加中关系简史
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/canadian-views-china/thumbnail-history-canada-china-relations
加拿大对中国的看法 2020 年 7 月 22 日
从矛盾心理到不信任
研究论文 2020 年 7 月 22 日 ISBN: 978 1 78413 405 1
自2018年底两国陷入外交争端以来，加拿大对中国的态度发生了巨大转变——从矛盾到不信任。本文认为，这些强硬的情绪不太可能消散，加中关系似乎已经进入了僵局。 新的、更谨慎的阶段。
概括
对中国的强硬看法可能会持续下去
对中国采取协调一致的态度？
加拿大总理皮埃尔·埃利奥特·特鲁多（Pierre Elliott Trudeau）是现任总理的父亲，他是 1970 年首批与中华人民共和国建立外交关系的西方领导人之一，比美国建立外交关系早九年。 此后，加拿大对华政策或多或少地追随了美国的政策。 与华盛顿一样，渥太华也奉行接触政策，这一政策的基础是对两国关系的商业潜力的希望，以及中国将逐步开放其内政并成为国际社会负责任的成员的期望。 即使在 1989 年因天安门广场示威活动而肆意杀害抗议者之后，这种做法仍然持续存在。事件发生后，加拿大谴责了中国领导层，并暂停了多个领域的合作，但时任外交国务卿乔·克拉克 (Joe Clark) 表示， ”，他说：“我们没有、也不会成为反华的对象……我们必须尽量避免采取可能将中国推向孤立的措施。”3加拿大迅速恢复了与中国的合作，再次与美国的立场保持一致 。
2006年，斯蒂芬·哈珀总理上台后短暂放弃了这一政策，指责之前的自由党和保守党政府未能捍卫中国的人权和民主。 在表明加拿大态度转变的其他姿态中，哈珀承诺他不会“以万能的美元”出卖加拿大的重要价值观；4在他渥太华的办公室会见了达赖喇嘛（他的办公桌上挂着一面西藏国旗）； 并尖锐地宣布他不会参加2008年北京夏季奥运会。 然而，到 2009 年，哈珀前往中国并促进双边合作和贸易，促使一位评论员写到他“对亚洲重要性的大马士革转变”。5 这种转变似乎在 2012 年完成，当时哈珀称赞两国“” 战略伙伴关系”，并与中国外长温家宝共同宣布，双边外国投资促进和保护协定的谈判已成功。6两国领导人还启动了一项联合研究，以审查“自由贸易协定的可行性和一些潜力”。 贸易协定”(FTA).7
2017 年底，加拿大和中国似乎准备宣布正式启动自由贸易协定谈判。 然而，两国最终未能就谈判的基本规则达成一致，进一步的讨论陷入僵局。
2015年接替哈珀担任总理的贾斯汀·特鲁多也有兴趣扩大加拿大与中国的贸易。 习近平主席和其他中国官员宣布双边关系进入“黄金时代”，以迎接特鲁多的当选，但加拿大领导人则更为谨慎。 在授权就可能的中加自由贸易协定进行探索性讨论之前，他敦促中国取消对某些加拿大农产品的进口限制，并释放自 1984 年以来一直居住在中国的加拿大人凯文·加勒特 (Kevin Garratt)，他于 2014 年被中国当局拘留，并被诬陷 军事间谍活动。 加勒特于 2016 年 9 月获释并返回加拿大后，探索性讨论继续进行，到 2017 年底，加拿大和中国似乎准备宣布正式开始自由贸易协定谈判。 然而，两国最终未能就谈判的基本规则达成一致，进一步的讨论陷入僵局。 与此同时，美国总统特朗普威胁扰乱与加拿大的贸易也成为加拿大政府关注的焦点。
这就是当年加中关系的现状
2018年底，美国司法部正式要求加拿大当局拘留在温哥华机场转机的孟晚舟，等待指控孟晚舟犯有银行欺诈和电汇欺诈联邦罪的引渡请求。 孟晚舟除了是中国最重要的电信公司华为的首席财务官之外，还是该公司创始人任正非的女儿，任正非曾是中国人民解放军成员，据报道与中国共产党有着密切的联系。 据《环球邮报》报道，特鲁多坚称加拿大逮捕孟晚舟的决定没有政治参与。 8 事实上，此类决定由加拿大司法部的职业执法官员做出，并最终由加拿大法官做出，他们会审查孟晚舟的决定。 引渡请求。 从技术上讲，司法部长有权暂停此类诉讼，但通常只在最后阶段发挥作用：决定是否向提出请求的国家移交嫌疑人。9 尽管如此，中国政府指责加拿大出于政治动机进行逮捕。
孟晚舟被捕几天后，中国当局拘留了加拿大企业高管迈克尔·斯帕弗(Michael Spavor)和担任国际危机组织智囊团政策顾问的前加拿大外交官迈克尔·科夫里格(Michael Kovrig)，逮捕了两人，理由是“涉嫌从事危害国家安全的活动”。 10 据报道，他们被关押在条件恶劣的中国拘留设施中，11 而孟晚舟已获得正当程序，并在引渡听证会期间住在她在温哥华的两处豪宅中的一处，她的代表是一名律师。 律师团队。 这并不是中国第一次拘留加拿大人，显然是为了向加拿大施压。 12
康明凯和斯帕沃尔于 2019 年 1 月被拘留两周后，加拿大人罗伯特·谢伦伯格 (Robert Schellenberg) 于 2018 年 11 月因贩毒罪被中国法院判处 15 年有期徒刑，在短时间内接受重审。 第二次听证会的法官们审议了不到一个小时，就裁定谢伦伯格先前的量刑过轻，判处他死刑——审理速度之快、非同寻常，连中国的法律专家都公开表示惊讶。 今年三月，中国还限制了某些加拿大农产品的进口——首先是油菜籽，随后是牛肉和猪肉。 事实证明，新的限制措施给农业部门带来了痛苦：2018 年，仅加拿大向中国出口的油菜籽就达 27 亿加元。13 总而言之，中国的行动似乎旨在迫使加拿大政府暂停对孟晚舟的引渡程序并释放她。
A thumbnail history of Canada–China relations
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/canadian-views-china/thumbnail-history-canada-china-relations
Canadian Views on China
a session on women’s workforce participation, future of work and aging societies at the
G20 Summit on 29 June 2019 in Osaka, Japan.
Photo credit: Copyright © Kazuhiro NOGI/Pool/Getty
Associate Fellow, US and the Americas Programme (based in Canada)
