查斯·弗里曼：我们对中国撒的谎
Chas Freeman: The Lies We Tell Ourselves About China
Glenn Diesen 2025年5月12日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tiMU8-0Id1I
查斯·弗里曼认为，美国对中国撒的谎，最终导致自身伤害，因为合作的机会被浪费，冲突被不必要地引发。
大家好，欢迎来到今天的节目。我最喜欢的嘉宾之一查兹·弗里曼曾任国防部国际安全事务助理部长，也被称为前美国驻沙特阿拉伯大使。不过，今天的话题……嗯，很有意思的是，他曾担任美国国务院中国事务主管，也曾在基辛格开放中国的时候与他共事。所以，嗯，欢迎回到节目，谢谢你，很高兴和你在一起。格伦，稍微更正一下，我……我写了基辛格1971年秘密访问北京所依赖的文件，我记得是1971年6月9日、7月9日至11日，去北京的，但我当时没有随行。嗯，我没有肚子疼，也没有去巴基斯坦的山上避难，然后飞去别的地方。嗯，嗯，尽管如此，我认为这段经历非常重要。嗯，我想，在那个年代，中国的开放显然有一个明确的目的，就是打破分裂。苏联和中国，还有呃，你知道，美国和中国之间的工作关系，呃，达成的协议，比如“一个中国”政策，所有这些都为美国和中国之间的和平与合作奠定了基础。呃，呃，是的，今天我想和你们讨论的话题是美中之间日益加剧的竞争。到目前为止，它主要集中在经济领域，但当然可能会升级，呃，希望不要升级到军事领域。呃，但我认为最好先问一个开放或宽泛的问题，也就是呃，呃，你抱怨说，美国对中国往往缺乏了解，这就是为什么我们经常陷入刻板印象。你认为当今对中国的主要误解是什么？美国政界对中国有哪些不了解？
Chas Freeman
从哪里开始呢？呃，错觉和误解的数量相当多，嗯，不幸的是当然，现在的美国人相当孤立，嗯，我记得在《二战》的结尾，著名的战地记者阿诺·德博斯告诉我，1947年，美国大约有2700名外国记者，而当时的报业非常分散，几乎每家报纸都有自己的外国记者，美国人对世界形势非常了解，嗯，今天，美国只有不到100名外国记者，这就是为什么当你听到新闻时，如果是关于国外的事情，你可能听到的是BBC特约记者或其他人的消息，嗯，所以我们对世界形势了解得不是很多，我们的学校不再教授地理，人们开玩笑说，美国人是通过与任何国家打仗来学习地理的，嗯，嗯，嗯，但主要是，我们经历了一系列阶段，我们进行了有限的合作，目的有限，完全是出于地缘政治考虑，嗯，中国已经和苏联分裂了他们面临着来自莫斯科的压力，苏联在20世纪60年代末确实存在着先发制人的入侵中国的危险，当时双方发生了实际的战斗，尼克松总统明智地意识到我们可以争取中国的支持来遏制苏联，我们也这么做了，这并非偶然，也许中国在某种程度上是一个受保护的国家，就像二战期间我们支持中国政府对抗日本一样，主要不是因为我们指望中国能打败日本，而是我们希望中国能牵制住大量的日本军队，否则这些军队可能会被部署到其他地方，所以这是一个战略举措，中国的继续独立对我们来说具有战略重要性，冷战时期也是如此，但是当冷战结束，苏联解体，柏林墙倒塌后，我们就不再有共同的敌人了，同时，我认为关键的一年是1989年，柏林墙当然，柏林墙在十一月倒塌了。六月份，北京天安广场发生了学生和工人起义，这场起义被武力镇压，彻底摧毁了美中关系。最终，那一年也是台湾不再是列宁主义独裁政权，成为民主国家的一年。
所以，我们突然有三股力量引导我们走向对中国的反感。
地缘政治上合作的理由显然消失了。意识形态上，泰贝和北京之间的平等关系消失了，因为泰贝不再是列宁主义者，而北京仍然是列宁主义者。当然，反共产主义的影响仍然存在。遏制，嗯，朝鲜战争和越南战争的经历，所有这些事情仍然伴随着我们，所以嗯，我相信，由于缺乏描述关系的详细词汇，我们在外交关系方面受到了束缚，嗯，我已经了解了其中一些，联盟是无条件地承诺在有条件的偶然关系中相互援助，这种关系设想某种有限的合作，也许是在有限的时间内，嗯，客户国基本上嗯，从嗯，为他们的其他国家提供更大的特权和特权中获得保护，嗯，许多国际关系只是在平等的基础上给予和接受，非常具有交易性，但是当你谈到竞争或对抗的种类时，嗯，我认为有四种，首先是你提到的竞争，嗯，我会非常谨慎地使用这个词，因为我认为它基本上意味着一种良性竞争，在这种竞争中，你试图通过提高自己来超越对方，这就像去参加田径比赛，如果你嗯你在跑道上奔跑，你打败了对方，其他人，那是因为你训练得更好，你身体更强壮，你跑得更快，不是因为他们更弱，或者其他什么原因，也不是因为你破坏了他们，因为呃呃，在竞争之后，嗯，我们有，嗯，我们有，嗯，我所说的对抗性对抗，就是你试图通过在跑道上绊倒或打断对方来取胜，不是通过超越自己，而是通过伤害对方，使其无法匹敌你，然后最后，如果你，嗯，如果你把这种状态发挥到极致，你就变成了你，你进入了敌意的境界，你的目标是消灭对方，嗯，我们在冷战中看到过，受核交换恐惧的制约，所以我们与中国的处境是，我们已经经历了整个过程，嗯，从二战中的受保护国地位，到冷战期间在阿富汗的军事合作，反对苏联占领时期，嗯，交易关系竞争，非常良性竞争，现在我们处于对抗性对抗状态，我们的目标是，如果可能的话，压制中国，将其击退，嗯，这当然是不可能的，因为我们的能力有限，而中国正在独自推进，所以我很抱歉，回复得这么冗长，但嗯，这是一种非常战略性、非常复杂的关系，我们刚刚看到，嗯，美国和中国进行了严重的经济战，然后显然，嗯，紧张局势有所缓和，如果你愿意的话，可以限制一天，但这不是停火，我们没有放弃对抗，嗯，这不是停火，我们不会停止，嗯，互相采取措施，嗯，这只是降低对抗的强度，同时，我们正在看看是否能够达成某种长期谅解，嗯，结束贸易战，或者至少将其限制在一定范围内，某种军备控制协议，如果你会的，嗯，但我们不是，你知道特朗普政府把这描绘成其极限施压策略的重大胜利。这不是，嗯，中国人不想要关税，他们进行了报复，嗯，美国现在已经让步了，我很感谢你区分竞争和对抗，因为它做得很好。我非常支持美国的产业政策，也对它抱有希望，希望它能够加强其技术主权和竞争力。但还有别的事情，那就是，如果这足够了，我认为美国可以慢慢来，逐步建设，是的，重新工业化所有我认为应该做的事情，但似乎很多这些政策都过度了，因为目标不仅仅是提高竞争力，而且正如你所说，也要打破中国，所以这似乎超出了竞争的范围，但是，他们需要打破中国，这是否与意识形态有关，还是那么，世界观是什么呢？因为如果美国愿意与中国平等分享舞台，那么美国就可以采取更温和的产业政策，重建自身实力，而不必再次打断中国的膝盖。这是否与意识形态有关？你如何解释这种关系中对主导地位的需求？我认为，这一切的驱动力是失去主导地位所带来的心理困扰。大约在1870年，美国成为世界最大经济体。在20世纪，我们逐步成为世界主导的
政治和军事力量，以及主导的金融力量，并且长期以来一直是经济强国。现在我们看到中国，如果你用适当的标准来衡量两国的GDP，比较标准是购买力平价，而不是名义汇率，因为名义汇率会波动，而且代表着外部因素。那么，中国的中国的经济规模已经比我们大了三分之一，嗯，它生产了超过世界三分之一的制成品，我们现在只生产大约15%，嗯，嗯，它深深植根于二战后的布雷顿森林体系，嗯，比如我们已经退出的世界贸易组织，所以我们面临着一个讽刺的局面：中国人一边捍卫我们创造的世界秩序，一边试图对其进行一些调整，嗯，当然，以利于他们自己，嗯，我们的行为具有破坏性，嗯，嗯，在这种情况下，嗯，我们不理会《联合国宪章》和国际法，我们破坏了世界贸易组织，当我们不喜欢全球多数派的决定时，我们退出了各种联合国专门机构，嗯，我们变得越来越孤立，而中国则越来越参与其中，所以这就是正在发生的事情，嗯，为了恢复竞争力，我认为这是一个非常合适的目标，我认为我们必须认识到一些经济现实，首先，工业领域发生的事情与农业领域发生的事情完全一样，所以1900年，我不知道挪威的情况，但在1900年的美国，大约80%的人口从事农业生产，呃，现在只有不到1%，而我们生产的粮食比以往任何时候都多，呃，那是因为资本已经取代了劳动力，也就是说，人们变得更有生产力，因为他们 实现了农业机械化，嗯，农业机械化也带来了科学和红色，更抗病的优良品种等等，从而带来了更高的产量，嗯，动物种群也是如此，嗯，所以，嗯，工业领域正在发生的事情和我说的完全一样，1980年，%的人从事农业，15%左右从事工业，5%从事所谓的 服务业，这是一个非常模糊的类别，但如果你看看现在的情况，你会发现，农业领域不到1%，工业领域占8%，这相当于125年前的一半，嗯，还有
