瓦尔代文件 2018年12月26日
https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/chinas-geoeconomics-and-the-new-cold-war/
格伦·迪森，政治与国际关系博士
挪威东南大学教授
联系方式：Glenn.Diesen@usn.no
地址：挪威博尔 3184，拉韦恩 215 号，D3-92 室
引言
中国地缘经济正在飞速发展，以适应快速的技术发展和不断变化的国际权力分配。世界正在进入一场新的工业革命，这场革命进一步将资本与劳动力的关系脱钩，这促使北京放弃对低工资竞争力的依赖，转而通过“数字丝绸之路”引领高科技战略产业的发展。新工业革命中的技术领导地位源于巨大的需求，而中国正通过垄断不断增长的国内市场和加强与世界的经济互联互通来满足这一需求。“一带一路”倡议重塑了全球价值链，新的交通和能源走廊直达中国，而这些走廊的资金来源于中国主导的国际金融工具。由于共同致力于重塑全球价值链和构建多极世界，俄罗斯和中国正成为天然的盟友。中国为发展国家技术平台提供了典范，使其成为现代地缘经济中不可或缺的资产。此外，中国的“一带一路”倡议与俄罗斯自身加强大欧亚大陆经济互联互通的雄心相契合。
过去，西方的制裁曾将俄罗斯边缘化于国际市场，如今却将俄罗斯推向以中国为中心的全球价值链。制裁削弱了俄罗斯实现经济互联互通和技术自主多元化的能力，导致俄罗斯过度依赖中国，这对俄罗斯和西方都不利。 “新冷战”正迫使俄罗斯与中国建立不对称伙伴关系，旨在构建多极世界秩序。与此同时，西方国家正日益将中国视为挑战西方中心主义价值链的对手，这种不对称性日益加剧。
新工业革命中的中国地缘经济战略
20世纪70年代，中国通过向西方开放市场并在国际事务中保持低调，开启了所谓的“和平崛起”之路。在地缘经济层面，中国采取了诸如抑制工资和货币贬值等新重商主义政策，以最大限度地增加出口并最大限度地减少进口。出口商享受免税和大量贸易信贷的补贴，而进入庞大中国市场的外部渠道则取决于本土生产以及技术和专有技术的转让。中国为长期保持领导地位付出的代价是国内市场暂时受到抑制和生活水平下降，与此同时，世界制造业产能转移到中国，巨额外汇储备也随之积累。此外，中国通过收购西方公司吸收外国技术，逐渐在全球价值链中从廉价制造的世界工厂跃升至日益高科技的生产领域。北京也经常被指控窃取知识产权和进行逆向工程。华盛顿对经济权力从西方转向东方的担忧日益加深，但由于依赖中国利用其贸易顺差购买不断增长的美国债务，从而补贴美国更高的生活水平，这种担忧并未转化为强有力的政策。随后，美国精英们将经济相互依存的优点颂扬为绝对收益，而非解决相对收益带来的对称性问题。
中国最初的发展战略不可避免地具有临时性，因为其不断增长的经济需要安全可靠的自然资源、交通走廊和金融工具。在先前的发展模式下，长期快速的经济增长也造成了环境恶化、不平等加剧以及潜在的政治不稳定。此外，由于从农业部门转移出来的剩余劳动力正在迅速枯竭，作为一项关键比较优势的低生产成本正在逐渐消失。放弃资本管制、与美元脱钩以及允许人民币升值的压力日益增大，这将推高生产成本，削弱竞争力。此外，持有越来越多的美国国债也构成风险：如果美国加息、贬值本币或违约，中国将永远无法获得百分之百的偿付。中国不再满足于成为用收益为美国债务融资的世界工厂，而是利用其庞大的外汇储备与以西方为中心的价值链竞争，以彰显自身实力。
中国新的发展战略适应了主导性的地缘经济
世界主要趋势是资本与劳动关系的断裂。第二次世界大战至20世纪70年代期间，由于对高技能劳动力的需求日益增长，西方企业和工人共享了技术进步带来的效率提升的经济回报。然而，自20世纪70年代以来，资本与劳动的关系逐渐脱钩。技术创新持续提高效率，但经济回报却日益集中在资本所有者手中，而劳动力的工资却停滞不前。
数字经济催生了规模更大、员工更少的企业，而认知过程的自动化进一步边缘化了劳动力的价值。知识产权和专有技术等资产如今构成了企业价值的绝大部分。因此，企业将重点转向高价值资产的所有权，因为产品设计比实际生产更重要。同样，各国也面临着越来越大的压力，需要发展技术自主权，将其作为日益重要的地缘经济工具。尽管如此，自由放任资本主义的意识形态倡导导致了历史记忆的消解，而微软、英特尔和苹果等公司被错误地描绘成仅仅因为自由市场资本主义而保持市场主导地位。这些公司受益于国家通过公共资金资助研发而提供的低成本技术创新。[1] 自动化和机器人时代的技术只会加剧权力从劳动力向资本的转移，因为越来越高效的机器超越了人类。因此，越来越需要一个强大的国家来避免过度依赖外国资本和技术。
中国可能是最后一个利用低工资作为竞争优势接管全球制造业，并利用这些收入获取战略资产、攀登全球价值链的大国。自动化和机器人技术正在重塑全球价值链，制造业正在回归拥有更先进基础设施的发达国家。机器人密度高的国家正在经历“回流”，因为这些国家的机器人在竞争中胜过孟加拉国和越南等低工资制造业国家。新工业革命意味着向全球化2.0转型，届时供应链将得到简化，各国可以获得更大的自主权。运输成本的降低、对自由市场资本主义意识形态的拥护以及比较优势，使得日益复杂的供应链得以发展，从而刺激了全球化。如今，随着制造技能转化为软件，人们越来越不愿意建立长供应链，因为长供应链中，各个国家制造不同的零部件，然后在其他几个国家组装，最终到达消费者手中。此外，第一波全球化浪潮中根深蒂固的极端经济自由主义和快速的技术创新正在让位于经济民族主义，而不受约束的市场力量和创造性破坏正在扰乱社会和政治稳定。
“一带一路”倡议开启了中国新的地缘经济模式。中国利用巨额外汇储备发展战略性产业、建设交通走廊以及国际投资银行、贸易机制、全球交易/支付系统等金融工具，并确立人民币作为贸易/储备货币的地位。对中国而言，发展战略性产业意味着通过获取自然资源和提升技术能力“走出去”。新的战略性产业发展则伴随着所谓的“数字丝绸之路”，这包括经济数字化以及人工智能、大数据、机器人技术、量子计算、纳米技术、云存储和其他相关技术的发展。
“中国制造2025”倡议认为，国家干预对于发展领先技术并支持国内企业实施这些创新至关重要。中国欧盟商会于2017年发布了一份报告，指责该倡议对高科技产业提供过度补贴，以至于欧洲企业无法保持竞争力。[2] 中国正通过以指数级的速度用机器人取代人类工人来维持其制造业的强大实力。工厂生产实现自动化，智能仓库由机器人运营，自动驾驶卡车和无人机用于运输货物，全自动港口也得到发展，以提高出口竞争力。与此同时，中国在增材制造（3D打印）领域的进步减少了对复杂供应链和物流的依赖——例如，配备更高效算法的机器已经可以打印生物材料、整栋建筑以及带有活动部件的复杂组件。
由于对廉价劳动力的需求减少，中国
允许工资上涨，从而使其国内市场成为未来几年全球增长的源泉。然而，国内市场受到外国渗透的保护，以确保技术领先地位。即将实现的无人驾驶汽车商业化将导致全球数千万与交通运输行业相关的工作岗位流失。中国以国家安全为由，限制外国对其街道的拍摄和测绘，这将确保国内市场由中国公司开发的自动驾驶汽车主导。滴滴出行，作为优步的中国版，即将推出一支自动驾驶机器人出租车车队。随着太阳能高速公路测试的成功，这些电动机器人出租车未来可能在行驶于太阳能高速公路时进行充电。
2019年，中国5G网络的商业化将显著提高互联网速度，并促进国内物联网技术（IoT）市场的增长。此外，中国的工业物联网（IIoT）凭借互联传感器和大数据分析，将极大地提高生产力和交付能力。数字化进步和大数据推动了人工智能的发展，进而推动了神经技术、生物技术和机器人技术等所有其他技术的发展。银行业也将迎来重大变革——分布式账本技术（区块链）正在创造“无银行”银行。中国在追赶阶段对知识产权的漠视有望得到扭转。北京可能会成为知识产权的主要倡导者，以确保竞争对手向其支付专利费。
虽然中国发展战略性高科技产业增强了其自主性，但“一带一路”倡议的成功很大程度上取决于与俄罗斯的合作。莫斯科可以成为支持北京“一带一路”倡议不可或缺的合作伙伴，也可能成为难以忍受的障碍。在“大欧洲”倡议的框架下，俄罗斯和东欧融入以西方为中心的价值链，将对围绕中国的世界经济重组构成重大障碍。相比之下，俄罗斯与中国合作致力于“大欧亚”倡议，有助于重塑全球价值链，使其朝着有利于北京的方向发展。与俄罗斯的伙伴关系提升了中国实现能源供应和运输走廊多元化的能力。利益协调可以产生巨大的共同利益，因为“莫斯科和北京将拥有中亚和蒙古，有效地将所有外部势力排除在欧亚大陆的中心之外”。[3]
随着俄罗斯考虑通过中巴经济走廊将西伯利亚大铁路与瓜达尔港连接起来，中巴经济走廊（CPEC）也可能变得更加可行。俄罗斯远东地区的港口建设和配套铁路基础设施将把中国东北内陆省份吉林和黑龙江与太平洋连接起来。通过发展中蒙俄经济走廊，中蒙之间的互联互通也因规模经济而得到加强。此外，作为世界最大能源生产国的俄罗斯与作为最大能源消费国的中国之间的合作将产生协同效应，有助于人民币国际化，发展新的投资银行、评级机构和贸易机制。此外，俄罗斯与亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB）、金砖国家新开发银行的合作，以及上海合作组织（SCO）巨大的地缘经济潜力，也增强了以中国为中心的新型金融工具。
