Mearsheimer 零和博弈 大国将一国的收益视为其他国家的损失

米尔斯海默的“零和”博弈理论应用于“大霸主”的概念，表明国际关系中的大国将一国的收益视为其他国家的损失。这意味着，随着一国权力或影响力的增强，其他国家会发现自己的权力和影响力正在减弱。米尔斯海默认为，这种零和博弈的视角会导致持续的权力斗争，并倾向于阻止其他国家获得地区霸权，即使这意味着引发冲突。

阐述：

零和博弈：

在零和博弈中，一方的收益会直接被另一方的损失抵消。在国际关系的语境中，这意味着如果一国变得更强大，其他国家就会被认为变得更弱，从而形成竞争态势。

大霸主：

“大霸主”一词指的是霸权国家，通常指美国，它试图通过阻止其他国家获得类似的权力来维持其主导地位。

米尔斯海默的论点：

米尔斯海默在其著作《大国政治的悲剧》中概述了其理论，他认为，像美国这样的大国，其根本驱动力在于生存和安全。为了实现这一目标，它们会努力争取地区霸权，即在特定地区占据主导地位。

防止霸权：

大国，尤其是“大霸权”，对其他国家取得地区霸权心存疑虑。这是因为地区霸权可能对其自身的利益和安全构成重大威胁。

零和博弈视角：

这种对敌对霸权的恐惧源于零和博弈视角，即一个国家的崛起被视为对其他国家的直接威胁。因此，大国会采取行动对抗任何潜在的竞争对手，通常是通过军事干预或其他形式的施压。

示例：

米尔斯海默列举了美国对抗德意志帝国、纳粹德国、日本帝国和苏联等历史案例，认为美国试图阻止这些国家在各自地区实现区域霸权，体现了其在国际关系中的零和博弈策略。

原型博弈催生了多种权力、冲突与合作模式

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355330002_Archetypal_games_generate_diverse_models_of_power_conflict_and_cooperation

作者：布莱恩·布伦斯  2021年12月

摘要与图表

相互依存有多种形式。我们展示了三种权力模式如何催生出理解社会生态系统动态和转型的多种模型。原型博弈所追踪的路径超越了对少数社会困境的关注，从而能够识别和理解社会情境中的多样性和复杂性，包括家庭协调和背叛问题。我们运用扩展的二人二选（2×2）博弈的拓扑结构，推导出简单的相互依赖原型，从而生成具有重叠机会和挑战的集体行动模型。通过均等化结果排序（建立平局以表明结果间的无差异性）来简化收益矩阵，得到三个原型博弈，它们在顺序上等同于社会心理学中相互依赖理论所定义的独立、协调和交换的收益结构。这三种对称的权力模式结合起来，构成了一个非对称的零和冲突原型，并进一步构成了权力和依赖结构。区分结果排序（打破平局）将这些原始原型转化为更复杂的配置，包括协同、妥协、惯例、竞争和优势的中间原型。相互依存的原型模型及其产生不同情况的途径有助于理解社会生态系统的制度多样性和潜在转变，区分组织的收敛和发散集体行动问题，并阐明治理中权力的基本模式。

Mearsheimer's "zero-sum" game theory, as applied to the concept of the "Big Bully," suggests that great powers in international relations view gains for one state as losses for others. This means that as one state gains power or influence, other states see their own power and influence diminishing. Mearsheimer argues that this zero-sum perspective leads to a constant struggle for power and a tendency to prevent other states from achieving regional hegemony, even if it means engaging in conflict.

Elaboration:

Zero-Sum Game:

In a zero-sum game, one player's gain is directly offset by another player's loss. In the context of international relations, this means that if one state becomes stronger, other states are perceived to become weaker, leading to a competitive dynamic.

Big Bully:

The term "Big Bully" refers to a hegemonic state, often the United States, that seeks to maintain its dominance by preventing other states from achieving similar power.

Mearsheimer's Argument:

Mearsheimer's theory, outlined in his book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics," argues that great powers, like the United States, are driven by a fundamental quest for survival and security. To achieve this, they will strive for regional hegemony, which is a position of dominance within a specific region.

Preventing Hegemony:

Great powers, especially the Big Bully, are wary of other states achieving regional hegemony. This is because a regional hegemon can pose a significant threat to the Big Bully's own interests and security.

Zero-Sum Perspective:

This fear of a rival hegemon stems from the zero-sum perspective, where the rise of one state is seen as a direct threat to the others. Therefore, great powers will act to counter any potential rivals, often through military intervention or other forms of pressure.

Examples:

Mearsheimer cites historical examples like the United States' actions against Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union, arguing that the US sought to prevent these states from achieving regional hegemony in their respective regions, demonstrating a zero-sum approach to international relations.

Archetypal games generate diverse models of power, conflict, and cooperation

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355330002_Archetypal_games_generate_diverse_models_of_power_conflict_and_cooperation

December 2021

Authors: Bryan Bruns

Abstract and Figures

Interdependence takes many forms. We show how three patterns of power generate diverse models for understanding dynamics and transformations in social-ecological systems. Archetypal games trace pathways that go beyond a focus on a few social dilemmas to recognize and understand diversity and complexity in a landscape of social situations, including families of coordination and defection problems. We apply the extended topology of two-person two-choice (2 × 2) games to derive simple archetypes of interdependence that generate models with overlapping opportunities and challenges for collective action. Simplifying payoff matrices by equalizing outcome ranks (making ties to show indifference among outcomes) yields three archetypal games that are ordinally equivalent to payoff structures for independence, coordination, and exchange, as identified by interdependence theory in social psychology. These three symmetric patterns of power combine to make an asymmetric archetype for zero-sum conflict and further structures of power and dependence. Differentiating the ranking of outcomes (breaking ties) transforms these primal archetypes into more complex configurations, including intermediate archetypes for synergy, compromise, convention, rivalry, and advantage. Archetypal models of interdependence, and the pathways through which they generate diverse situations, could help to understand institutional diversity and potential transformations in social-ecological systems, to distinguish between convergent and divergent collective action problems for organizations, and to clarify elementary patterns of power in governance.