嗯，自动化和机器人技术嗯，各种各样的生产管理技术从亨利·福特发明的流水线开始，嗯，嗯，然后，经过多个阶段，美国工人的生产力大大提高，嗯，到目前为止，生产更多商品所需的人力更少，实际上，我们的产量比以往任何时候都多，但我们的就业行业正在下滑，最后，我们现在有，所以是91，让我们看看，嗯，15，也就是8%，1%，嗯，也就是91%的人从事所谓的服务业，这基本上是一个毫无意义的类别，
嗯，需要经济学家重新审视，他们在20世纪30年代发明了这个类别，GDP也急需理论上的
重新审视，嗯，所以我们看到中国也发生了同样的事情，
农业劳动力正在迅速减少，工业劳动力正在减少，
工业就业岗位正在减少，嗯，我们现在看到中国年轻人失业，
那些接受过工业经济教育的人现在不再需要它们了。
那么，这一切的意义何在？美国正在发生的事情，引发了……大量的焦虑和不满。我们……而不是……去探究这些与进步息息相关的根源，……我们……责怪外国人。那么，谁才是最适合指责中国的外国人呢？为什么？因为我们……有反华情绪的历史，我们有在冷战时期遏制中国的历史，而中国是由……一个自称共产党的组织统治的。我们都知道，我们想象，如果你见过一个……共产党员，你就见过他们。所有发表关于……中国和共产主义等等言论的人，他们既没有见过中国人，也没有去过中国……他们也从未见过……任何类型的共产党员，除了反华的越南人，因此，尽管他们的……意识形态被误导，但他们仍然是好人。所以，有很多因素导致了这种情况，但归根结底，……我们对中国的看法非常扭曲，新闻报道不足。呃
我们媒体的编辑政策存在偏见，嗯，政治建制
把中国当成了首选的敌人，嗯，所以我们处于一个非常奇怪的境地。
如果你误解了你的竞争对手，你就无法拥有有效的政策谈判地位或
竞争，而我们
从根本上来说也是如此。除此之外，嗯，你提到了产业政策。
中国人已经制定出了一种非常有效的产业政策模式，
基本上，嗯，依赖于政策性银行。
银行通过放贷来支持国家目标，所以嗯，你知道，当你在某种程度上这样做的时候，你会遇到一些奇怪的事情。嗯，例如，一家中国公司
在“一带一路”倡议下收购了意大利轮胎制造商倍耐力的大部分股份，
因为它能够将其描绘成与“一带一路”有某种关联。嗯，我觉得这有点牵强，
但显然其中一家政策性银行准备通过贷款来支持它，所以你嗯
基本上就是戴英的想法，嗯，如果你想要过河，你得有个目标，你得告诉别人，呃，你得过河，我不在乎怎么做，嗯，如果你到了那里从经济角度来说，这很值得，所以他想出了摸着石头过河的主意，嗯，中国人就是这么做的。他们宣布了一个目标，比如说我们需要一个电力经济，呃，我们需要呃，可再生能源，呃，他们说，如果你投资这些东西，我们会在经济上支持你。结果就是，你知道，超过50%的在建水力发电项目在中国，70%的在建太阳能发电项目在中国，风能发电也类似，当然，中国在电动汽车方面也处于领先地位，在高压输电系统方面也处于领先地位，在……呃，电力生产效率等方面也处于领先地位。我还可以举其他例子，因为中国现在……在……呃，绝大多数……技术领域都处于领先地位，有些技术我们并不理解，我们想象出口管制……可以保护我们宝贵的体液不被中国人榨干，如果你还记得奇异博士的爱……呃，他还活得好好的，在华盛顿的某个地方，嗯……呃，即使基辛格去世了，嗯，我本来想说，
把国内问题归咎于外国势力的倾向，如今在欧洲也经常看到，但嗯，我以为你们把所有问题都归咎于瑞典人，
嗯，嗯，现在更多是指向俄罗斯人，嗯，嗯，嗯，对我来说，美国民族主义的独特之处在于，它与世界各地的民族主义不同，因为民族主义往往以更丑陋的形式出现，嗯，看看你的伟大何时结束，嗯，它为什么结束，谁应该受到责备，所以你回顾历史，看看是谁夺走了你的伟大。我想，
美国民族主义一直以来的独特之处在于，它通常非常积极，这是基于一种假设，即他最辉煌的日子就在前方，嗯，它看起来更温和，更乐观，嗯，但嗯，也许是因为美国一直在不断强大，但现在当然相对衰落的美国似乎正在追随所谓的欧洲道路，而我们当时所关注的是……你知道这个黄金时代是什么时候，是谁夺走了它，然后中国被认定为……最终人们得出这样的结论：……中国人抢走了我们的工作，不是外包，而是抢走了……但这确实引出了一个问题：……如果这对美国来说是一个挑战，那么……我们该如何……资本主义本身？鉴于官方说法是……中国是由……共产党领导的，但……它是资本主义的……这种资本主义形式在很大程度上与19世纪的美国非常相似，非常工业化的资本主义，它限制……寻租者……寻求……和谐，确保社会不会成为自由市场的附属物……你认为美国是否需要改变其资本主义本身的运作方式？如果是这样，你认为中国是一个榜样吗？或者它不再适合美国？我不认为……中国为美国提供了一个典范，特别是因为它具有强烈的列宁主义特征，嗯，这与美国长期以来试图效仿的欧洲启蒙价值观并不相容，而这些价值观现在正被用来反对美国非常专制的总统制，嗯，所以我认为有些东西对中国有用，嗯，毕竟这是一个拥有15亿人口的社会，嗯，以前从来没有人真正有效地治理过这么大的国家。中国人经历过多次他们所谓的“一团乱麻”，无政府状态，文化大革命就是一个最近的例子，嗯，他们非常重视秩序，嗯，如果我们有像中国人那样的限制，我们也会这样做。嗯，例如，嗯，美国的人口大约比中国人少1/4，但我们的农业用地是中国人的四倍，嗯，他们拥有世界7%的供水量，嗯，我们大约有25%的供水量。 27% 我们拥有极好的自然资源。
我们的邻居，正如俾斯麦所说，嗯，北边是温顺有礼的加拿大人，南边是无忧无虑的墨西哥人。他们俩都对美国构成威胁，嗯，反正他们也没有。我们正在努力解决这个问题。嗯，嗯，我们东西边的邻居是鱼。嗯，你知道，中国与14个国家接壤，多年来与这些国家发生过多次冲突。嗯，在过去的一千年里，中国有600年被外国人统治，所以这是一段非常不同的历史。如果我们的耕地与人口比例和中国一样，那么美国就会有40亿人，其中大多数可能在加利福尼亚。所以我不太担心，因为我在
东海岸。嗯，嗯，所以，嗯，即使你
不了解历史，这些也是差异。我认为我们误解了东亚的历史，嗯，就欧洲模式而言，欧洲是最血腥的大陆紧随其后的是印度次大陆。嗯，它们都是欧亚大陆的延伸，拥有多种语言、文化等等，相互碰撞，形成了交战国。嗯，中国在前基督教时代经历过那段时期，但它已经度过了那段时期。东亚的情况从未像欧洲那样。嗯，各国都向中国屈服，因为中国的规模、知识和科学实力、繁荣昌盛以及良好的治理，但中国并没有出去征服这些国家。嗯，所以也有例外，比如越南。嗯，一些韩国的历史也涉及到中国的征服，或者说，征服了现在的中国。嗯，但我认为我们从根本上误解了这段历史。嗯，我不确定中国人是否理解他们自己的历史。嗯，如果他们理解的话，那也包含在“我们永远不会称霸”这句话里。我认为中国是。唯一一个这么说的国家，呃，在19世纪，美国说过我们永远不会成为帝国主义者，但昭昭天命从未停止。
我们推翻了夏威夷的君主制，将其并入我们的国家。然后我们又去了菲律宾、关岛等等，然后我们向南去了波多黎各和古巴。嗯，所以中国人说我们永远不会成为帝国主义者。嗯，但我认为我们必须对他们是否会落入我们曾经犯下的陷阱保持怀疑态度。是的，不，这对美国来说是一件关键的事情，尤其是在19世纪。他们不会变得像欧洲人一样。嗯，我认为这就是为什么在1898年，