无论与西方的关系如何，莫斯科都有强烈的动机与北京协调其欧亚地缘经济发展战略。俄罗斯的地缘经济“东移”战略增强了与中国、韩国、日本以及其他机器人密度和其他技术领域世界领先国家的经济联系。迄今为止，由于缺乏操作这些技术的技能，以及缺乏为行业和企业提供实施这些创新的教育和培训平台，俄罗斯在自动化和工业机器人技术方面的应用进展缓慢。然而，俄罗斯已具备强势进入该领域的条件。俄罗斯是世界上少数几个拥有几乎完全独立数字平台的国家之一，该平台由提供搜索引擎、电子邮件服务、社交媒体和其他关键数字基础设施的国内企业组成了一个生态系统。鉴于俄罗斯在军事领域一直保持着机器人技术的领先地位，并且能够将向能源匮乏的东亚国家出售自然资源的收入转化为新技术的获取和技术成熟度的提升，这一发展战略也可以延伸到新工业革命时期。此外，将俄罗斯发展成为东西南北交通走廊，可以增强俄罗斯在欧洲的经济影响力，而新的金融工具也有助于增强俄罗斯在欧洲的影响力。
这些措施可以增强莫斯科的财政自主权。
然而，卷入与中国的不对称伙伴关系仍然是莫斯科持续存在的合理担忧。与中国进行克制且负责任的经济一体化需要俄罗斯保持谈判实力。俄罗斯需要的不是与中国达成自由贸易协定，而是一项包含关税和特定行业补贴的贸易协定，以减轻创造性破坏并增强高科技战略产业的竞争力。俄罗斯不应从难以忍受的对西方的依赖转向过度依赖中国，而应发展自己的技术平台并与其他国家建立经济联系，以建立平衡。然而，与西方的冲突和反俄制裁迫使莫斯科迅速转向东方。
“新冷战”的非理性
西方与俄罗斯之间持续加剧的“新冷战”可能是本世纪最大的地缘经济失误，尤其是在中国崛起为一个霸道的地缘经济新贵的阴影下，双方竞争加剧。将西方与俄罗斯之间持续不断的冲突称为“新冷战”的倾向，重蹈了以往战争的覆辙。使用冷战术语会引发人们对熟悉且较为平淡的过去的怀旧之情，这有利于动员政治和物质支持来对抗俄罗斯。
然而，将冷战与冷战进行比较具有误导性，因为如今国际权力的两极格局已不复存在，资本主义和共产主义之间的意识形态分歧也已不复存在。冷战期间，西方在很大程度上垄断了经济治国方略，因为其主要对手是与国际市场基本脱节的共产主义国家。19世纪的俄英竞争是一个更合适的历史参照，当时俄罗斯作为一个不断扩张的欧亚大陆强国，挑战了英国的海上帝国。结果，俄罗斯或英国并没有以全球霸权的形式宣称胜利，而是随着美国、德国和日本等新对手的崛起，一个更加多极化的世界出现了。
西方与俄罗斯之间不断升级的冲突促使全球价值链围绕日益强大的中国进行重组。与俄罗斯的激烈对抗令人费解，因为西方的“理性”政策是协调与俄罗斯的利益，打造“大西方”，而不是将俄罗斯推入中国怀抱，使其成为主要的地缘经济挑战者。就连与俄罗斯毫无交情的兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基也承认，美国有必要将俄罗斯纳入“扩张的西方”，以在欧亚大陆施加影响力，制衡正在崛起的中国。[4] 然而，冷战时期欧洲遗留下来的零和博弈结构阻碍了这一“理性”政策的实施。完全的零和博弈关系更容易出现不稳定和“纯粹冲突”，赢家通吃。[5] 因此，大国之间利益协调对于将地缘经济竞争限制在不扭曲依赖平衡的程度至关重要。与北约霸权主义野心催生的零和博弈结构一样，欧盟同样霸权的地缘经济模式使其无法与俄罗斯协调基本利益。
反俄制裁导致俄罗斯“转向东方”在很大程度上转向中国，这削弱了俄罗斯和西方的力量。2014年首次反俄制裁后立即达成的4000亿美元“西伯利亚力量”能源协议，正是“新冷战”如何强化中国地缘经济的典型例证。据信，由于莫斯科在谈判中处于不利地位，俄罗斯最终达成了对中国更有利的条款和价格。该协议也对西方不利，因为它标志着中俄战略伙伴关系的启动，将俄罗斯的能源架构转向东方。
中国进入俄罗斯战略产业和市场的壁垒已逐渐消除，为中国企业在俄罗斯上游能源市场的收购以及在俄罗斯市场获得宝贵经验铺平了道路。由于华盛顿反对日本参与在萨哈林岛附近俄罗斯海岸的联合海上石油勘探，俄日能源合作受到影响。2013年在符拉迪沃斯托克建造液化天然气工厂以增加对日本供应的计划在2015年被推迟，俄罗斯转而优先考虑建设通往中国的天然气管道。随着俄罗斯相对的经济联系从日本转向中国，预计政治上的忠诚度也将随之而来。俄罗斯可能放弃其在太平洋地区的官方中立地位，转而公开与中国结盟，这可能会损害美国在该地区的利益。同样，美国对参与“北溪2号”项目的欧洲公司实施制裁
输油管道破坏了欧洲的能源安全，并促使俄罗斯增加对华供应。正如俄铝事件所揭示的那样，美国的制裁甚至遭到其合作伙伴的谴责，随后由于切断了西方市场与其重要供应链之间的联系，制裁得以撤销。
俄罗斯此前对先进军事装备和敏感技术出口的限制也已缩减。俄罗斯已开始向中国交付S-400导弹防御系统和苏-35战斗机，同时阿穆尔-1650潜艇技术和核动力卫星部件也已向中国开放。中国对俄罗斯的出口也取代了西方供应商。例如，当德国供应商停止交付用于俄罗斯军队现代化升级的发动机时，中国对先前从德国进口的发动机进行了重新设计和复制，从而取代了其成为供应商。虽然中国发动机质量较低，但对俄出口带来的规模经济效应将有助于中国军事工业的进一步发展。同样，在航天领域，俄罗斯国家航天集团（Roscosmos，俄罗斯国家航天活动公司）在技术研发和太空探索方面更倾向于与中国而非美国合作。
尽管俄罗斯过去曾试图限制中国经济在欧洲的扩张，但如今这越来越被视为多极体系的体现。中国收购并快速扩张希腊比雷埃夫斯港，展现了其在欧洲更大的地缘经济野心。中国正在用高速铁路连接比雷埃夫斯港和匈牙利，这将使北京能够在东欧和中欧地区展现影响力，而东欧和中欧一些国家对欧盟的干涉行为日益不满。这一举措不仅使比雷埃夫斯港能够分流鹿特丹等西欧港口的客流量，中国还取代了西方国家的资金，并造成了债务依赖。正如欧盟委员会调查和投诉的那样，匈牙利接受了中国的资金，而不是通过可能更有利于欧盟贷款条件的公开招标程序。尽管欧盟努力阻止该项目，但中国仍在继续其“16+1”合作模式，即与11个中东欧国家和5个巴尔干国家开展合作。欧盟正试图通过设立外国投资委员会（CFIEU）来对抗中国的战略收购，该委员会类似于美国的外国投资委员会（CFIUS）。然而，在欧盟寻求增强内部凝聚力并增强对贸易政策的控制权之际，不受欢迎的反俄制裁正在成员国之间制造不和，并助长反建制政治团体的崛起。
俄罗斯非但没有反对中国通往欧洲的南部海上航线，反而积极支持北方航道。由于缺乏西方合作伙伴，俄罗斯放弃了北极大国先前达成的限制中国等非北极国家进入北极的共识。在北极地区支持中国以增强中俄共同影响力，是恢复战略伙伴关系对称性的机会。俄罗斯的“大欧亚大陆”倡议和中国的“一带一路”倡议在北极地区发展更加均衡，因为俄罗斯垄断了北极地区，而中国则通过资金和贸易额贡献力量。协同效应和规模经济对于基础设施投资的合理性至关重要，因为北极运输走廊还可以支持能源开采、科学探索、旅游和军事部署。北极运输走廊可能有利于俄罗斯和中国的航运和工业发展，而这些项目的资金将增强非西方开发银行的实力，并有助于人民币国际化。
西方与俄罗斯之间的竞争也助长了北京试图通过国际金融工具获得更大控制权的野心。西方试图通过限制俄罗斯进入债务市场来削弱俄罗斯经济，最终导致俄罗斯市场被中国吞并。西方的制裁旨在关闭俄罗斯的关键资产，例如俄罗斯石油公司、俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司和亚马尔液化天然气项目，而该项目后来得到了中国的救助。虽然中国银行最初不得不遵守西方的制裁，但中俄之间也一直在发展类似的经济基础设施，以使其免受西方经济战的影响。两国货币在贸易中的使用日益增多。虽然由于学习曲线的原因，本币和人民币计价债务的贸易起步缓慢，但经验和制度使中俄能够将类似的做法推广到其他国家。
伊朗等一些合作伙伴显然渴望接受欧亚模式的新金融工具，但即使是国家
那些不愿放弃美元进行多元化投资的国家更愿意使用人民币进行交易。俄罗斯日益依赖中国作为其石油出口市场，导致俄罗斯在 2015 年取代沙特阿拉伯成为中国最大的石油供应国。沙特阿拉伯要想与俄罗斯对华石油供应竞争，最终需要接受人民币而非美元作为石油支付。通过赢得能源出口国的支持，中国正在实现其建立“石油人民币”与石油美元竞争的雄心。中国终于推出了与美国布伦特原油和西德克萨斯中质原油 (WTI) 竞争的原油基准，并从 2018 年 3 月开始交易以人民币计价的原油期货合约。中国于 2017 年为卢布和人民币交易建立了对付 (PVP) 系统，这也开创了先例，并将扩展到其他“一带一路”沿线国家。尽管人民币的相对使用率仍然较低，但中国正寻求通过引入人民币在贸易融资、投资领域以及作为储备货币，快速实现人民币国际化。