Canadian attitudes towards China have undergone a dramatic shift – from ambivalence to distrust – since the two countries became locked in a diplomatic dispute in late 2018. This paper argues that these hardened sentiments are unlikely to dissipate and Canada–China relations seem to have entered a new, warier phase.
A thumbnail history of Canada–China relations
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the father of the current prime minister, was one of the first Western leaders to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1970, nine years before the US did the same. Canada’s policy towards China has more or less tracked that of the US since then. Like Washington, Ottawa pursued a policy of engagement that rested on hopes for the commercial potential of the relationship, and on the expectation that China would gradually liberalize its domestic affairs and become a responsible member of the international community. This approach persisted even after the indiscriminate killing of protesters in response to the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989. In the aftermath of that event, Canada condemned the Chinese leadership and suspended cooperation in several areas, but as Joe Clark, then secretary of state for foreign affairs, put it: ‘We have not become, and will not become, anti-China […] We must try to avoid measures that would push China towards isolation.’3 Canada quickly resumed cooperation with China, again aligning with the US stance.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper briefly abandoned this policy when he gained power in 2006, accusing previous Liberal and Conservative governments of failing to defend human rights and democracy in China. Among other gestures indicating a shift in the Canadian approach, Harper pledged that he would not sell out important Canadian values ‘to the almighty dollar’;4 met the Dalai Lama in his Ottawa office (with a Tibetan flag displayed upon his desk); and announced pointedly that he would not attend the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. By 2009, however, Harper was travelling to China and promoting bilateral cooperation and trade, prompting one commentator to write of his ‘Damascene conversion to the importance of Asia’.5 The conversion seemed complete in 2012, when Harper praised the two countries’ ‘strategic partnership’ and announced, jointly with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao, the successful negotiation of a bilateral foreign investment promotion and protection agreement.6 The two leaders also launched a joint study to examine ‘the feasibility and some of the potentials of a free-trade agreement’ (FTA).7
By late 2017 Canada and China appeared poised to announce the formal start of negotiations towards an FTA. However, the two countries were ultimately unable to agree on the ground rules for the negotiations, leaving further discussions in limbo.