嗯，美国击败了西班牙，嗯，获得了许多殖民地，正如你所说，包括菲律宾。这引起了美国社会很大一部分人的厌恶。比如马克·吐温，以及其他人，他们认为帝国不是，是的，追求帝国是在浪费灵魂。欧洲的道路，但嗯嗯，不过这很有趣，因为有一种普遍的观点认为，中国的行为方式与美国有根本区别，但嗯，我想这是两种不同的视角，嗯，我知道，比如杰弗里·萨克森就指出，中国的行为方式与美国内部有所不同。另一方面，还有默奇默的观点，认为一切都是外部因素。换句话说，如果“对冲”主义（hedgemon）本身是一个机会，那么支持它的意识形态和理念也会随之而来。所以，中国人也可能会有他们的帝国时刻，如果你愿意的话，嗯，但是，你如何看待中国未来的政策？你认为它会衰落吗？会开始追求更多的帝国野心吗？或者，你认为我们未能认识到美国和中国的其他动机，因为我认为这是一个共同的主题，不仅对美国如此，对欧洲人来说也是如此。如今，人们缺乏认识到安全关切和利益的能力。对手……呃，在过去，这在任何讨论中都是一个出发点。但我们何时讨论过伊朗、俄罗斯或中国的安全或利益？我们停止讨论这些……呃，我们对手的担忧。呃，您如何看待这个问题？您认为中国会出于安全考虑采取行动吗？还是您认为中国可能出于更多的霸权主义冲动？抱歉，
这是一个很长的问题。不，这是一个非常有趣的多层次问题。在谈论中国之前，让我先谈谈美国。嗯，马克·吐温和其他反对美国帝国主义的人是正确的，它最终被证明与美国民主格格不入。呃，我们现在看到了这一点。嗯，第二点是我们发明了一种新的帝国……呃，呃，一个……帝国。
与其说是占领，不如说是保护费。如果你愿意的话，我们保护每个人免受他人侵害。嗯，这似乎是美国外交政策的天才之处，我们有一种不可抗拒的冲动，要保护每个人免受他人侵害。呃，这
让我们陷入了麻烦。呃，它另外，嗯，我们也有一个源于我们战争经验的传统，这在我们的内战、第一次世界大战、第二次世界大战以及冷战中非常不寻常，我们
认为目标是对方无条件投降，然后进行道德重建，嗯，所以这就是我们在内战中所做的，你知道，我们占领了南方，并试图以不同的方式重建它，我们在第一次世界大战后对德国也这样做了，嗯，在第二次世界大战后，嗯，我们再次试图
追求无条件投降，最终苏联因自身缺陷而解体，然后出现了一个论点，嗯，我们需要帮助它，嗯，你知道，
忏悔它的罪过，并在道德上变得优越，但我们不愿意
为此投入资金，嗯，杰弗里·萨克斯和其他人做了一些事情，嗯，在这方面没有什么帮助，尽管我钦佩杰弗里·萨克斯目前的
观点，但我还是这么说嗯，所以关于中国的情况，嗯，我认为中国人想要的不是他们似乎认为联盟实际上是对其他国家的保护，而不是聚集力量来增加他们的权力和影响力，而是会让他们陷入麻烦的负担，所以他们实际上没有任何盟友。他们与朝鲜建立了受保护的国家关系，朝鲜是美国军队和日本军队之间的缓冲国。从他们的角度来看，他们与巴基斯坦也建立了类似的受保护的国家关系，这种关系的驱动力是希望抵消印度在南亚的霸权。西藏当然是南亚的一部分。所以中国人对南亚的力量平衡有着合理的担忧，这就是他们支持巴基斯坦的原因。所以他们知道如何玩地缘政治游戏，这很明显。但我认为他们寻求的不是控制，他们当然不是在寻求对正在萎缩而不是增长的人口的依赖。他们不想引进更多的韩国人、越南人或其他外国人。他们想要什么呢？他们不谋求对自然资源的军事控制，他们已经吸取了教训，只要付出足够的钱，就能买到你需要的东西，嗯，嗯，所以我认为他们想要的是作为一个独立文明大国的尊严得到尊重。当然，如果其他国家想效仿他们，他们会感到荣幸，但他们并不坚持这一点，这与美国不同。美国的立场是，如果你想和我们打交道，你就必须……像我们一样，中国人的立场是，你是外国人，我们很高兴，你是外国人，请保持这种状态，我们不在乎你做什么，
只要我们能赚钱，而且你不损害我们的尊严。所以我认为我们正在讨论一种截然不同的世界秩序方法，嗯，嗯，它可能有帝国主义的方面，但它们与英国、法国、俄罗斯帝国或嗯，嗯，或者美国准帝国所追求的那些不同，所以我不知道中国最终会走向何方，嗯，我认为在竞争领域，主要的……我没注意到有什么区别。我认为我们真正需要关注的是，根据经合组织的数据，到2030年，也就是仅仅五年之后，全球STEM领域的劳动力将有37%来自中国，37%来自印度，26%来自俄罗斯，4.5%来自俄罗斯，4.2%来自美国。这并非
在良性竞争中取得成功的秘诀，我将其定义为良性竞争，这就是为什么我们以这种方式陷入对抗性对抗。
嗯，但底线是，如果我们想要竞争，如果我们想要超越，如果我们想要……呃，即使不是世界主要强国，也不是世界几个主要强国之一，我们也需要效仿中国改革开放的做法，我们正在做相反的事情，我们正在加倍巩固我们现有的经济结构，我们不推行反垄断政策，嗯，你知道，嗯，呃这是一个过时的观察，但你可能知道，当我不住在新罕布什尔州吉泽尔仓库的时候，我兼职一家国际公司的董事长。嗯，嗯，几年前，我从事家具行业。当时，美国有120家家具公司，大部分归底特律的马努吉亚家族所有。他们是亚美尼亚裔美国人，是发明三角水龙头的人的后裔。三角水龙头是控制浴室水龙头冷热水流出的控制杆。嗯，嗯，在中国，有5万家家具公司。他们参与了残酷的竞争。所以你提到了19世纪的市场资本主义，也就是中国模式。驱动经济的不是大型国有企业，而是众多相互竞争的小型实体。所以我们看到，嗯，嗯，人工智能最近最大的进步来自DeepSeek，这是一个私人项目，
与政府无关，甚至没有得到任何补贴，嗯，它基本上是一家拥有算法的公司，
一直在上海证券交易所进行股票交易，直到政府
取缔了该算法，他们不得不想办法利用他们的
技术，显然他们在人工智能领域非常成功，所以我们
我们面临的是一场竞争，这场竞争不是军事性的，尽管我们选择将其视为军事性的竞争，
这主要是经济和技术性的竞争，取胜的关键在于国内经济的开放和
改革，而我们没有这样做，嗯，我认为这些很重要，
是的，嗯，是的，中国实际做的一些事情，因为人们通常
没有普遍认识到中国非常强大，或者严格反对结盟，这是他们坚持的，
我的意思是，如果他们这样做，我相信俄罗斯人会对中国俄罗斯人更加开放。联盟，但对中国来说，他们不想结盟，他们已经明确表示，这是一个长期存在的政策，正如你所说，他们也拒绝普世主义，这为对冲资金打开了大门。也就是说，如果你支持自由民主的普世主义，那么你就可以声称自己有权代表其他民族的自由，比如中国人。他们一直坚持文明的独特性，认为一个文明不应该告诉另一个文明如何发展，这至少在意识形态层面上是矛盾的，这与对冲资金的原则或基础相矛盾。此外，经济去中心化的程度也很有趣。我的最后一个问题是，如果美国想遏制中国，那么过去几周甚至几个月的一些政策似乎相互矛盾。所以我研究了台湾的情况，程度较轻，威胁要将所有半导体产业转移到美国。但我认为更重要的是疏远日本，因为日本一直非常……也许……屈从是一个很强烈的词，但它一直……至少对美国来说，日本是一个非常忠诚的盟友。但我们现在看到，在这场关税战中，日本一直在使用一些非常强硬的言辞，他们不认为应该用这个词，因为
他们不想被美国勒索，所以这在某种程度上是前所未有的，或者至少是新的。你认为，鉴于美国不确定的未来，或者至少它正在努力在国际经济中寻找新的地位，你认为日本现在有可能寻求……而不是改变立场吗？这行不通，但至少它应该使其经济伙伴多元化，并……对中国进一步开放，即使不是为了在与美国的谈判中获得筹码，至少你看到中日关系正在改变。是的，但这存在巨大的困难，双方都承受着巨大的情感痛苦，原因各不相同。嗯，中国人认为，在1931年至1945年间，死于日军之手的人数达到3500万。日本帝国在中国的14年暴行
无论数字是否如此之高，都是一个争议问题，但几乎每个