俄罗斯也倾向于其他由中国主导的金融工具，例如投资基金、评级机构以及交易和支付系统的开发。俄罗斯寻求通过共同投资基金协调各方利益，以减少对西方资金的依赖。例如，俄罗斯直接投资基金和中国投资有限责任公司合资成立了俄中投资基金（RCIF）。中国欧亚经济合作基金（CEF）和RCIF为共同项目提供投资，并协调俄罗斯的欧亚经济联盟与中国的“一带一路”倡议。出于政治动机，穆迪、标准普尔和惠誉等西方评级机构将俄罗斯的评级下调至“接近垃圾级”或“垃圾级”，以提高对俄罗斯的贷款成本。同样出于政治动机，大公国际等中国评级机构给予俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司最高评级，以提供更优惠的贷款并取代西方金融机构。[6]
俄罗斯的交易系统也在协调发展。中国开发的人民币跨境支付系统（CIPS）降低了俄罗斯被SWIFT封锁的威胁。美国在克里米亚地区暂停Visa和Mastercard的使用，并在俄罗斯其他地区封锁受制裁的个人，促使莫斯科减少对美国支付系统的依赖。俄罗斯的回应是推出自己的MIR卡，并通过与中国银联合作确保其在国际上得到认可。2017年，俄罗斯农业银行发行了首张银联-MIR借记卡，这使得MIR能够使用银联覆盖160多个国家的网络。
结论：俄罗斯与西方关系解冻将带来什么？
西方正逐渐认识到中俄伙伴关系已从“权宜之计”转变为战略伙伴关系。然而，试图复制基辛格三角外交以分裂中俄的野心，正受到“新冷战”的阻碍。西方与俄罗斯的冲突加剧了中俄关系的不对称，并增强了中国挑战以西方为中心的价值链的能力。伊朗问题上未能汲取的教训是，西方制裁只会让中国垄断市场，并发展最终与西方抗衡的地缘经济能力。对俄制裁的加剧迫使北京和莫斯科都踏上了一条艰难的学习之路，以减少对西方的依赖。制裁非但没有迫使俄罗斯接受让步并改变其政策，反而使俄罗斯准备接受痛苦的改革，以引领多极世界秩序。
本文表达的观点和意见均为作者本人观点，除非另有明确说明，否则不代表瓦尔代国际辩论俱乐部的观点。
瓦尔代国际辩论俱乐部
参考文献
[1] Perelman, M，2003，《窃取这一理念：知识产权与企业对创造力的没收》，Palgrave MacMillan出版社，纽约。
[2] 《中国制造2025：将产业政策置于市场力量之上》，2017年，欧洲商会，3月7日。
[3] Lukin, A，2015，《欧亚大国三角》，载A. Klieman（主编），《大国与地缘政治：再平衡世界中的国际事务》，Springer出版社，拉马特-阿维夫，第183-206页。 201.
[4] Brzezinski, Z，2013，《战略愿景：美国与全球权力危机》，纽约基础出版社，第123页。
[5] Schelling, TC，1980，《冲突战略》，哈佛大学出版社，伦敦，第3页。
[6] Lukin, A，2015，《俄罗斯东进——转向亚洲……还是转向中国？》，《俄罗斯分析文摘》，第169期，6月30日；Hille, K，2015，《莫斯科寻求为俄罗斯企业解锁中国融资》，《金融时报》，5月7日。
Nàxiē bù yuàn fàngqì měiyuán jìnxíng duōyuán huà tóuzī de guójiā gèng yuànyì shǐyòng rénmínbì jìnxíng jiāoyì. Èluósī rìyì yīlài zhōngguó zuòwéi qí shíyóu chūkǒu shìchǎng, dǎozhì èluósī zài 2015 nián qǔdài shātè ālābó chéngwéi zhōngguó zuìdà de shíyóu gōngyìng guó. Shātè ālābó yào xiǎng yǔ èluósī duì huá shíyóu gōngyìng jìngzhēng, zuìzhōng xūyào jiēshòu rénmínbì ér fēi měiyuán zuòwéi shíyóu zhīfù. Tōngguò yíngdé néngyuán chūkǒu guó de zhīchí, zhōngguó zhèngzài shíxiàn qí jiànlì “shíyóu rénmínbì” yǔ shíyóu měiyuán jìngzhēng de xióngxīn. Zhōngguó zhōngyú tuīchūle yǔ měiguó bù lún tè yuányóu hé xī dé kè sà sī zhōng zhì yuányóu (WTI) jìngzhēng de yuányóu jīzhǔn, bìng cóng 2018 nián 3 yuè kāishǐ jiāoyì yǐ rénmínbì jìjià de yuányóu qíhuò héyuē. Zhōngguó yú 2017 nián wèi lúbù hé rénmínbì jiāoyìjiànlìle duìfù (PVP) xìtǒng, zhè yě kāichuàngle xiānlì, bìng jiāng kuòzhǎn dào qítā “yīdài yīlù” yánxiàn guójiā. Jǐnguǎn rénmínbì de xiāngduì shǐyòng lǜ réngrán jiào dī, dàn zhōngguó zhèng xúnqiú tōngguò yǐnrù rénmínbì zài màoyì róngzī, tóuzī lǐngyù yǐjí zuòwéi chúbèi huòbì, kuàisù shíxiàn rénmínbì guójì huà.
Èluósī yě qīngxiàng yú qítā yóu zhōngguó zhǔdǎo de jīnróng gōngjù, lìrú tóuzī jījīn, píngjí jīgòu yǐjí jiāoyì hé zhīfù xìtǒng de kāifā. Èluósī xúnqiú tōngguò gòngtóng tóuzī jījīn xiétiáo gè fāng lìyì, yǐ jiǎnshǎo duì xīfāng zījīn de yīlài. Lìrú, èluósī zhíjiē tóuzī jījīn hé zhōngguó tóuzī yǒuxiàn zérèn gōngsī hézī chénglìle é zhōng tóuzī jījīn (RCIF). Zhōngguó ōu yà jīngjì hézuò jījīn (CEF) hé RCIF wèi gòngtóng xiàngmù tígōng tóuzī, bìng xiétiáo èluósī de ōu yà jīngjì liánméng yǔ zhōngguó de “yīdài yīlù” chàngyì. Chū yú zhèngzhì dòngjī, mù dí, biāozhǔn pǔ'ěr hé huì yù děng xīfāng píngjí jīgòu jiāng èluósī de píngjí xiàtiáo zhì “jiējìn lèsè jí” huò “lèsè jí”, yǐ tígāo duì èluósī de dàikuǎn chéngběn. Tóngyàng chū yú zhèngzhì dòngjī, dàgōng guójì děng zhōngguó píngjí jīgòu jǐyǔ èluósī tiānránqì gōngyè gǔfèn gōngsī zuìgāo píngjí, yǐ tígōng gèng yōuhuì de dàikuǎn bìng qǔdài xīfāng jīnróng jīgòu.[6]
Èluósī de jiāoyì xìtǒng yě zài xiétiáo fāzhǎn. Zhōngguó kāifā de rénmínbì kuà jìng zhīfù xìtǒng (CIPS) jiàngdīle èluósī bèi SWIFT fēngsuǒ de wēixié. Měiguó zài kè lǐ mǐ yà dìqū zàntíng Visa hé Mastercard de shǐyòng, bìng zài èluósī qítā dìqū fēngsuǒ shòu zhìcái de gèrén, cùshǐ mòsīkē jiǎnshǎo duì měiguó zhīfù xìtǒng de yīlài. Èluósī de huíyīng shì tuīchū zìjǐ de MIR kǎ, bìng tōngguò yǔ zhōngguó yínlián hézuò quèbǎo qí zài guójì shang dédào rènkě.2017 Nián, èluósī nóngyè yínháng fāxíngle shǒu zhāng yínlián-MIR jiè jì kǎ, zhè shǐdé MIR nénggòu shǐyòng yínlián fùgài 160 duō gè guójiā de wǎngluò.
Jiélùn: Èluósī yǔ xīfāng guānxì jiědòng jiāng dài lái shénme?
