital flows began to accelerate. The unravelling reached a tipping point in 1970 when the US economy was suffering from a host of ills: inflation approaching 6%, GDP growth south of 1%, an emerging CA deficit, and gold coverage falling from 55% to 22%.
Soon after came President Richard Nixon’s justifiably infamous ‘new economic policy’, announced on 15 August 1971. The prime architect of the ‘Nixon shock’ was treasury secretary John Connally and included a brazenly unilateral 10% surcharge on all dutiable imports (a powerful bargaining chip), a 10% reduction in foreign assistance expenditures, closing the ‘gold window’ (so the dollar was no longer freely convertible) and 90-day wage and price controls.
If the intent was to shock, trumpet the unacceptability of the status quo, and incentivise its overseas counterparts (including the Germans who only wanted one thing from their currency: stability), few economic policies have been so successful. Financial officials on both sides of the Atlantic (and Pacific) by then recognised that a full-blown dollar crisis could explode at any moment and were rushing to the bargaining table.
‘Typhoon’ Connally (as he was referred to by his Japanese contemporaries) was a force of nature and a heavy-hitter among heavy-hitters. His American colleagues included such luminaries as national security adviser Henry Kissinger, under secretary Paul Volcker and George Shultz (famous in 1971 for his pronouncement that “Santa Claus is Dead”). Even without his stint at the Treasury, Connally would have deserved a prominent place in American political annals - he was governor of Texas from 1963 to 1969 (as a Democrat), and was a passenger in the car when John F Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas (Connally himself was hit by two bullets and seriously injured).
Unencumbered by a deep knowledge of either economics or finance (responding to queries regarding his credentials he quipped, “I can add”), during his tenure Connally consistently and effectively focused the G-10 on three key areas of discussion: exchange rate realignment (long overdue), trade liberalisation (improved opportunities for US exporters) and more equitable burden sharing (of mutual defence expenditures and development assistance, for which the US had long borne the lion’s share).
At the G-10 Rome meetings held in late 1971 Connally proclaimed to his astonished counterparts, “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem,” having the intended consequence of driving yet another nail into the coffin of Bretton Woods and leading in short order to a roughly 20% depreciation of the dollar. The key outcome from Rome was broad agreement to achieve immediate settlement of monetary and trade issues (with the US dropping the 10% import surcharge). The G-10 ministers met again three weeks later at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington and came to an essential agreement on exchange rate policies, which Nixon humbly referred to as “the most significant monetary agreement in the history of the world”.
The demise of BW was driven by three key features of the macro backdrop (accelerating private capital flows, burgeoning imbalances, dramatically undervalued currencies) and three crucial catalysts (a sense of economic crisis, fears of a full-blown dollar collapse, several bigger-than-life personalities).
Are these features in place today and are they also prerequisites for BW II to collapse? There are certainly a number of undervalued currencies in Asia and global imbalances are by far the most stretched they have ever been. However, Chinese private capital flows remain highly regulated and controlled and there is not yet a sense of crisis (still, some commentators refer to the US-China negotiations as a ‘nuclear’ stand-off).
Although BW II is already strained, to ultimately break what is inherently a fragile and fundamentally flawed system will require significant erosion of China’s capital controls and regulations, and further development of its domestic financial markets and institutions. This is occurring, but only at a snail’s pace.
It seems safe to conclude that, for better or worse, BW II will be with us for some time yet. In light of this, a sensible investment strategy involves placing a modest structural bet, short the US dollar against a basket of Asian currencies, with a view to increasing the bet’s size dramatically once Chinese private capital flows begin to accelerate, especially if accompanied by a sense of economic crisis in the US. In the meantime Chinese monetary authorities had better get used to hosting a never-ending queue of US politicians and being constantly reminded that “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.”
Kevin Hebner is macro strategist at Third Wave Global Investors based in Greenwich, Connecticut
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Further, many market pundits have argued that, given America’s economic woes and multiple imbalances, a dramatic decline of the US dollar is once again nigh - especially so against the unambiguously cheap renminbi, as well as the yen and other Asian currencies.
For the dollar to depreciate significantly against a basket of Asian currencies requires a collapse of Bretton Woods II. Under the BW II hypothesis, an informal arrangement exists between the US and several mercantilist Asian countries, which closely manage their currencies against the greenback, with the Asian current account surpluses recycled to provide cheap financing for the structural US current account deficit.