中国中东部和北部的家庭都在那场冲突中失去了亲人，呃，而且
西方人并不真正理解这一点，我们知道我们中的一些人无论如何都知道俄罗斯人牺牲惨重，或者
苏联人牺牲惨重，因为不仅仅是俄罗斯人参与了与
纳粹的较量，但呃，我们不太了解亚洲的陆战，呃，故事是关于
美国在太平洋战场战胜日本海军，嗯，所以日本，呃，作为一个越来越独立的大国，呃，它不会向美国屈服，
它在20世纪80年代的广场协议中有过这样做的经历，那场协议使
日本走上了经济停滞的道路，至今仍未完全恢复，嗯，呃，它不会重蹈覆辙，呃，它
承认日本和中国一样，认为这场较量不那么重要与其说是经济问题，不如说是权力攫取、心理恐吓或对美国的臣服。嗯，嗯，日本已经恢复了一些民族自豪感，而且它不会再这样做了。嗯，所以我们看到的是，日本在多个领域都采取了积极主动的行动，例如，在特朗普第一任期内，美国退出了跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（TPP），尽管民主党也提议退出。嗯，日本接管了这个项目，而这个项目的当前版本反映了日本在亚太地区的领导地位。嗯，嗯，日本在政治和军事上也变得更加活跃。嗯，就在前几天，两艘日本护卫舰出现在中国刚刚建成的柬埔寨港口。据说那里是一个中国基地，但它不是吗？它是一个可以容纳军舰的基地。但第一批前往那里的主要舰艇不是中国的，而是日本的。嗯，日本正在积极地为越南和菲律宾提供军事援助，旨在平衡中国的力量。嗯，它正在积极寻求更广泛的合作，不仅与韩国和印度尼西亚——该地区重要的工业强国——或欧洲——以及中国——保持密切联系，所以日本正在成为一个我称之为“全球节点”的……多节点国际架构，即它独立运作，能够……容纳与其他国家紧密或疏密的联系，并能够改变这些联系。这种联系存在于三维空间中，并非二维连接线末端的一根极点。嗯，所以我们……看到日本和许多其他国家一起崛起，嗯，我认为，除了你提到的意识形态方面之外，对中国霸权的制约之一……中国有着古老的……传统，即崇尚仁义道德的蒙扎，他曾说过，如果你想要拥有国际影响力，嗯，你必须成为一个人们想要效仿的良好社会，不要出去……试图推销自己，嗯，要有道德，别人就会想要像你一样。想向你学习，嗯，就是这样19世纪的美国人认为，不幸地，帝国主义的倒退治愈了我们，但中国人，面对着这样一个世界：中等强国，包括一些他们自己国家的强国，包括亚太地区的强国，正在日益平衡多种关系，使其关系多样化，不再仅仅依附于一个保护者，即亚太地区的美国。但我们看到，在西亚，随着土耳其作为一个非常独立且难以预测的角色的崛起，我们看到法国试图在欧洲及其他地区重新确立独立地位。我们看到沙特阿拉伯凭借其丰富的碳氢化合物资源和金融资源，正在崛起成为一个中等强国。我们，我们看到印度尼西亚是一个正在崛起的潜在大国。印度当然仍然保持着刻意的不结盟立场。我们看到拉丁美洲出现了一种名为“积极不结盟”的概念，这意味着我们不会只与美国站在一起，也不会屈从于美国。门罗主义限制了我们
与欧盟、中国、印度、日本等等建立关系的权利，所以我们看到的是一个
我称之为多极化、日益多节点化的世界，嗯 ...在中国，或者来自中国，嗯，嗯，这不会在技术上改变，正如我所说，我们正在输掉这场两极竞争。
与中国的竞争，嗯，澳大利亚战略政策研究所评估了……谁在创新方面做得最多，评估了64个技术领域，他们声称中国现在在57个领域领先于韩国，在2个领域领先于韩国，在5个领域领先于美国，所以技术竞争……嗯，你知道我们正在远离那个……出口管制于事无补，
迫害华裔科学家于事无补，嗯，
学生交流的障碍于事无补，嗯，所以最终我们只剩下……军事方面，这就是我们现在所拥有的一切……嗯，你知道人们在规避风险……嗯，他们不想卷入与中国的战争……嗯，他们当然也不想卷入……结束……中国内战，我们必须记住，台湾问题……是战败方的产物中国内战结束后，美国在美国的保护下撤退到台湾，并在那里与中国其他地区分离，在美国的保护下驻扎在那里。因此，美国反对承认一个中国，只有一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分。但另一方面，美国又阻止通过谈判解决中国内战。因为每次中国提出条件，我们都会提供军事援助，这给了不想谈判的台湾人借口。所以，这是一项非常混乱的政策，它既不利于美国利益，也不利于真正争取该地区各国以某种方式联合或共同反对中国。他们都希望美国能够帮助他们，支持他们与处于其中心的国家建立长期可行的关系。我认为，华盛顿经常会警告其他国家不要与中国进行贸易或脱钩，但这种做法经常被错误地理解。集团政治，但我认为，世界上大多数国家之所以对中国崛起表示欢迎，并非因为他们想屈从于一个中国集团，而不是美国集团，而是因为当拥有多个权力中心时，它所代表的意义是什么？这给世界各国带来了什么希望？如果与中国、美国以及其他国家进行贸易，它们就能实现经济多元化。嗯，你可以拥有更独立的经济政策，从而转化为更大的政治自主权。我认为这就是它如此吸引人的原因。我认为，阻止各国实现经济多元化的冲动，嗯，是的，这几乎被视为对政治自主权的攻击。嗯，嗯，这就是我所描述的世界秩序变化的净效应，它赋予了中小型国家更大的回旋自由。嗯，在一个日益多元化的多元体系中，嗯，赋予了中小型国家以前没有的自主权。你这让他们有自由去追求自己的发展，按照自己希望的方式发展，所以在这方面，美国的立场是失败的，因为中国人说，你们如何发展取决于你们自己，我们对此无话可说，如果你们想向我们学习，那就去学习吧，如果你们想向别人学习，那我们也不会介意，我们说你们必须遵循我们的方式，否则你们……嗯，嗯，另一个问题是，中国人并没有试图阻止美国在任何地方销售商品或服务，而我们试图阻止他们，所以，正如有人所说，我……我想是拉里·萨默斯说，他从一位非洲对话者那里听说，你知道，当中国人来的时候，他们会提供……道路、水坝和电气化，而当你们来的时候，你们坚持要……我们遵循你们的政治立场，而你们什么也不提供，所以，哪个……会赢你知道，如果美国想要成功……呃……继续保持大国地位，保持我们一直以来的压倒性优势……呃……我们不仅需要进行国内改革，还需要改变我们的外交政策，承认其他国家的利益，并努力为他们服务，或者说，顺应这些利益，而不是抵制它们。有人说，你知道，当变革之风吹起时，有些人筑墙挡风，有些人造风车，我们需要造风车，所以我认为欧盟正确地将中国面临的挑战描述为系统性挑战。这是一个系统性挑战，它是一个选择，是在一个拥有众多通往现代化的不同道路的开放世界，还是一个被保护主义主导的封闭世界之间做出选择。顺便说一句，我不认为关税会让美国重新工业化，但嗯，这只是我国将怪异现象在理论上正常化的众多方式之一。我看到大西洋两岸都有很多弄巧成拙的政策。这些天，嗯，有很多自我伤害，呃，无论如何，我希望华盛顿的人们仍然关注你，因为呃，我们也许可以减少一些自我伤害，无论如何，非常感谢你的时间，呃，是的，总是从倾听中学习，所以再次感谢你，谢谢你邀请我，我为我对你的非常简单的问题的复杂回答道歉，不，这就是让它变得有趣的原因，所以非常感谢，再见，再见
Chas Freeman: The Lies We Tell Ourselves About China
Glenn Diesen 2025年5月12日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tiMU8-0Id1I
Chas Freeman argues that the US tells itself lies about China, which results in self-harm as opportunities for cooperation are wasted and conflicts are unnecessarily pursued.