Xīfāng zhèng zhújiàn rènshí dào zhōng é huǒbàn guānxì yǐ cóng “quányí zhī jì” zhuǎnbiàn wéi zhànlüè huǒbàn guānxì. Rán'ér, shìtú fùzhì jī xīn gé sānjiǎo wàijiāo yǐ fēnliè zhōng é de yěxīn, zhèng shòudào “xīn lěngzhàn” de zǔ'ài. Xīfāng yǔ èluósī de chōngtú jiājùle zhōng é guānxì de bù duìchèn, bìng zēngqiángle zhōngguó tiǎozhàn yǐ xīfāng wéi zhōngxīn de jiàzhí liàn de nénglì. Yīlǎng wèntí shàng wèi néng jíqǔ de jiàoxùn shì, xīfāng zhìcái zhǐ huì ràng zhōngguó lǒngduàn shìchǎng, bìng fāzhǎn zuìzhōng yǔ xīfāng kànghéng dì dìyuán jīngjì nénglì. Duì é zhìcái de jiājù pòshǐ běijīng hé mòsīkē dōu tà shàngle yītiáo jiānnán de xuéxí zhī lù, yǐ jiǎnshǎo duì xīfāng de yīlài. Zhìcái fēidàn méiyǒu pòshǐ èluósī jiēshòu ràngbù bìng gǎibiàn qí zhèngcè, fǎn'ér shǐ èluósī zhǔnbèi jiēshòu tòngkǔ de gǎigé, yǐ yǐnlǐng duō jí shìjiè zhìxù.
Běnwén biǎodá de guāndiǎn hé yì jiàn jūn wèi zuòzhě běnrén guāndiǎn, chúfēi lìng yǒu míngquè shuōmíng, fǒuzé bù dàibiǎo wǎ'ěr dài guójì biànlùn jùlèbù de guāndiǎn.
Wǎ'ěr dài guójì biànlùn jùlèbù
cānkǎo wénxiàn
[1] Perelman, M,2003,“qièqǔ zhè yī lǐniàn: Zhīshì chǎnquán yǔ qǐyè duì chuàngzào lì de mòshōu”,Palgrave MacMillan chūbǎn shè, niǔyuē.
[2] “Zhōngguó zhìzào 2025: Jiāng chǎnyè zhèngcè zhì yú shìchǎng lìliàng zhī shàng”,2017 nián, ōuzhōu shānghuì,3 yuè 7 rì.
[3] Lukin, A,2015,“ōu yà dàguó sānjiǎo”, zài A. Klieman(zhǔbiān),“dàguó yǔ dìyuán zhèngzhì: Zài pínghéng shìjiè zhōng de guójì shìwù”,Springer chūbǎn shè, lā mǎ tè-ā wéi fū, dì 183-206 yè. 201.
[4] Brzezinski, Z,2013,“zhànlüè yuànjǐng: Měiguó yǔ quánqiú quánlì wéijī”, niǔyuē jīchǔ chūbǎn shè, dì 123 yè.
[5] Schelling, TC,1980,“chōngtú zhànlüè”, hāfó dàxué chūbǎn shè, lúndūn, dì 3 yè.
[6] Lukin, A,2015,“èluósī dōng jìn——zhuǎnxiàng yàzhōu……háishì zhuǎnxiàng zhōngguó?”,“Èluósī fēnxī wénzhāi”, dì 169 qī,6 yuè 30 rì;Hille, K,2015,“mòsīkē xúnqiú wèi èluósī qǐyè jiěsuǒ zhōngguó róngzī”,“jīnróng shíbào”,5 yuè 7 rì.China's Geoeconomics and the 'New Cold War'
Valdai Papers 26.12.2018
https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/chinas-geoeconomics-and-the-new-cold-war/
GLENN DIESEN, PhD in Politics and International RelationsProfessor at the University of South-Eastern Norway
CONTACTS: Glenn.Diesen@usn.no
Address: Room D3-92, 215 Raveien, Borre 3184, Norway
Address: Room D3-92, 215 Raveien, Borre 3184, Norway
Introduction
Chinese geoeconomics is making a great leap forward to adjust to rapid technological developments and a changing international distribution of power. The world is entering a new industrial revolution that further decouples the relationship between capital and labour, which incentivises Beijing to abandon its reliance on low-wage competitiveness and instead take the lead in developing high-tech strategic industries with its digital Silk Road. Technological leadership in the new industrial revolution is funded by the scale of demand, which China is filling by monopolizing on the growing Chinese domestic market and strengthening economic connectivity with the world. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) restructures global value chains as new transportation and energy corridors lead to China, which are financed by Chinese-led international financial instruments. Russia and China are becoming natural allies due to the shared objective of restructuring global value chains and developing a multipolar world. China offers a model for developing national technological platforms as an imperative asset in modern geoeconomics. Furthermore, China’s BRI is harmonized with Russia’s own ambitions for increased economic connectivity in Greater Eurasia.
Western sanctions that would in the past have marginalized Russia from international market are now merely pushing Russia towards China-centric global value chains. To the detriment of both Russia and the West, sanctions are making Russia excessively reliant on China by undermining Moscow’s ability to diversify its economic connectivity and technological autonomy. The ‘new Cold War’ is relegating Russia to an asymmetrical partnership with China aimed to construct a multipolar world order. Concurrently, the West is developing increasingly unfavourable asymmetry with China as an adversary challenging Western-centric value chains.
China’s Geoeconomic Strategy in the New Industrial Revolution
In the 1970s, China embarked on the so-called peaceful rise by opening its markets to the West and keeping a low pro. le in international affairs. Translated into geoeconomics, China employed neo-mercantilist policies such as wage suppression and currency devaluation to maximize exports and minimize imports. Exporters are subsidised with tax exemption and extensive trade credits, while external access to the huge Chinese market is conditioned on local production and transfer of technology and know-how. A temporarily suppressed domestic market and a lower standard of living was the price paid for long-term leadership while the world’s manufacturing capabilities were transferred to China and huge amounts of foreign reserves were accrued. Furthermore, China gradually ascended in global value chains from the factory of the world for cheap manufacturing to increasingly high-tech production by absorbing foreign technology through acquisition of Western corporations. Beijing is also frequently accused of stealing intellectual property rights and reverse-engineering. Washington grew increasingly apprehensive about economic power shifting from the West to the East, yet this did not translate into forceful policies due to reliance on China using its trade surplus to purchase growing American debt and thereby subsidising a higher standard of living in the US. Subsequently, American elites extolled the virtues of economic interdependence as an absolute gain rather than addressing the symmetries caused by relative gain.
China’s initial development strategy was unavoidably temporary for its growing economy required safe and reliable access to natural resources, transportation corridors, and financial instruments. Prolonged and rapid economic growth under the former development model also created environmental degradation, rising inequality and pending political instability. Furthermore, low production costs as a key comparative advantage erodes since the surplus of labour migrating from the agriculture sector is rapidly being exhausted. The mounting pressure to relinquish capital control, decouple from the US dollar, and allow the yuan to surge will heighten production costs and reduce competitiveness. Furthermore, holding an ever.increasing amount of the US Treasury becomes a risk: China will never get repaid a hundred cents on the dollar if the US in. ates/devalues its currency or defaults. No longer content to be the factory of the world that uses its proceeds to .nance the US debt, China is asserting itself by using its vast foreign reserves to rival Western-centric value chains.
China’s new development strategy adapts to the dominant geoeconomic trend in the world, which is the disruption of the relationship between capital and labour. Between the Second World War and the 1970s, the economic reward of increased efficiency due to technological advancements was shared by companies and workers in the West due to the need for increasingly skilled labour. However, the relationship between capital and labour has gradually decoupled since the 1970s. Technological innovations continue to increase efficiency, yet the economic reward has increasingly concentrated among capital owners while the wages for labour stagnated.
The digital economy produced larger corporations with fewer employees, while the automation of the cognitive processes further marginalizes the value of labour. Assets such as intellectual property rights and know-how now make up a majority of corporations’ value. Corporations thus shift focus to ownership of high-value assets, as product design is more important than actual production. Similarly, states are under growing pressure to develop technological autonomy as an increasingly important geoeconomic tool. Nonetheless, the ideological advocacy of laissez-faire capitalism has contributed to a purge of historical memory while corporations such as Microsoft, Intel, and Apple are incorrectly portrayed as maintaining dominant positions in the market solely due to the free-market capitalism. These companies bene. tted greatly from low-cost access to technological innovations due to state support through public .nancing of research and development.[1] Technologies in the era of automation and robotics will only intensify the shift of power from labour to capital simply because increasingly ef. cient machines outperform humans. There is subsequently a growing need for a strong state to avoid excessive reliance on foreign capital and technologies.
China is likely the last major power to have used low wages as a competitive advantage to take over global manufacturing and bene. tted from the revenue to acquire strategic assets and climb global value chains. Automation and robotics are remaking global value chains, and manufacturing is returning to developed countries with more sophisticated infrastructure. Countries with high robot density are experiencing ‘reshoring’ as their robots outcompete low-wage manufacturing states such as Bangladesh and Vietnam. The new industrial revolution entails a transition to globalization 2.0, when supply chains are getting simplified and states can attain greater autonomy. The lowering of transportation costs, ideological embrace of free-market capitalism, and comparative advantages, which enabled increasingly complex supply chains to develop, spurred globalization. Today, as manufacturing skills are converted into software, there is less incentives for long supply chains where a variety of countries manufacture different components that are then assembled in several other countries before reaching the consumer. Furthermore, the extreme economic liberalism embedded in the first globalization wave and rapid technological innovations are giving way to economic nationalism while uninhibited market forces and creative destruction are disrupting society and political stability.