Clearly timing the unraveling of BW II and the accompanying dollar decline will be no easy task. To my eye the best place to look for clues regarding how this plays out are the events that lead inexorably to the demise of its prequel, the BW era. One only has to look at the litany of similarities between then and now (domestic economic weakness, global imbalances and primary trading partners maintaining extremely undervalued currencies).
The Bretton Woods system became operational in 1946, with key features including fixing the US dollar to the price of gold at $35 an ounce and having other countries maintain a fixed and agreed parity vis-à-vis the dollar - ie, gold. However, the BW system was arguably doomed as early as 1958 when the European currencies attained full convertibility and private capital flows began to accelerate. The unravelling reached a tipping point in 1970 when the US economy was suffering from a host of ills: inflation approaching 6%, GDP growth south of 1%, an emerging CA deficit, and gold coverage falling from 55% to 22%.
Soon after came President Richard Nixon’s justifiably infamous ‘new economic policy’, announced on 15 August 1971. The prime architect of the ‘Nixon shock’ was treasury secretary John Connally and included a brazenly unilateral 10% surcharge on all dutiable imports (a powerful bargaining chip), a 10% reduction in foreign assistance expenditures, closing the ‘gold window’ (so the dollar was no longer freely convertible) and 90-day wage and price controls.
If the intent was to shock, trumpet the unacceptability of the status quo, and incentivise its overseas counterparts (including the Germans who only wanted one thing from their currency: stability), few economic policies have been so successful. Financial officials on both sides of the Atlantic (and Pacific) by then recognised that a full-blown dollar crisis could explode at any moment and were rushing to the bargaining table.
‘Typhoon’ Connally (as he was referred to by his Japanese contemporaries) was a force of nature and a heavy-hitter among heavy-hitters. His American colleagues included such luminaries as national security adviser Henry Kissinger, under secretary Paul Volcker and George Shultz (famous in 1971 for his pronouncement that “Santa Claus is Dead”). Even without his stint at the Treasury, Connally would have deserved a prominent place in American political annals - he was governor of Texas from 1963 to 1969 (as a Democrat), and was a passenger in the car when John F Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas (Connally himself was hit by two bullets and seriously injured).
Unencumbered by a deep knowledge of either economics or finance (responding to queries regarding his credentials he quipped, “I can add”), during his tenure Connally consistently and effectively focused the G-10 on three key areas of discussion: exchange rate realignment (long overdue), trade liberalisation (improved opportunities for US exporters) and more equitable burden sharing (of mutual defence expenditures and development assistance, for which the US had long borne the lion’s share).
At the G-10 Rome meetings held in late 1971 Connally proclaimed to his astonished counterparts, “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem,” having the intended consequence of driving yet another nail into the coffin of Bretton Woods and leading in short order to a roughly 20% depreciation of the dollar. The key outcome from Rome was broad agreement to achieve immediate settlement of monetary and trade issues (with the US dropping the 10% import surcharge). The G-10 ministers met again three weeks later at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington and came to an essential agreement on exchange rate policies, which Nixon humbly referred to as “the most significant monetary agreement in the history of the world”.
The demise of BW was driven by three key features of the macro backdrop (accelerating private capital flows, burgeoning imbalances, dramatically undervalued currencies) and three crucial catalysts (a sense of economic crisis, fears of a full-blown dollar collapse, several bigger-than-life personalities).
Are these features in place today and are they also prerequisites for BW II to collapse? There are certainly a number of undervalued currencies in Asia and global imbalances are by far the most stretched they have ever been. However, Chinese private capital flows remain highly regulated and controlled and there is not yet a sense of crisis (still, some commentators refer to the US-China negotiations as a ‘nuclear’ stand-off).
Although BW II is already strained, to ultimately break what is inherently a fragile and fundamentally flawed system will require significant erosion of China’s capital controls and regulations, and further development of its domestic financial markets and institutions. This is occurring, but only at a snail’s pace.
It seems safe to conclude that, for better or worse, BW II will be with us for some time yet. In light of this, a sensible investment strategy involves placing a modest structural bet, short the US dollar against a basket of Asian currencies, with a view to increasing the bet’s size dramatically once Chinese private capital flows begin to accelerate, especially if accompanied by a sense of economic crisis in the US. In the meantime Chinese monetary authorities had better get used to hosting a never-ending queue of US politicians and being constantly reminded that “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.”