hi everyone and welcome i am joined today by one of my favorite guests Chaz Freeman who was previously the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs also known as the former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia but for today's topic uh it's also very interesting that he was the director of Chinese affairs at the US State Department and also with Kissinger when uh he opened up China so uh yeah welcome
back to the program thank you glad to be with you Glenn uh a minor correction i I
wrote the papers that Kissinger relied upon for his secret trip in 1971 I think June 9 July 9 to 11 uh 1971 to Beijing but I wasn't on the trip um I didn't have a stomach ache and retreat to a hill station in Pakistan and fly off to somewhere else okay well um nonetheless I think a lot of this uh experience is uh of great importance well I guess back in those days the opening up of China obviously had a well a clear purpose of breaking splitting up the Soviets and the Chinese but also uh you know working relationship between the United States and China uh the deals that were made such as one China policy all of this has laid the foundation for what the yeah peace and cooperation between the Americans and Chinese have been since and uh and uh yeah the topic I want to discuss with you today is the growing rivalry between the US and China so far it's primarily in the economic realm but of course it could escalate uh hopefully not into the military sphere uh but I thought it's good to start maybe with a bit of a open or wide question which is uh uh uh that you've complained that there are in the United States there's often a lack of knowledge about China which is why we often lean into stereotypes and what do you see as being the main misperceptions about China today what is it that the political establishment in the United States don't understand about China
Chas Freeman
where to begin um uh the number of delusions misperceptions is quite large um and unfortunately of course Americans these days are quite insular um I remember being told at the end of by Arno Debos who was a well-known journalist war correspondent in World War II that in 1947 there were I think 2,700 2,700 US foreign correspondents for a newspaper scene that was very fragmented almost every newspaper had its own foreign correspondent and Americans are really quite well informed about the world um today there are less than 100 foreign correspondents for the United States which is why when you uh hear the news you if it's about something abroad you're probably hearing a BBC stringer or someone um so u we're not very well informed generally uh our schools no longer teach geography u people joke that Americans learn geography by going to war with wherever it is and um the um uh but mainly uh we have gone through a series of phases we had a non-tiance limited cooperation for limited purposes uh driven entirely by geopolitical considerations uh the Chinese were already split from the Soviets uh and they were under pressure from Moscow there was a real danger of a preemptive Soviet invasion of uh China in the 1960s at the end of the 60s there was actual fighting and President Nixon had the wit to see that we could enlist China in support of the containment of the USSR which is what we did uh that was non tant um perhaps it was maybe China was a sort of protected state in the sense that uh it had been in World War II when we supported uh the Chinese government against Japan um mainly not because we had any expectation that China could defeat Japan but we had the hope that it would tie down a vast number of Japanese forces who might otherwise be deployed elsewhere so it was a strategic move the continued independence of China was strategically important to us and the same was true in the cold war but when the cold war ended um and the Soviet Union imploded u after the Berlin wall came down uh we no longer had a common enemy uh and uh simultaneously this is all I think the crucial year was 1989 the Berlin wall came down of course in November uh in June there was the uh student and worker revolt in Tenan Square in Beijing which was put down um with force that drained all the warmth from the USChina relationship and finally that year was also the year that Taiwan ceased to be a Leninist dictatorship and became a
democracy so we had suddenly three forces directing us toward antipathy to
China uh the geopolitical argument for cooperation had apparently disappeared um the um ideological uh equal equation of Taibbe with Beijing had disappeared because Taibbe was no longer Leninist while Beijing remained so and of course there was the lingering effects of anti-communism containment um the experiences of the Korean and Vietnam war all these things are still with us so um I have I I believe there are that we are u hamstring hamstrung in uh for foreign relations by the absence of uh a detailed uh vocabulary for describing relationships and um I've gone around some of them alliances are unconditional commitments to mutual assistance on conditional contingent relationships which envisage some kind of limited cooperation perhaps for a limited time um client states basically uh derive protection from uh affording the uh the their their other country the larger one privileges prerogatives uh and a lot of international relations are simply give and take on an equal basis very transactional but when you get to the dement the varieties of um competition or confrontation um I think there are there are four first is rivalry which you mentioned um I'd be very cautious about that word because I think it it basically means a healthy competition that is one in which you try to outdo the other by improving yourself That's like going to a track meet if you uh you run on the track it's and you beat the other side the other people it's because you train better you're physically stronger you're faster not because uh they are weaker or whatever or because you sabotage them because the uh uh after rivalry um we have um uh we have uh uh what I call adversarial antagonism that is where you you seek to win by tripping or hamstringing the other party on the track not by excelling yourself but by uh injuring the other side so that it can't match you and then finally if you um uh if you carry that far enough you become you you you enter the realm of enmity where your objective is the annihilation of the other side um we saw that in the cold war constrained by a fear of nuclear exchanges uh so what we are with where we are with China is we've gone through the whole circle uh from uh protected state status in World War II and again in the cold war on tant cooperation in Afghanistan against the Soviet uh uh occupation um transactional relationship rivalry very healthy competition and now we're at adversarial antagonism and our objective is to uh hold China down if possible push
it back uh and that is of course impossible because uh we have limited
capacity to do that and China is going ahead on its own so I'm sorry about the
long- winded uh response but uh this is a very strategically very complex
relationship we've just seen um the United States and China engage in serious economic warfare and then achieve apparently um some sort of relaxation of tensions limited a day if you will but it's not a truce we haven't given up the antagonism uh it's not a ceasefire we're not going to stop um taking steps against each other uh all it is is a reduction in the intensity of the confrontation while we see if we can reach some kind of longer term understanding uh that ends the trade war or at least confines it within limits a sort of arms control agreement if you will um but we're not uh you know the Trump administration portrays this as a major victory for its maximum pressure tactics It's not um the Chinese didn't want tariffs they retaliated um the United States has now backed down well I appreciate you differentiating between rivalry and antagonism because uh it does well I I'm I'm quite uh supportive and uh hopeful about American industrial policies to see strengthen its uh its technological sovereignty and competitiveness but there is something else though which is this uh if if that was enough I think the US could have uh take its time to do gradual buildup and yeah re-industrialize all all of the things which I think should be done but it
appears that a lot of these policies go into overdrive because the objective isn't simply to become more competitive but also as you said to break to break China as well so that's beyond the competition it seems to but uh they this need to break China is this does this go to the ideology or the view of the world then because if there was a willingness to essentially share the stage with China as an equal the US could have a more moderate industrial policy in terms of just rebuilding its own strength not necessarily again breaking the knees of the Chinese is this um does this go to ideology how do you explain the the the I guess the demand for primacy in this relationship well I think the uh the driver of all this is uh psychological distress at losing primacy um that is around 1870 the United States became the largest economy in the world and uh in the 20th century we became by stages the dominant
political and military force in the world as well as the dominant financial
power and uh and uh for a long time economic power uh now we see China uh if
you measure uh the GDP of the two countries uh by the proper standard for
comparison which is um uh purchasing power parody uh not nominal exchange
rates which fluctuate and which which represent extraneous factors then
China's economy is already one-third larger than ours um it produces over
one-third of the world's manufactured goods we produce about 15% now um and um
it is uh very embedded in the Bretonwoods post World War II uh institutions for example the World Trade Organization which we have walked away from so we have the ironic situation that the Chinese are defending the world order that we created while trying to tweak it a bit uh to their advantage of course um and we are acting destructively um and uh in this context um we don't pay any attention to the UN charter international law we've sabotaged the World Trade Organization we've walked