China’s new geoeconomic model was launched with the BRI with its vast foreign reserves used to develop strategic industries, transportation corridors, and .nancial instruments such as international investment banks, trade regimes, global transaction/payment systems, and establishing the yuan as a trade/reserve currency. For China, developing strategic industries meant ‘going global’ by acquiring natural resources and advancing technological competencies. The new strategic industries are developed with the so-called digital Silk Road, which entails digitalizing the economy and developing artificial intelligence, big data, robotics, quantum computing, nanotechnology, cloud storage, and other related technologies.
The Made in China 2025 Initiative recognizes that state intervention is imperative to develop leading technologies and support domestic corporations to implement these innovations. The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China released a report in 2017 accusing the Initiative of offering excessive subsidies for high-tech industries to the extent that European firms could not remain competitive.[2] China is maintaining its manufacturing power by replacing its human workers with robots at an exponential rate. Production at factories is automated, smart warehouses are run
by robots, self-driving trucks and drones are used to transport goods, and fully automated ports are developed for more competitive exports. Meanwhile, Chinese advancements in additive manufacturing (3D printing) reduce reliance on complex supply chains and logistics — for instance, machines with ever-more efficient algorithms can already print biological material, entire buildings, and complex components with moving parts.
With less need for cheap labour, China is permitting wages to rise and thereby making its domestic market a source for global growth in the years to come. Yet, the domestic market is shielded by foreign penetration to ensure technological leadership. The pending commercialization of driverless cars will shed tens of millions of jobs around the world that are tied to the transportation industry. China cites national security concerns to limit foreign filming and mapping of its streets, which will ensure that the domestic market is dominated by self-driving cars developed by Chinese companies. Didi, the Chinese copy of Uber, is set to launch an entire fleet of self-driving robot taxis. With successful testing of solar panelled high.ways, these electric robot taxis may in the future recharge as they drive on the solar panel highways.
The commercialization of its 5G network in 2019 will significantly heighten internet speed and allow for domestic growth in the market of technology of things (Internet of Things, IoT). Furthermore, China’s Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) with connected sensors and big-data analytics will greatly enhance productivity and delivery. Digital advancements and big data have enabled artificial intelligence to be developed, which contributes to advance all other technologies from neurotechnology, biotechnology, and robotics. Banking is also set for a major disruption – distribution ledger technology (blockchain) is creating banking without banks. China’s previous disregard for intellectual property rights during the catch-up phase can be expected to reverse. Beijing may instead become a leading proponent of intellectual property rights to ensure that rivals pay them royalties.
While China’s development of strategic high-tech industries enhances its autonomy, the success of the BRI largely depends on cooperation with Russia. Moscow can be an indispensable partner in support of Beijing’s BRI – or an insufferable obstacle. The integration of Russia and Eastern Europe into Western-centric value chains under the auspices of ‘Greater Europe’ would have created significant obstacles to restructure the world economy around China. In contrast, Russia’s commitment to Greater Eurasia in partnership with China contributes to restructure global value chains to Beijing’s favour. A partnership with Russia improves China’s ability to diversify energy supplies and transportation corridors. Harmonization of interests can produce substantial common benefits as ‘Moscow and Beijing would have Central Asia as well as Mongolia to themselves, effectively shutting out all external powers from the heart of Eurasia.’[3]
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) could also become more viable as Russia considers linking the Trans-Siberian Railway to the port of Gwadar through the CPEC. Development of ports in the Russian Far East and supporting rail infrastructure connects China’s landlocked Northeast provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang to the Pacific. The connectivity between China and Mongolia also strengthens from the economies of scale by developing the China–Mongolia–Russia economic corridor. Furthermore, cooperation between Russia as the world’s largest energy producer and China as the greatest energy consumer creates synergy effects by being instrumental to internationalize the yuan, developing new investment banks, rating agencies, and trade regimes. Furthermore, new China-centric financial instruments are also strengthened with Russian cooperation with the Asian Infrastructure Investment bank (AIIB), the BRICS’ New Development Bank, and with great geoeconomic potential for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Moscow has strong incentives to harmonize its Eurasian geoeconomic development strategy with Beijing irrespective of relations with the West. Russia’s geoeconomic Turn to the East enhances economic connectivity with China, South Korea, Japan, and other world leaders in robot density and other technologies. To date, Russia has been a slow adopter of automation and industrial robotics due to insufficient skills to operate the technology and a shortage of platforms to educate and train industry and businesses to implement these innovations. Yet, Russia is equipped to make a forceful entry. Russia is one of the few countries in the world with almost a completely independent digital platform consisting of an ecosystem of domestic corporations providing search engines, email services, social media, and other digital critical infrastructure. This development strategy can also be extended into the new industrial revolution, considering that Russia has kept up with robotics within the military sphere and can convert revenue from sales of natural resources to energy-hungry East Asian states into acquisition of new technologies and advancement of the technology readiness level. Moreover, developing Russia as an East–West and North–South transportation corridor heightens Russia’s economic clout in Europe, while new financial instruments can augment Moscow’s financial autonomy.
Yet, getting embroiled in an asymmetrical partnership with China remains a legitimate and lingering concern for Moscow. A restrained and responsible economic integration with China requires Russia to maintain negotiation power. Rather than a free-trade agreement with China, Russia requires a trade agreement that incorporates a combination of tariffs and subsidies for selected industries to mitigate creative destruction and to enhance competitiveness of high-tech strategic industries. Instead of shifting from intolerable dependence on the West towards excessive reliance on China, Russia should develop its own technological platforms and economic connectivity with other states to establish an equilibrium. Albeit, the con.ict with the West and anti-Russian sanctions compelled Moscow to rapidly shift to the East.
The Irrationality of the ‘New Cold War’
The ongoing and intensifying ‘new Cold War’ between the West and Russia could be the greatest geoeconomic blunder of the century against the backdrop of the rivalry taking place in the shadow of a rising China as a domineering geoeconomic newcomer. The inclination to refer to the ongoing conflict between the West and Russia as a ‘new Cold War’ repeats the common mistake of fighting the previous war. Using Cold War terminology invokes undertones and even nostalgia for a familiar and less complicated past, which is conducive to mobilize political and material support in the rivalry against Russia.
Yet, the Cold War comparison is deceptive as there is no longer a bipolar international distribution of power or the ideological divide between capitalism and communism. The West largely monopolized on economic statecraft during the Cold War as its main adversaries were communist states largely divorced from international markets. The Russian-British rivalry in the 19th century is a more suitable historical reference, when Russia as an expanding Eurasian land power challenged the maritime empire of Britain. Instead of resulting in Russia or Britain claiming victory in the form of global hegemony, a more multipolar world emerged with the rise of new rivals such as the US, Germany, and Japan.
The escalating conflict between the West and Russia contributes to the restructuring of global value chains around the increasingly powerful China. The fierce confrontation against Russia is a puzzle as the ‘rational’ policy for the West would be to harmonize interests with Russia to create a ‘Greater West’, rather than pushing Russia into the arms of China as the main geoeconomic challenger. Even Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was no friend of Russia, recognized the need for the US to include Russia in the ‘expanded West’ to exert influence into Eurasia and balance a rising China.[4] Yet, a ‘rational’ policy is obstructed by the zero-sum structures in Europe inherited from the Cold War. Completely zero-sum relationships are more vulnerable to instability and ‘pure conflict’ where the winner takes all.[5] Harmonization of interests among great powers is therefore imperative to limit geoeconomic competition to skewing the balance of dependence. Much like the zero-sum structures deriving from the hegemonic aspirations of NATO, the no less hegemonic geoeconomics of the EU makes it impossible to harmonize basic interests with Russia.
Anti-Russian sanctions have contributed to make the Russian Turn to the East largely a pivot to China, which weakens both Russia and the West. The $400 billion Power of Siberia energy agreement reached immediately after the initial anti-Russian sanctions in 2014 was symptomatic of how the ‘New Cold War’ strengthens Chinese geoeconomics. Russia is believed to have settled on terms and prices that were more favourable to China due to Moscow’s unfavourable negotiation position. The agreement was also detrimental to the West as it signified the launch of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership by redirecting Russian energy architecture towards the East.
Barriers to China accessing Russia’s strategic industries and markets have gradually been lifted, paving the way for Chinese acquisitions in the Russian upstream energy market and for Chinese companies to gain invaluable experience in Russian markets. Energy cooperation between Russia and Japan has suffered as Washington objected to Japan participating in joint offshore exploration of oil from the Russian coast near Sakhalin. The plans from 2013 to construct an LNG plant in Vladivostok to increase supplies to Japan were postponed in 2015, and Russia instead prioritized constructing gas pipelines to China. With Russia’s relative economic connectivity shifting from Japan to China, political loyalties are expected to follow. Russia potentially abandoning its official neutral status in the Pacific in favour to overt alignment with China could be detrimental to US interests in the region. Similarly, US sanctions against European companies contributing to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline undermines the energy security of Europe and creates greater incentive for Russia to increase its deliveries to China. As the RUSAL incident revealed, US sanctions were even rebuked by its partners and were subsequently walked back as it severed Western markets from its vital supply chains.