Kevin Hebner is macro strategist at Third Wave Global Investors based in Greenwich, Connecticut
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https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-dollar-is-a-problem-for-rich-and-poor-countries-by-hippolyte-fofack-2024-08/chinese
Hippolyte Fofack
发自剑桥——1971 年，时任美国财政部长约翰·康纳利（John Connally）对十国集团的同行们说过一句名言：“美元是我们的货币，但却是你们的问题。”康纳利出人意表地坦承了一个事实：尽管美元是世界主要储备货币，但它的首要目的是促进美国的利益。
这一点在今天依然适用。但近几十年来美元在全球贸易和金融中的核心作用给新兴市场和发展中经济体带来的问题要多于给富裕国家带来的问题。比如美国联邦储备委员会当前的紧缩周期——就像之前的其他紧缩周期一样——就对新兴市场和发展中经济体造成了过于巨大的影响，助长了大规模、无节制的资本外流。这反过来又引发了货币动荡，加剧了宏观经济挑战，增加了偿债成本，导致用于公共投资的财政空间受限。
而美联储与其他发达经济体央行之间近期的货币政策分歧则在加剧全球富裕国家的汇率波动。美联储“加息换长期”政策立场的溢出效应可能在最近出手干预外汇市场以阻止日元快速下滑的日本身上表现得最为明显。
今年6月美国财政部将日本列入了可能存在不公平外汇交易行为“监控名单”。虽然财政部没有将日本定为汇率操纵国（这可能导致美国对其最坚定的盟友之一实施制裁），但此举意义重大，尤其是因为它凸显了货币政策分歧的全球性风险以及在这方面进行国际协调的内在挑战。
日本之所以被列入监控名单是因为它符合财政部用来评估美国主要贸易伙伴政策的三项标准中的两项，即对美贸易顺差至少达到150亿美元，经常账户盈余超过GDP的3%。第三个标准则是持续、单方面干预外汇市场，在12个月内净购买总额至少达到GDP的2%。财政部向国会提交的报告指出虽然日本尚未达到这一门槛，但它已经在积极干预外汇市场。
日本当局确实花费了数十亿美元来支撑日元，因为自2021年以来日元已经贬值了1/3并在今年4月跌至1美元兑 160多日元的34年来最低点。这主要是因为两国之间存在巨大的利率差：当美联储在2022年初大幅提高利率以对抗通胀时，日本央行却维持负利率政策以应对国内通货紧缩。财政部在报告中强调它期望“在各个庞大且自由交易的外汇市场中，干预措施只会留到非常特殊的情况下才使用，而且还是在经过适当事先协商的情况下”。
几个月来投资者越来越多地转向借入日元去投资海外高收益资产的套利交易。这种状况加上债券收益率上升给日元带来了下行压力。此外由于汇率风险增加，货币贬值致使出口商不愿将国外收入兑换成日元，从而进一步减少了需求，加剧了日元的疲软。
7月日本政府再次斥资360亿美元买入日元——这是日本政府今年的第三次干预。花旗集团估计日本拥有2000-3000 亿美元的金融储备来实施此类行动，这可能导致需要出售美元、其他货币甚至政府债券来支撑日元并减轻经济损失。
通常情况下货币当局会出手削弱本币以促进出口和提高竞争力。美国当年就是这样干的：1985年的《广场协议》导致日元对美元升值46%，削弱了日本的竞争力，促使日本汽车企业在美国建厂。
而日本货币当局最近采取的不寻常措施则反映了货币政策分歧对全球稳定和增长造成的高昂代价。虽然日元疲软促进了入境旅游和对美出口，但也导致汇率过度波动，抑制了企业投资，提高了工业和进口商的成本。占日本经济一半以上的私人消费出现放缓，增加了滞胀风险。因此日本政府已将本财年（2025年3月结束）的经济增长预期从1.3%下调至0.9%左右。
一些迹象表明利差正在缩小而日元汇率则趋于稳定。7月下旬日元对美元汇率上升4%并在日本央行将基准利率上调至0.25%的第二天升至3月以来的最高水平。日元的飙升是在美国6月通胀数据较为温和且7月劳动力市场较为疲软后发生的，因为随着美联储将从一味关注通胀目标转向价格稳定和最大就业的双重任务以应对经济增长面临的新威胁，这两项数据都可能导致该机构提前降息。
但是这些系统性重要央行之间的新一轮政策分化凸显了美元的巨大全球影响力。当这些货币当局同步行动时人们很容易将美国货币视作一个只影响新兴市场经济体的问题。然而日本最近的货币承压状况却直白地提醒了我们：美元对富裕经济体和贫穷经济体都是个问题。
Hippolyte Fofack, a former chief economist at the African Export-Import Bank, is a fellow with the Sustainable Development Solutions Network at Columbia University, a research associate at Harvard University’s Center for African Studies, a distinguished fellow at the Global Federation of Competitiveness Councils, and a fellow at the African Academy of Sciences.