out of various specialized UN bodies when we don't like what the global majority decides and um we are becoming more isolated china is becoming more engaged so this is this is what is happening as to uh restoring competitiveness which I think is an an entirely appropriate goal i think we have to you know recognize some economic realities first of all what's happened in industry is exactly what happened in agriculture so in 1900 I don't know the situation in Norway but in 1900 in the United States roughly 80% of the population worked on the farm to produce food uh now it's
less than 1% and we produce more food than ever uh that is because capital has
substituted for labor that is people have become more productive because they've
mechanized agriculture um who also introduced science and red
better varieties of plants that are more resistant to disease and so forth give higher
yields um and the same is true with the animal population um so uh what is
happening in industry is exactly the same thing i said 1980% worked in
agriculture 15% or so were in industry 5% were in what was called
services a very vague category but if you look at the situation now you'll
find less than 1% in agriculture 8% in industry that is half of the percentage
of uh 125 years ago um and uh there too
um automation robotics um uh various uh techniques for managing uh production
beginning with the assembly line Henry Ford's invention and uh uh and
continuing uh through multiple stages have made the American worker vastly
more productive um so far fewer people are needed to produce much more goods we
actually produce more than ever but our employment industry is going down and
finally we've got now we have so that's 91 let's see uh 15 that is 8% 1% um that
is 91% are in something called services which is essentially become a meaningless category
um and needs to be re-examined by economists they invented that category
in the 1930s along with GDP badly needs a theoretical
re-examination um so uh we're seeing the same things happening in China
agricultural workforce is declining rapidly the industrial workforce is job
industrial jobs are going down uh we see unemployment now in China among youth
who were educated for an industrial economy that now no longer requires them
so uh what is the relevance of all this well we things are happening in the United States which produce uh a great
deal of angst um disqu um and rather
than looking at the causes of these which are uh intrinsic to progress we
blame foreigners so who is the perfect foreigner to blame china why because we
have a history of anti-Chinese sentiment we have a history of a containment of China in the cold war it's run by
something that calls itself the Communist Party we all you know we imagine that if you've seen one
communist you you've seen them all the people who make these statements about
China and communism and so forth have neither met a Chinese or never been to China uh nor have they ever met a
communist of any kind except the Vietnamese who are anti-Chinese and therefore good people despite their
misguided ideology so um there are many factors going into this but the bottom
line is uh we have a very distorted view of China inadequate press coverage uh
biased editorial policies in our media um the political establishment that has
made China the enemy of choice uh and so uh we are in a very strange
position you can't have a an effective policy negotiating position or
competition if you misunderstand who with whom you are competing and we
fairly fundamentally do on top of this uh you mentioned industrial policy the
Chinese have come up with a very effective uh pattern of industrial policy which
basically um relies on policy uh banks
banks that lend to support national objectives so um you know you get
strange things when you do this to some extent um for example Chinese company
acquired most of Pirelli the Italian tire maker under the belt and road
initiative because it was able to portray that as somehow related to the belt and road uh I find that rather
far-fetched but apparently one of the policy banks was prepared to bank support it with lending so you have uh
essentially Diaing's idea that um if you want to get across the river you have an
objective you just tell people uh you get across the river i don't care how
you do it um if you get there it'll be worth your while financially so he came
up with the idea of feeling your way across the river with your toes on the rocks um and that's what the Chinese do
they announce an objective let's say we need an electric economy uh we need uh renewable energy
uh and they say and if you invest in these things we'll back you financially
so the result is you know over 50% of the hydraulic hydro hydroelectric power
under construction is in China 70% of the solar power under construction is in
China similar pattern for wind power and of course China leads in electric
vehicles it also uh leads in high voltage transmission systems it leads in
uh the efficiency of electric power production and so forth i could take other examples because China is now
ahead in um the vast majority of uh
technologies something which we don't understand we imagine export controls
can preserve our precious bodily fluids from being drained by by the Chinese from us if you remember Dr strange Love
uh he's alive and well in Washington uh somewhere and um uh even if Kissinger is
dead well uh I was going to say the the the
tendency to blame um foreign powers for domestic ills is also something we're
seeing a lot in Europe these days as well but uh I thought what you blame the Swedes for all your problems
well well pointing more towards the Russians these days but yeah uh well
what was always for me unique about American nationalism though is that it was uh uh unlike the uh yeah nationalism
around the world cuz nationalism often the uglier form tends to be uh look towards when was your greatness and uh
why did it end and who's to blame so you go through history and see who robbed you of your greatness now I guess what's
always been exceptional about American nationalism is that it's been usually very positive that is with the assumption that his greatest days are
ahead of it it's uh comes off as more benign again optimistic uh but uh
perhaps this is because the United States always gone from strength to strength but now of course in relative
decline it appears that the Americans are kind of following the call it the European path where we where it looks
towards you know when was this golden age who took it away and then China is identified and one ends up with this
narratives that the yeah the Chinese took our jobs not that it was outsourced but took it uh but it does beg the
question though if it's a challenge for the United States a bit how to do
capitalism itself i again we're in a bit of a strange situation given that officially yeah the Chinese are led by
the communist party but uh but it's capitalist it form of capitalism appears
to resemble to a large extent what America had in the 19th century very industrial capitalism where it limits
the rent seekers yeah seek to yeah harmonize make sure that society doesn't become an
appendage of a free market uh do you see the United States needing to change how
it does capitalis ism itself and if so do you think China is a model or is it not appropriate for the US anymore i
don't think uh China presents a model for the United States uh in particular because of its strong
Lenist character um it's not compatible with the enlightenment European
enlightenment values that the United States uh long tried to exemplify and
which are being now asserted against a very authoritarian uh presidency um in the United States so
I don't I think there's certain things uh that work for the Chinese um after all this is a society of a billion and a
half people um nobody has ever really effectively governed anything that large
before the Chinese have multiple experiences of what they call one chaos
anarchy a cultural revolution being a recent case in point uh and uh they put
a huge emphasis on order uh so would we if we had the constraints that the
Chinese do for example uh the United States um has
uh about 1/4 as many people less than that actually uh than as the Chinese but
we have four times as much agricultural land um they have 7% of the world's
water supply we have something like 25 27% we have a terrific endowment our
neighbors as Bismar said uh are the meek and mild and polite Canadians to the
north and the happy golucky Mexicans to the south neither of whom pose a challenge well they didn't anyway we're
working on that but um um and to our east and west our neighbors are fish uh
you know China borders 14 countries with which it's had multiple conflicts over the years um for the for 600 of the past
thousand years China was ruled by foreigners so this is a very different history and if we had the same
u u arable land to population ratio that the Chinese do we would have four
billion people in the United States most of them in California probably so I don't worry about it too much i'm on the
East Coast um but um uh so um these are differences even if you
don't get to history and I think we misunderstand the history of East Asia
uh in terms in terms of European models europe is the bloodiest continent uh of
all followed closely by the subcontinent of India um these are both uh extensions
of the Eurasian landmass uh that have multiple languages cultures
and so forth bumping up against each other they both produce waring states um
China had that period uh in the pre-Christian era and it got over it uh
and the situation in East Asia never resembled that um of uh of in Europe um
uh countries um deferred to China because of its size its intellectual and
scientific prowess its prosperity its good govern but China didn't go out and
conquer that uh so um there are exceptions Vietnam being a key one uh
some Korean history also involves Chinese conquest or conquest from what
is now what is now China um but I think we fundamentally misunderstand uh this
history um and I'm not sure the Chinese understand their own history either uh
or if they do it's encapsulated in the phrase we will never be
hegemonic now I I think China is the only country that says that uh in the
19th century the United States said that we will never be imperialists but manifest destiny never
stopped we overthrew the monarchy in Hawaii and incorporated that into our
country then we went on to the Philippines and Guam and so forth then we south to Puerto Rico and Cuba and um
so the Chinese are saying we will never be imperialist uh but I think we have to be a bit