Russia’s previous restrictions on exports of advanced military equipment and sensitive technologies have also been scaled back. Russia has already commenced delivering the S-400 missile defence system and Su-35 fighter jets to China, while the submarine technology of the Amur.1650 and components for nuclear-powered satellites are also accessible. Chinese exports to Russia have also replaced Western suppliers. For example, Chinese reengineering and duplications of previously imported engines from Germany enabled China to replace it as a supplier when German suppliers halted delivery of engines used for the modernization of the Russian military. While the Chinese engines have lower quality, the increased economies of scale from exports to Russia will contribute to further development of China’s military industry. Similarly, within the space industry, Russia’s Roscosmos (Russian State Corporation for Space Activities) is gravitating towards cooperation with China rather than the US in terms of development of technology and space exploration.
While Russia would seek to limit growing Chinese economic expansion into Europe in the past, it is increasingly viewed as a symptom of a more multipolar system now. China’s acquisition and rapid expansion of the port of Piraeus in Greece demonstrated greater geoeconomic ambitions in Europe. China is connecting the Port of Piraeus to Hungary with a high-speed railway, which will allow Beijing to project influence in Eastern and Central Europe, where several states are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the intrusiveness of the EU. Not only does the initiative enable the port of Piraeus to cannibalize the traffic to Western European ports such as Rotterdam, China also replaces Western funding and creates debt dependence. As the European Commission investigated and complained, Hungary accepted funding from China rather than having a required public tender process that would likely have favoured the loan conditions from the EU. While the EU has made efforts to halt the project, China continues its 16+1 format for cooperation where China engages 11 Central and Eastern European states and 5 Balkan states. The EU is seeking to counter China’s strategic acquisitions by establishing a Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIEU), similar to the US counterpart, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). However, at a time when the EU seeks to augment its internal cohesion and obtain greater control over trade policies, the unpopular anti-Russian sanctions is sowing discord among members and contributing to the rising of anti-establishment political groups to power.
Instead of opposing China’s southern maritime route into Europe, Russia is accommodating the Northern Sea Route. Russia has abandoned the previous consensus among Arctic powers to limit the access of non-Arctic states such as China due to the lack of Western partners. Accommodating China in the Arctic to project collective Sino-Russian influence is an opportunity to restore symmetry within the strategic partnership. Russia’s Greater Eurasia and China’s BRI are more balanced in the Arctic as Russia monopolizes on the territory, while China contributes with funding and the trade volume. Synergy effects and economies of scale are important to justify infrastructure investments, as the Artic transportation corridor can also support energy extraction, scienti.c exploration, tourism, and military deployments. The Arctic transportation corridor will likely favour Russian and Chinese shipping and industry, while the funding of these initiatives will strengthen non-Western development banks and be instrumental to internationalize the yuan.
Beijing’s ambitions to obtain greater control with the international financial instruments are also aided by the rivalry between the West and Russia. The West’s effort to cripple Russian economy by restricting access to debt markets resulted in the Russian market being handed over to China. Western sanctions aimed to shut down key Russian assets, such as Rosneft, Gazprom, the Yamal LNG project, which was then rescued by China. While Chinese banks initially had to adhere to Western sanctions, a parallel economic infrastructure has been developing between China and Russia to immunize it from Western economic warfare. Local currencies are increasingly used in trade. While trade in local currencies and yuan-denominated debt had a slow start due to the learning curve, the experience and institutions enables China and Russia to expand similar practices to other states.
Some partners such as Iran are obviously eager to embrace new financial tools in a Eurasian format, yet even states reluctant to diversify away from the dollar have greater incentive to trade in yuan. Russia’s growing reliance on China as an export market for oil resulted in Russia replacing Saudi Arabia as the largest supplier of oil to China in 2015. For Saudi Arabia to compete with Russian oil deliveries to China, it will eventually need to accept yuan for oil payments rather dollar. By winning over energy exporters, China is realizing its ambition to establish a ‘petroyuan’ to rival the petrodollar. China has finally launched its crude oil benchmarks to rival the US Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI), with yuan-denominated crude oil futures contra cts traded from March 2018. China’s establishment of a payment-versus-payment (PVP) system in 2017 for rouble and yuan transactions h as similarly set a precedent to be expanded to other states affiliated with the BRI. While the relative use of yuan is still low, China is seeking to internationalize its currency rapidly by introducing it in trade finance, investments, and as a reserve currency.
Russia is also gravitating towards other Chinese-led financial instruments such as investment funds, rating agencies, transaction and payment systems are developed. Interests are sought to be harmonized with shared investment funds and in order to reduce reliance on access to Western funding. For example, Russian Direct Investment Fund and China Investment Corporation established the Russia–China Investment Fund (RCIF) as a joint venture. The China–Eurasian Economic Cooperation Fund (CEF) and the RCIF offer investments in shared projects and harmonize Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union with China’s BRI. Politically motivated, Western rating agencies such as Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch downgraded Russia’s ratings to ‘near junk’ or ‘junk’ to heighten lending costs to Russia. Equally politically motivated, Chinese rating agencies, such as Dagong Global, responded by giving Gazprom the highest rating to offer more favourable loans and replace Western financing institutions.[6]
Russian transaction systems are also being harmonized. China’s development of the China International Payment System (CIPS) has made Russia less vulnerable to threats of being blocked from SWIFT. The US suspending Visa and Mastercard in Crimea and blocking of sanctioned individuals in other parts of Russia motivated Moscow to reduce reliance on the US payment systems. Russia responded by launching its own MIR card and ensured its acceptance internationally by partnering with China’s UnionPay. In 2017, the first UnionPay–MIR debit card was issued by Rosselkhozbank, which enabled MIR to use UnionPay’s network, which spans more than 160 countries.
Conclusion: What Could Be Achieved by a Thaw in Russian-Western Relations?
The West is gradually recognizing that the Sino-Russian partnership has transitioned from a ‘marriage of convenience’ to a strategic partnership. Yet, the ambitions to repeat Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy to split Russia and China is obstructed by the ‘new Cold War’. The conflict between the West and Russia has exacerbated the asymmetry of China’s relations with Russia and augmented China’s ability to challenge Western-centric value chains. The lesson not learnt in the case of Iran was that Western sanctions merely allowed China to monopolize on the market and develop geoeconomic capabilities that would eventually rival the West. The intensification of anti-Russian sanctions has compelled both Beijing and Moscow to embark on a steep learning curve to reduce reliance on the West. Instead of compelling Russia to accept concessions and alter its policies, sanctions have made Russia prep ared to accept painful reforms to spearhead a multipolar world order.
The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Valdai International Discussion Club
Western sanctions that would in the past have marginalized Russia from international market are now merely pushing Russia towards China-centric global value chains. To the detriment of both Russia and the West, sanctions are making Russia excessively reliant on China by undermining Moscow’s ability to diversify its economic connectivity and technological autonomy. The ‘new Cold War’ is relegating Russia to an asymmetrical partnership with China aimed to construct a multipolar world order. Concurrently, the West is developing increasingly unfavourable asymmetry with China as an adversary challenging Western-centric value chains.
China’s Geoeconomic Strategy in the New Industrial Revolution
In the 1970s, China embarked on the so-called peaceful rise by opening its markets to the West and keeping a low pro. le in international affairs. Translated into geoeconomics, China employed neo-mercantilist policies such as wage suppression and currency devaluation to maximize exports and minimize imports. Exporters are subsidised with tax exemption and extensive trade credits, while external access to the huge Chinese market is conditioned on local production and transfer of technology and know-how. A temporarily suppressed domestic market and a lower standard of living was the price paid for long-term leadership while the world’s manufacturing capabilities were transferred to China and huge amounts of foreign reserves were accrued. Furthermore, China gradually ascended in global value chains from the factory of the world for cheap manufacturing to increasingly high-tech production by absorbing foreign technology through acquisition of Western corporations. Beijing is also frequently accused of stealing intellectual property rights and reverse-engineering. Washington grew increasingly apprehensive about economic power shifting from the West to the East, yet this did not translate into forceful policies due to reliance on China using its trade surplus to purchase growing American debt and thereby subsidising a higher standard of living in the US. Subsequently, American elites extolled the virtues of economic interdependence as an absolute gain rather than addressing the symmetries caused by relative gain.
China’s initial development strategy was unavoidably temporary for its growing economy required safe and reliable access to natural resources, transportation corridors, and financial instruments. Prolonged and rapid economic growth under the former development model also created environmental degradation, rising inequality and pending political instability. Furthermore, low production costs as a key comparative advantage erodes since the surplus of labour migrating from the agriculture sector is rapidly being exhausted. The mounting pressure to relinquish capital control, decouple from the US dollar, and allow the yuan to surge will heighten production costs and reduce competitiveness. Furthermore, holding an ever.increasing amount of the US Treasury becomes a risk: China will never get repaid a hundred cents on the dollar if the US in. ates/devalues its currency or defaults. No longer content to be the factory of the world that uses its proceeds to .nance the US debt, China is asserting itself by using its vast foreign reserves to rival Western-centric value chains.
China’s new development strategy adapts to the dominant geoeconomic trend in the world, which is the disruption of the relationship between capital and labour. Between the Second World War and the 1970s, the economic reward of increased efficiency due to technological advancements was shared by companies and workers in the West due to the need for increasingly skilled labour. However, the relationship between capital and labour has gradually decoupled since the 1970s. Technological innovations continue to increase efficiency, yet the economic reward has increasingly concentrated among capital owners while the wages for labour stagnated.