这一点在今天依然适用。但近几十年来美元在全球贸易和金融中的核心作用给新兴市场和发展中经济体带来的问题要多于给富裕国家带来的问题。比如美国联邦储备委员会当前的紧缩周期——就像之前的其他紧缩周期一样——就对新兴市场和发展中经济体造成了过于巨大的影响，助长了大规模、无节制的资本外流。这反过来又引发了货币动荡，加剧了宏观经济挑战，增加了偿债成本，导致用于公共投资的财政空间受限。
而美联储与其他发达经济体央行之间近期的货币政策分歧则在加剧全球富裕国家的汇率波动。美联储“加息换长期”政策立场的溢出效应可能在最近出手干预外汇市场以阻止日元快速下滑的日本身上表现得最为明显。
今年6月美国财政部将日本列入了可能存在不公平外汇交易行为“监控名单”。虽然财政部没有将日本定为汇率操纵国（这可能导致美国对其最坚定的盟友之一实施制裁），但此举意义重大，尤其是因为它凸显了货币政策分歧的全球性风险以及在这方面进行国际协调的内在挑战。
日本之所以被列入监控名单是因为它符合财政部用来评估美国主要贸易伙伴政策的三项标准中的两项，即对美贸易顺差至少达到150亿美元，经常账户盈余超过GDP的3%。第三个标准则是持续、单方面干预外汇市场，在12个月内净购买总额至少达到GDP的2%。财政部向国会提交的报告指出虽然日本尚未达到这一门槛，但它已经在积极干预外汇市场。
日本当局确实花费了数十亿美元来支撑日元，因为自2021年以来日元已经贬值了1/3并在今年4月跌至1美元兑 160多日元的34年来最低点。这主要是因为两国之间存在巨大的利率差：当美联储在2022年初大幅提高利率以对抗通胀时，日本央行却维持负利率政策以应对国内通货紧缩。财政部在报告中强调它期望“在各个庞大且自由交易的外汇市场中，干预措施只会留到非常特殊的情况下才使用，而且还是在经过适当事先协商的情况下”。
7月日本政府再次斥资360亿美元买入日元——这是日本政府今年的第三次干预。花旗集团估计日本拥有2000-3000 亿美元的金融储备来实施此类行动，这可能导致需要出售美元、其他货币甚至政府债券来支撑日元并减轻经济损失。
通常情况下货币当局会出手削弱本币以促进出口和提高竞争力。美国当年就是这样干的：1985年的《广场协议》导致日元对美元升值46%，削弱了日本的竞争力，促使日本汽车企业在美国建厂。
而日本货币当局最近采取的不寻常措施则反映了货币政策分歧对全球稳定和增长造成的高昂代价。虽然日元疲软促进了入境旅游和对美出口，但也导致汇率过度波动，抑制了企业投资，提高了工业和进口商的成本。占日本经济一半以上的私人消费出现放缓，增加了滞胀风险。因此日本政府已将本财年（2025年3月结束）的经济增长预期从1.3%下调至0.9%左右。
一些迹象表明利差正在缩小而日元汇率则趋于稳定。7月下旬日元对美元汇率上升4%并在日本央行将基准利率上调至0.25%的第二天升至3月以来的最高水平。日元的飙升是在美国6月通胀数据较为温和且7月劳动力市场较为疲软后发生的，因为随着美联储将从一味关注通胀目标转向价格稳定和最大就业的双重任务以应对经济增长面临的新威胁，这两项数据都可能导致该机构提前降息。
但是这些系统性重要央行之间的新一轮政策分化凸显了美元的巨大全球影响力。当这些货币当局同步行动时人们很容易将美国货币视作一个只影响新兴市场经济体的问题。然而日本最近的货币承压状况却直白地提醒了我们：美元对富裕经济体和贫穷经济体都是个问题。
Hippolyte Fofack, a former chief economist at the African Export-Import Bank, is a fellow with the Sustainable Development Solutions Network at Columbia University, a research associate at Harvard University’s Center for African Studies, a distinguished fellow at the Global Federation of Competitiveness Councils, and a fellow at the African Academy of Sciences.