skeptical about whether they will not uh fall into the same trap that we did
yeah no this was a key thing for the United States especially 19th century they wouldn't become like the Europeans uh I think this is why in 18 1898 when
uh the US defeated the Spanish uh and uh acquired a lot of its colonial possessions as you said including
Philippines that this is something that created a uh yeah um distaste by large part of US
society mark Twain for example and others arguing that empire was not yeah that was wasting its soul by pursuing
the the European path but uh uh but it is interesting though because this it's a common argument that China would
behave fundamentally different from the United States but uh it's I guess two
different perspectives uh I know for example Jeffrey Saxon makes this point that is something internally different
there on the other hand then you have the Merchimer argument arguing it's all external so in other words if uh the
hedgeimon presents itself as an opportunity then essentially the ideologies and ideas supporting it would
follow so the the Chinese might also have their imperial moment if you will
uh but uh how do you see um China's uh go China's policies going
forward do you think it will fall uh will begin to pursue more I guess uh
yeah in imperial ambitions or and what what do you think the that we we we fail
to recognize as in terms of other motivations for the United so for for China because it is a common theme I
think not just for the US but also for the Europeans the the lack of ability these days to recognize the security
concerns and interests of opponents uh in the past this would be the point of departure in any discussion but when do
we ever discuss the security or interest of Iran or Russia or China we we stopped
discussing this uh concerns of our adversaries but uh how how do you see this then do you see China acting on its
security concerns or do you think more hegemonic impulses might play in sorry
that was a very long question no it's a very interesting multi-layered question
and let me make a few comments on of the United States before I talk about China
um Mark Twain and others who argued against American imperialism were correct it ultimately turned out to be
incompatible with American democracy uh we're seeing that now um
second point is we invented a new sort of empire uh which was uh uh an empire
not of occupation so much as a protection racket if you will we were
protecting everybody against somebody else um that seems to be the genius of American foreign policy that we have an
in irresistible impulse to protect everybody from everybody else uh this
gets us into trouble uh it also um we also have a tradition born of our
experience in war which is very unusual in our civil war in World War I World War II and again in the cold war we
imagined that the objective was unconditional surrender of the other side followed by its moral
reconstruction uh so that's what we did you know in our civil war we we occupied
the south and tried to rebuild it in a different way and we did that after World War I with Germany and um after
World War II uh uh we we again tried to
pursue unconditional surrender finally the Soviet Union imploded of its own
defects and then there was an argument well we need to help it uh uh you know
repent of its sins and become morally uh superior but we didn't weren't willing
to invest the money in that so um and Jeffrey Sachs and others um did some
things that uh weren't very helpful in that regard i say that despite my admiration for Jeffrey Sachs current
views um so on the case of China um I think what the Chinese want is not
the sort of empire we had uh they seem to regard alliances
uh which are in effect uh protection of other states not as uh aggregating power
to them adding to their power and influence but as liabilities that can
get them into trouble so they really don't have any allies uh they have a
protected state relationship with North Korea which is a buffer state between
American forces and Japanese forces uh from their perspective um and they have
a similar protected state relationship with Pakistan which is driven by the
desire to offset the otherwise inevitable Indian hegemony in South Asia
uh Tibet of course is part of South Asia uh so the Chinese have a legitimate concern about the balance of power in
South Asia and that's why they back Pakistan so um they know how to play
geopolitical games that's clear um but I think what they seek is not control
they're not they're not certainly not seeking leans for uh a population that
is uh contracting rather than growing um they don't want to bring in more
Koreans or Vietnamese or other foreigners um what they want they don't
seek control of natural resources militarily they've learned the lesson
that you can buy what you need uh if you pay enough um and um so I think what
they want is respect for their dignity as an independent major civilizational
state of course they're flattered if others wish to emulate them but they
don't insist on this unlike the United States the American position is if you want to deal with us you have to become
like us chinese position is you're foreigners we're happy you're foreigners stay that way please we don't care what
you do as long as we can make money and you don't injure our dignity so I think
we're talking about a very different approach to world order
uh and um and it may have imperial aspects but they're not the same as the
ones uh that the British or French empires or the Russian Empire for that
matter or um uh or the American quasi empire
um pursued so I don't know where China is going to end up um I think in the
competition realm the major uh no difference that I noticed and I think
the thing we really need to focus on is that according to the OECD in 2030 which is only 5 years from
now 37% of the world's STEM workforce will be Chinese 37%
uh 26% will be Indian 4.5% will be
Russian 4.2% 2% will be American now that is not a recipe for
success in rivalry as I define it as healthy competition uh which is why we have been
driven into adversarial antagonism uh in the way that we have
um but the bottom line is um if we want to compete if we want to excel if we
want to um remain u uh if not the primary power in the world one of the
one of several primary powers in the world we need to do what the Chinese did reform and opening uh we're we're doing
the opposite uh we're doubling down on our current economic structure we're not
pursuing antitrust policy um you know um
uh this is an outdated uh observation but uh as you may know I chair a comp
international company uh on the side uh when I'm not living in the Gizer warehouse in New Hampshire um and
um uh years ago I did some things in the furniture business uh at that time there
were 120 furniture companies in the United States most of them owned by the Manugian
family in Detroit Armenian Americans who are the descendants of the
man who invented the delta faucet uh the lever that
controls hot and cold coming out of your out of your faucet in your bathroom um
and made a fortune uh and um uh in China there were 50,000 furniture companies
and they were engaged in cut road comp cutthroat competition so you mentioned 19th century capitalism in market
economic terms that's the Chinese model it's not the great state-owned enterprises that are the driving force
in the economy it's the multitude of competing smaller entities that that
that is and so we see that uh uh the
greatest advance in artificial intelligence recently is from deepseek which is a private thing had
nothing to do with the government didn't even get any subsidies uh it was basically a company that that had an
algorithm that was doing uh trading shares on the Shanghai stock market stock market until the government
outlawed that al algorithm and they had to figure out what to do with their
their technology and they went into AI very successfully apparently so um we're
we're confronting u uh we're in a competition which isn't military although we choose to treat it as such
it's primarily economic and technological and the key to winning that is domestic economic opening and
reform and we're not doing it yeah well I think these are important
yeah uh yeah parts of what China actually does because there's often yeah
not widespread recognition that China is very strong or strictly against alliances this is something they insist
on i mean if they I'm sure the Russians will be much more open to a Chinese Russian alliance but uh for the Chinese
they they don't want any alliances they made this the abundantly clear it's been a very long-standing policy and as you
said with they also reject the universalism that is uh which opens up for hedge money that is if you are for
liberal democratic universalism then you can claim the right to represent the freedom of other peoples the Chinese
they keep insisting on civilizational distinctiveness that you one civilization should not tell another one
how to develop now that's at least at least on ideological
level that's contradict well that contradicts the principle or the foundation for hedge money also it's
interesting the the extent to which econom is decentralized uh my last question though is about if the United
States wants to contain China with it appears as some of the policies over the past well at least weeks if not months
has been maybe contradictory so I looked then well lesser extent Taiwan the the
threats to to yeah shift all of its uh well to have all the semiconductor
industries move to the US but but I thought more the alienation of Japan uh because Japan's always been very maybe
subservient is a strong word but it's been a very loyal ally at least to the United States but we see now with in
this tariff war that the Japanese have been using some very strong language that they don't think the word because
they don't want to be extorted by the United States so this is um well to some
extent unprecedented or new at least do you see uh the possibility of uh with
the uncertain future of the United States or at least it's trying to find a new place in the international economy
do you see a possibility of Japan now seeking to well not switch sides this
doesn't work but at least there diversify its economic partners and open
up a bit more to China if not to gain leverage from within negotiations with
the United States well at least you see China Japan changing uh its relationship
yes but there are tremendous difficulties um there's a great deal of emotional distress involved on both