The digital economy produced larger corporations with fewer employees, while the automation of the cognitive processes further marginalizes the value of labour. Assets such as intellectual property rights and know-how now make up a majority of corporations’ value. Corporations thus shift focus to ownership of high-value assets, as product design is more important than actual production. Similarly, states are under growing pressure to develop technological autonomy as an increasingly important geoeconomic tool. Nonetheless, the ideological advocacy of laissez-faire capitalism has contributed to a purge of historical memory while corporations such as Microsoft, Intel, and Apple are incorrectly portrayed as maintaining dominant positions in the market solely due to the free-market capitalism. These companies bene. tted greatly from low-cost access to technological innovations due to state support through public .nancing of research and development.[1] Technologies in the era of automation and robotics will only intensify the shift of power from labour to capital simply because increasingly ef. cient machines outperform humans. There is subsequently a growing need for a strong state to avoid excessive reliance on foreign capital and technologies.
China is likely the last major power to have used low wages as a competitive advantage to take over global manufacturing and bene. tted from the revenue to acquire strategic assets and climb global value chains. Automation and robotics are remaking global value chains, and manufacturing is returning to developed countries with more sophisticated infrastructure. Countries with high robot density are experiencing ‘reshoring’ as their robots outcompete low-wage manufacturing states such as Bangladesh and Vietnam. The new industrial revolution entails a transition to globalization 2.0, when supply chains are getting simplified and states can attain greater autonomy. The lowering of transportation costs, ideological embrace of free-market capitalism, and comparative advantages, which enabled increasingly complex supply chains to develop, spurred globalization. Today, as manufacturing skills are converted into software, there is less incentives for long supply chains where a variety of countries manufacture different components that are then assembled in several other countries before reaching the consumer. Furthermore, the extreme economic liberalism embedded in the first globalization wave and rapid technological innovations are giving way to economic nationalism while uninhibited market forces and creative destruction are disrupting society and political stability.
China’s new geoeconomic model was launched with the BRI with its vast foreign reserves used to develop strategic industries, transportation corridors, and .nancial instruments such as international investment banks, trade regimes, global transaction/payment systems, and establishing the yuan as a trade/reserve currency. For China, developing strategic industries meant ‘going global’ by acquiring natural resources and advancing technological competencies. The new strategic industries are developed with the so-called digital Silk Road, which entails digitalizing the economy and developing artificial intelligence, big data, robotics, quantum computing, nanotechnology, cloud storage, and other related technologies.
The Made in China 2025 Initiative recognizes that state intervention is imperative to develop leading technologies and support domestic corporations to implement these innovations. The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China released a report in 2017 accusing the Initiative of offering excessive subsidies for high-tech industries to the extent that European firms could not remain competitive.[2] China is maintaining its manufacturing power by replacing its human workers with robots at an exponential rate. Production at factories is automated, smart warehouses are run
by robots, self-driving trucks and drones are used to transport goods, and fully automated ports are developed for more competitive exports. Meanwhile, Chinese advancements in additive manufacturing (3D printing) reduce reliance on complex supply chains and logistics — for instance, machines with ever-more efficient algorithms can already print biological material, entire buildings, and complex components with moving parts.
With less need for cheap labour, China is permitting wages to rise and thereby making its domestic market a source for global growth in the years to come. Yet, the domestic market is shielded by foreign penetration to ensure technological leadership. The pending commercialization of driverless cars will shed tens of millions of jobs around the world that are tied to the transportation industry. China cites national security concerns to limit foreign filming and mapping of its streets, which will ensure that the domestic market is dominated by self-driving cars developed by Chinese companies. Didi, the Chinese copy of Uber, is set to launch an entire fleet of self-driving robot taxis. With successful testing of solar panelled high.ways, these electric robot taxis may in the future recharge as they drive on the solar panel highways.
The commercialization of its 5G network in 2019 will significantly heighten internet speed and allow for domestic growth in the market of technology of things (Internet of Things, IoT). Furthermore, China’s Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) with connected sensors and big-data analytics will greatly enhance productivity and delivery. Digital advancements and big data have enabled artificial intelligence to be developed, which contributes to advance all other technologies from neurotechnology, biotechnology, and robotics. Banking is also set for a major disruption – distribution ledger technology (blockchain) is creating banking without banks. China’s previous disregard for intellectual property rights during the catch-up phase can be expected to reverse. Beijing may instead become a leading proponent of intellectual property rights to ensure that rivals pay them royalties.
While China’s development of strategic high-tech industries enhances its autonomy, the success of the BRI largely depends on cooperation with Russia. Moscow can be an indispensable partner in support of Beijing’s BRI – or an insufferable obstacle. The integration of Russia and Eastern Europe into Western-centric value chains under the auspices of ‘Greater Europe’ would have created significant obstacles to restructure the world economy around China. In contrast, Russia’s commitment to Greater Eurasia in partnership with China contributes to restructure global value chains to Beijing’s favour. A partnership with Russia improves China’s ability to diversify energy supplies and transportation corridors. Harmonization of interests can produce substantial common benefits as ‘Moscow and Beijing would have Central Asia as well as Mongolia to themselves, effectively shutting out all external powers from the heart of Eurasia.’[3]
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) could also become more viable as Russia considers linking the Trans-Siberian Railway to the port of Gwadar through the CPEC. Development of ports in the Russian Far East and supporting rail infrastructure connects China’s landlocked Northeast provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang to the Pacific. The connectivity between China and Mongolia also strengthens from the economies of scale by developing the China–Mongolia–Russia economic corridor. Furthermore, cooperation between Russia as the world’s largest energy producer and China as the greatest energy consumer creates synergy effects by being instrumental to internationalize the yuan, developing new investment banks, rating agencies, and trade regimes. Furthermore, new China-centric financial instruments are also strengthened with Russian cooperation with the Asian Infrastructure Investment bank (AIIB), the BRICS’ New Development Bank, and with great geoeconomic potential for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Moscow has strong incentives to harmonize its Eurasian geoeconomic development strategy with Beijing irrespective of relations with the West. Russia’s geoeconomic Turn to the East enhances economic connectivity with China, South Korea, Japan, and other world leaders in robot density and other technologies. To date, Russia has been a slow adopter of automation and industrial robotics due to insufficient skills to operate the technology and a shortage of platforms to educate and train industry and businesses to implement these innovations. Yet, Russia is equipped to make a forceful entry. Russia is one of the few countries in the world with almost a completely independent digital platform consisting of an ecosystem of domestic corporations providing search engines, email services, social media, and other digital critical infrastructure. This development strategy can also be extended into the new industrial revolution, considering that Russia has kept up with robotics within the military sphere and can convert revenue from sales of natural resources to energy-hungry East Asian states into acquisition of new technologies and advancement of the technology readiness level. Moreover, developing Russia as an East–West and North–South transportation corridor heightens Russia’s economic clout in Europe, while new financial instruments can augment Moscow’s financial autonomy.
Yet, getting embroiled in an asymmetrical partnership with China remains a legitimate and lingering concern for Moscow. A restrained and responsible economic integration with China requires Russia to maintain negotiation power. Rather than a free-trade agreement with China, Russia requires a trade agreement that incorporates a combination of tariffs and subsidies for selected industries to mitigate creative destruction and to enhance competitiveness of high-tech strategic industries. Instead of shifting from intolerable dependence on the West towards excessive reliance on China, Russia should develop its own technological platforms and economic connectivity with other states to establish an equilibrium. Albeit, the con.ict with the West and anti-Russian sanctions compelled Moscow to rapidly shift to the East.
The Irrationality of the ‘New Cold War’
The ongoing and intensifying ‘new Cold War’ between the West and Russia could be the greatest geoeconomic blunder of the century against the backdrop of the rivalry taking place in the shadow of a rising China as a domineering geoeconomic newcomer. The inclination to refer to the ongoing conflict between the West and Russia as a ‘new Cold War’ repeats the common mistake of fighting the previous war. Using Cold War terminology invokes undertones and even nostalgia for a familiar and less complicated past, which is conducive to mobilize political and material support in the rivalry against Russia.
Yet, the Cold War comparison is deceptive as there is no longer a bipolar international distribution of power or the ideological divide between capitalism and communism. The West largely monopolized on economic statecraft during the Cold War as its main adversaries were communist states largely divorced from international markets. The Russian-British rivalry in the 19th century is a more suitable historical reference, when Russia as an expanding Eurasian land power challenged the maritime empire of Britain. Instead of resulting in Russia or Britain claiming victory in the form of global hegemony, a more multipolar world emerged with the rise of new rivals such as the US, Germany, and Japan.
The escalating conflict between the West and Russia contributes to the restructuring of global value chains around the increasingly powerful China. The fierce confrontation against Russia is a puzzle as the ‘rational’ policy for the West would be to harmonize interests with Russia to create a ‘Greater West’, rather than pushing Russia into the arms of China as the main geoeconomic challenger. Even Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was no friend of Russia, recognized the need for the US to include Russia in the ‘expanded West’ to exert influence into Eurasia and balance a rising China.[4] Yet, a ‘rational’ policy is obstructed by the zero-sum structures in Europe inherited from the Cold War. Completely zero-sum relationships are more vulnerable to instability and ‘pure conflict’ where the winner takes all.[5] Harmonization of interests among great powers is therefore imperative to limit geoeconomic competition to skewing the balance of dependence. Much like the zero-sum structures deriving from the hegemonic aspirations of NATO, the no less hegemonic geoeconomics of the EU makes it impossible to harmonize basic interests with Russia.
Anti-Russian sanctions have contributed to make the Russian Turn to the East largely a pivot to China, which weakens both Russia and the West. The $400 billion Power of Siberia energy agreement reached immediately after the initial anti-Russian sanctions in 2014 was symptomatic of how the ‘New Cold War’ strengthens Chinese geoeconomics. Russia is believed to have settled on terms and prices that were more favourable to China due to Moscow’s unfavourable negotiation position. The agreement was also detrimental to the West as it signified the launch of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership by redirecting Russian energy architecture towards the East.