Justin Trudeau, who replaced Harper as prime minister in 2015, was also interested in expanding Canadian trade with China. President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials greeted Trudeau’s election by proclaiming a ‘golden era’ in bilateral relations, but the Canadian leader was more circumspect. Before authorizing exploratory discussions on a possible Canada–China FTA, he pressed China to remove import restrictions on certain Canadian agricultural products and to release Kevin Garratt, a Canadian resident in China since 1984 who had been detained by Chinese authorities in 2014 and falsely accused of military espionage. Following Garratt’s release and return to Canada in September 2016, exploratory discussions proceeded, and by late 2017 Canada and China appeared poised to announce the formal start of negotiations towards an FTA. However, the two countries were ultimately unable to agree on the ground rules for the negotiations, leaving further discussions in limbo. Meanwhile, US President Trump’s threats to disrupt trade with Canada had become the focus of the Canadian government’s attention.
Such was the status of Canada–China relations in late 2018, when the US Department of Justice formally requested that the Canadian authorities detain Meng Wanzhou as she was changing planes at Vancouver airport, pending an extradition request that accused Meng of the federal crimes of bank fraud and wire fraud. In addition to being the chief financial officer of Huawei, China’s foremost telecommunications company, Meng is the daughter of its founder Ren Zhengfei, a former member of the People’s Liberation Army who reportedly has strong connections to the Communist Party of China. As reported in The Globe and Mail, Trudeau insisted that there was no political involvement in the Canadian decision to arrest Meng.8 Indeed, such decisions fall to career law-enforcement officials in Canada’s Department of Justice, and ultimately to Canadian judges, who review extradition requests. The justice minister technically has the power to suspend such proceedings, but typically plays a role only at the final stage: deciding whether to surrender the suspect to the requesting state.9 Nevertheless, the Chinese government accused Canada of making a politically motivated arrest.
Days after Meng’s arrest, Chinese authorities detained Michael Spavor, a Canadian business executive, and Michael Kovrig, a former Canadian diplomat working as a policy adviser for the International Crisis Group think-tank, arresting both men on ‘suspicion of engaging in activities that endanger national security’.10 They have reportedly been held under harsh conditions in Chinese detention facilities,11 whereas Meng has been afforded due process and is living in one of her two Vancouver mansions for the duration of her extradition hearing, where she is represented by a team of lawyers. It was not the first occasion on which China had detained Canadians in an apparent bid to pressure Canada.12
Two weeks after the detention of Kovrig and Spavor, in January 2019, Canadian Robert Schellenberg, who in November 2018 had been sentenced by Chinese courts to a 15-year jail term for drug-trafficking, was retried at short notice. Judges at the second hearing deliberated for barely an hour before ruling that Schellenberg’s previous sentence was too light and sentencing him to death – proceedings so extraordinary and rapid that even Chinese legal experts openly expressed surprise. In March, China also restricted imports of certain Canadian agricultural goods – firstly canola, and subsequently beef and pork. The new restrictions proved painful to the agricultural sector: Canada’s exports to China of canola seeds, alone, amounted to C$2.7 billion in 2018.13 Taken together, China’s actions seemed intended to coerce the Canadian government into suspending the extradition proceedings against Meng and releasing her.