sides for different reasons um uh the Chinese believe the count 35 million
dead at the hands of the Japanese between 1931 and 1945 a 14-year rampage
through China by Imperial Japan whether the number is that high or not is a matter of dispute but virtually every
family in central east and north China lost someone in that conflration uh and
this is not really understood in the west we know some of us know anyway that the Russians sacrificed terribly or the
Soviets rather because it wasn't just Russians um in in the contest with the
Nazis but um we don't really know about the land war in Asia uh the story is of
American victory in the Pac Pacific over the Japanese Navy um so Japan uh is back
uh as an independent power more and more um it will not bow to the United States
it had the experience of doing so in the Plaza Accords in the 1980s which set
Japan on a course of economic stagnation from which it has never really fully
recovered um and uh it's not going to repeat this experience uh and it
recognizes Japan does as the Chinese do that this contest is less about
economics than it is about power grab or psychological intimidation or
subordination uh to the United States um uh and Japan has recovered a bit of its
national pride and it's not going to do that uh so what we see is the Japanese
acting proactively in a number of spheres for example after the United States withdrew from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership under Mr trump in the first term although the Democrats
also proposed to withdraw um Japan took over the project and the
current uh variant of that uh reflects Japanese leadership in Pacific Asia um
uh Japan has also become more active politically and militarily uh just the
other day two Japanese frigots turned up in the Cambodian port that the Chinese
just completed which is supposedly a Chinese base but isn't it's a a base
that can accommodate military vessels but the first major vessels to go there were not Chinese they were Japanese uh
Japan has got an active military aid program for Vietnam and the Philippines aimed at balancing China uh and it is
actively pursuing uh greater engagement not just with South Korea and um
Indonesia uh important industrial powers in the region uh or with Europe uh but
but also with China so Japan is becoming a uh what I call a node in the glo
uh multinodal international architecture that is it acts independently it can
accommodate thick and thin connections to other countries it can change those
connections it is exists in three dimensions it is not a pole at the end
of a two-dimensional uh connecting line um and uh so uh we
see that uh Japan emerging along with many others um and one of the checks on
Chinese hegemony I believe aside from the ideological one that you mentioned um where the Chinese have an ancient
tradition uh of menious monza who said that if you want international influence
uh you must become a good society that people want to emulate don't go out and
try to sell yourself uh be virtuous and others will want to be like you and will
want to learn from you um that was the American view in the 19th century uh the
lurch into imperialism unfortunately uh cured us of that um but the Chinese um
confront a world in which middle ranking powers uh including some in their own
Pacific Asian region um are now incre increasingly balancing multiple
relationships diversifying their relationships not cleaving solely to uh
one uh protector namely in Pacific Asia the United States but we see this you know
in in West Asia with the emerging emergence of Turkey as a very independent rather unpredictable actor
uh we see the the French trying to reassert an independent role um within
Europe and beyond it we see uh Saudi Arabia emerging as a middle ranking
power in its own right given its hydrocarbons and financial cloud uh we
see Indonesia as a rising potential great power um India of course remains
studiously non-aligned uh we see in Latin America the rise of a concept
called active non-alignment which means we're not going to stick just with the United
States or subject ourselves to the Monroe Doctrine constraints we reserve
the right to build a relationship with the European Union with China with India with Japan um and so forth so we see a
world in which which I I I describe as multi increasingly multinodal um and um
I think polarity thinking on the basis of polarity just doesn't fit with this
emerging world i don't know how it's going to end up looking but it doesn't seem to be compatible with any sort of
polarity you know G2 G3 um uh certainly not
um a single dominant power and a final comment because this is directly
relevant um we can't stop China from becoming the center of its own region uh
we've defaulted already on the trade and economic element of this when we withdrew from TPP
uh we're not part of any of the rulemaking councils in the region which
are composed of countries in the region india by the way has foolishly excluded itself from that but um the Chinese are
very much part of that everybody's trade in the region is directed at China or from China um and uh that's not going to
change technologically as I indicated we're losing the uh by bipart bipolar race
with China um the Australian Strategic Policy Institute which evaluates uh
who's doing the most innovation evaluates 64 areas of technology they claim that China's now ahead in 57 South
Korea in two and the United States in five so the technological competition uh is
not you know we are drifting away from that export controls don't help
persecution of scientists of Asian Chinese origin does not help um the
barriers to student exchange do not help and um so finally we're left with the
military side that's all we have now uh and there uh you know people are hedging
uh they don't want to be involved olved in a war with China uh and they certainly don't want to get involved in
finishing uh the Chinese civil war we we we have to remember that the Taiwan
issue is the product of the defeated side of the Chinese civil war retreating to Taiwan under American protection and
remaining there under American protection separate from the rest of China so the United States is in the
opposition of acknowledging one China there's only one China taiwan's part of
China but on the other hand preventing u a negotiated solution of the Chinese
civil war because every time the Chinese make an offer we up the Andy with
military assistance that gives people in Taiwan who don't want to negotiate the
excuse not to uh so this is a very confused policy and it's not one that is advancing American interests
uh or really enlisting the countries of the region in some sort of joint or shared opposition to to China they're
all um interested in America helping them backing them as they work out a
long-term viable relationship with the country that is at the center of their
region you know I think the the the impulse often to in
Washington to warn other countries about not trading with China or decoupling that is often seen I guess incorrectly
in the through the lens of block politics but it's a the reason why I
think a majority of the world is quite welcoming of China's rise is not that they want to subordinate themselves to a
Chinese block versus American but it's what it represents when you have many centers of power what what promise this
gives to states around the world is is the ability to diversify if you trade with both China and US as well as others
uh you can have more independent economic policy which translates into more political autonomy i think this is
the why it's so attractive i think often the the yeah the impulse to prevent
countries from uh diversifying it's uh it's yeah it's seen as almost an assault
on political autonomy uh well the the the the the net effect of the changes that uh
I've described in the world order which give greater freedom of maneuver to middlesized and smaller countries uh
within within an increasingly diverse um polyodal if you will uh system uh gives
smaller and medium-sized countries agency that they didn't have uh it gives them uh the freedom to pursue their own
development in the way they wish uh and uh so in this connection the American
position is u is a losing one um because the Chinese
say how you develop is up to you we don't have anything to say about that if you want to learn from us go ahead you
want to learn from someone else so that doesn't bother us um and we say you have to conform to our way or the highway you
Um and the um the other issue is that u
the Chinese are not trying to block the US uh from make selling goods or
services anywhere um and we're trying to block them uh so uh as someone said u I
think it was Larry Summers said he heard from an African interlocutor you know that when uh the Chinese come they offer
roads and dams and electrification and when you come uh you you you insist that
we conform to your political stances and you offer us nothing um so which is
going to win you know if the United States is going to be successful in uh
remain uh the great power the overwhelmingly superior power that we have been uh we need not only to reform domestically we need to change our foreign policy to recognize the interests of other countries and try to serve them or or surf those interests rather than resist them someone said you know when um when the winds of change blow uh some people build walls to keep the wind out other people build windmills we need to be build windmills and u so I think the Chinese challenge is correctly described by the European Union as systemic it is a systemic challenge it's a choice between an open
world of many uh many uh different paths to modernity and a closed world which is dominated by protectionism and by the way I don't think that tariffs are going to re-industrialize the United States but um that's that is a uh one of the many ways in which the weird has been normalized theoretically in my country well I see a lot of self-defeating policies on both sides of the Atlantic these days so um a lot of self harm uh anyways I hope people in Washington still pays attention to you as uh we can maybe reduce some of this self harm anyways thank you so much again for your time uh yeah always learn from listening to you so thanks again well thank you for uh having me on and I apologize for the convoluted nature of my responses to your very simple questions no that was that's what makes it interesting so thank you so much bye byebye