Barriers to China accessing Russia’s strategic industries and markets have gradually been lifted, paving the way for Chinese acquisitions in the Russian upstream energy market and for Chinese companies to gain invaluable experience in Russian markets. Energy cooperation between Russia and Japan has suffered as Washington objected to Japan participating in joint offshore exploration of oil from the Russian coast near Sakhalin. The plans from 2013 to construct an LNG plant in Vladivostok to increase supplies to Japan were postponed in 2015, and Russia instead prioritized constructing gas pipelines to China. With Russia’s relative economic connectivity shifting from Japan to China, political loyalties are expected to follow. Russia potentially abandoning its official neutral status in the Pacific in favour to overt alignment with China could be detrimental to US interests in the region. Similarly, US sanctions against European companies contributing to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline undermines the energy security of Europe and creates greater incentive for Russia to increase its deliveries to China. As the RUSAL incident revealed, US sanctions were even rebuked by its partners and were subsequently walked back as it severed Western markets from its vital supply chains.
Russia’s previous restrictions on exports of advanced military equipment and sensitive technologies have also been scaled back. Russia has already commenced delivering the S-400 missile defence system and Su-35 fighter jets to China, while the submarine technology of the Amur.1650 and components for nuclear-powered satellites are also accessible. Chinese exports to Russia have also replaced Western suppliers. For example, Chinese reengineering and duplications of previously imported engines from Germany enabled China to replace it as a supplier when German suppliers halted delivery of engines used for the modernization of the Russian military. While the Chinese engines have lower quality, the increased economies of scale from exports to Russia will contribute to further development of China’s military industry. Similarly, within the space industry, Russia’s Roscosmos (Russian State Corporation for Space Activities) is gravitating towards cooperation with China rather than the US in terms of development of technology and space exploration.
While Russia would seek to limit growing Chinese economic expansion into Europe in the past, it is increasingly viewed as a symptom of a more multipolar system now. China’s acquisition and rapid expansion of the port of Piraeus in Greece demonstrated greater geoeconomic ambitions in Europe. China is connecting the Port of Piraeus to Hungary with a high-speed railway, which will allow Beijing to project influence in Eastern and Central Europe, where several states are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the intrusiveness of the EU. Not only does the initiative enable the port of Piraeus to cannibalize the traffic to Western European ports such as Rotterdam, China also replaces Western funding and creates debt dependence. As the European Commission investigated and complained, Hungary accepted funding from China rather than having a required public tender process that would likely have favoured the loan conditions from the EU. While the EU has made efforts to halt the project, China continues its 16+1 format for cooperation where China engages 11 Central and Eastern European states and 5 Balkan states. The EU is seeking to counter China’s strategic acquisitions by establishing a Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIEU), similar to the US counterpart, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). However, at a time when the EU seeks to augment its internal cohesion and obtain greater control over trade policies, the unpopular anti-Russian sanctions is sowing discord among members and contributing to the rising of anti-establishment political groups to power.
Instead of opposing China’s southern maritime route into Europe, Russia is accommodating the Northern Sea Route. Russia has abandoned the previous consensus among Arctic powers to limit the access of non-Arctic states such as China due to the lack of Western partners. Accommodating China in the Arctic to project collective Sino-Russian influence is an opportunity to restore symmetry within the strategic partnership. Russia’s Greater Eurasia and China’s BRI are more balanced in the Arctic as Russia monopolizes on the territory, while China contributes with funding and the trade volume. Synergy effects and economies of scale are important to justify infrastructure investments, as the Artic transportation corridor can also support energy extraction, scienti.c exploration, tourism, and military deployments. The Arctic transportation corridor will likely favour Russian and Chinese shipping and industry, while the funding of these initiatives will strengthen non-Western development banks and be instrumental to internationalize the yuan.
Beijing’s ambitions to obtain greater control with the international financial instruments are also aided by the rivalry between the West and Russia. The West’s effort to cripple Russian economy by restricting access to debt markets resulted in the Russian market being handed over to China. Western sanctions aimed to shut down key Russian assets, such as Rosneft, Gazprom, the Yamal LNG project, which was then rescued by China. While Chinese banks initially had to adhere to Western sanctions, a parallel economic infrastructure has been developing between China and Russia to immunize it from Western economic warfare. Local currencies are increasingly used in trade. While trade in local currencies and yuan-denominated debt had a slow start due to the learning curve, the experience and institutions enables China and Russia to expand similar practices to other states.
Some partners such as Iran are obviously eager to embrace new financial tools in a Eurasian format, yet even states reluctant to diversify away from the dollar have greater incentive to trade in yuan. Russia’s growing reliance on China as an export market for oil resulted in Russia replacing Saudi Arabia as the largest supplier of oil to China in 2015. For Saudi Arabia to compete with Russian oil deliveries to China, it will eventually need to accept yuan for oil payments rather dollar. By winning over energy exporters, China is realizing its ambition to establish a ‘petroyuan’ to rival the petrodollar. China has finally launched its crude oil benchmarks to rival the US Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI), with yuan-denominated crude oil futures contra cts traded from March 2018. China’s establishment of a payment-versus-payment (PVP) system in 2017 for rouble and yuan transactions h as similarly set a precedent to be expanded to other states affiliated with the BRI. While the relative use of yuan is still low, China is seeking to internationalize its currency rapidly by introducing it in trade finance, investments, and as a reserve currency.
Russia is also gravitating towards other Chinese-led financial instruments such as investment funds, rating agencies, transaction and payment systems are developed. Interests are sought to be harmonized with shared investment funds and in order to reduce reliance on access to Western funding. For example, Russian Direct Investment Fund and China Investment Corporation established the Russia–China Investment Fund (RCIF) as a joint venture. The China–Eurasian Economic Cooperation Fund (CEF) and the RCIF offer investments in shared projects and harmonize Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union with China’s BRI. Politically motivated, Western rating agencies such as Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch downgraded Russia’s ratings to ‘near junk’ or ‘junk’ to heighten lending costs to Russia. Equally politically motivated, Chinese rating agencies, such as Dagong Global, responded by giving Gazprom the highest rating to offer more favourable loans and replace Western financing institutions.[6]
Russian transaction systems are also being harmonized. China’s development of the China International Payment System (CIPS) has made Russia less vulnerable to threats of being blocked from SWIFT. The US suspending Visa and Mastercard in Crimea and blocking of sanctioned individuals in other parts of Russia motivated Moscow to reduce reliance on the US payment systems. Russia responded by launching its own MIR card and ensured its acceptance internationally by partnering with China’s UnionPay. In 2017, the first UnionPay–MIR debit card was issued by Rosselkhozbank, which enabled MIR to use UnionPay’s network, which spans more than 160 countries.
Conclusion: What Could Be Achieved by a Thaw in Russian-Western Relations?
The West is gradually recognizing that the Sino-Russian partnership has transitioned from a ‘marriage of convenience’ to a strategic partnership. Yet, the ambitions to repeat Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy to split Russia and China is obstructed by the ‘new Cold War’. The conflict between the West and Russia has exacerbated the asymmetry of China’s relations with Russia and augmented China’s ability to challenge Western-centric value chains. The lesson not learnt in the case of Iran was that Western sanctions merely allowed China to monopolize on the market and develop geoeconomic capabilities that would eventually rival the West. The intensification of anti-Russian sanctions has compelled both Beijing and Moscow to embark on a steep learning curve to reduce reliance on the West. Instead of compelling Russia to accept concessions and alter its policies, sanctions have made Russia prep ared to accept painful reforms to spearhead a multipolar world order.
The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Valdai International Discussion Club
REFERENCES
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[2] ‘China Manufacturing 2025: Putting Industrial Policy Ahead of Market Forces’, 2017, European Chamber of Commerce, March 7.
[3] Lukin, A, 2015, ‘Eurasian Great Power Triangle’, in A, Klieman (ed.), ‘Great Powers and Geopolitics: International Affairs in a Rebalancing World’, Springer, Ramat-Aviv, pp. 183–206, p. 201.
[4] Brzezinski, Z, 2013, ‘Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power’, Basic books, New York, p. 123.
[5] Schelling, TC, 1980, ‘The Strategy of Conf lict’, Harvard University Press, London, p. 3.
[6] Lukin, A, 2015, ‘Russia’s Eastward Drive – Pivoting to Asia… Or to China?’, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 169, June 30; Hille, K, 2015, ‘Moscow seeks to unlock Chinese financing for Russian companies’, Financial Times, May 7.
[2] ‘China Manufacturing 2025: Putting Industrial Policy Ahead of Market Forces’, 2017, European Chamber of Commerce, March 7.
[3] Lukin, A, 2015, ‘Eurasian Great Power Triangle’, in A, Klieman (ed.), ‘Great Powers and Geopolitics: International Affairs in a Rebalancing World’, Springer, Ramat-Aviv, pp. 183–206, p. 201.
[4] Brzezinski, Z, 2013, ‘Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power’, Basic books, New York, p. 123.
[5] Schelling, TC, 1980, ‘The Strategy of Conf lict’, Harvard University Press, London, p. 3.
[6] Lukin, A, 2015, ‘Russia’s Eastward Drive – Pivoting to Asia… Or to China?’, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 169, June 30; Hille, K, 2015, ‘Moscow seeks to unlock Chinese financing for Russian companies’, Financial Times, May 7.
